Duckworth v. Warren

• Decision Date: 28 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2007-CA-01299-SCT.,2007-CA-01299-SCT.
• Citation: 10 So.3d 433
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: Jerry Wayne DUCKWORTH v. David Carrol WARREN, Bart Walker Individually and as Agent, Servant, Employee and State Trooper of the State of Alabama, The State of Alabama, Ray Stockman, Individually and as Agent, Servant and Employee of Emergystat, Inc.; Emergystat, Inc., a Corporation.

10 So.3d 433

Jerry Wayne DUCKWORTH v. David Carrol WARREN, Bart Walker Individually and as Agent, Servant, Employee and State Trooper of the State of Alabama, The State of Alabama, Ray Stockman, Individually and as Agent, Servant and Employee of Emergystat, Inc.; Emergystat, Inc., a Corporation.

No. 2007-CA-01299-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 28, 2009.

Charles Raymond Waits, III, B. Kelly Hardwick, Columbus, attorneys for appellant.

James T. Metz, Betty Ruth Fox, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.

Before CARLSON, P.J., LAMAR and CHANDLER, JJ.

CARLSON, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Aggrieved by the Monroe County Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment and entry of final judgment in favor of the State of Alabama and Alabama State Trooper Bart Walker, Jerry Wayne Duckworth appealed to this Court. Finding error in the trial court's grant of the Alabama defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, we reverse the trial court's final judgment and remand this case to the Circuit Court of Monroe County for a jury trial consistent with this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT

¶ 2. On February 12, 2002, Alabama State Trooper Bart Walker was preparing to check licenses in Lamar County, Alabama, when he noticed a Toyota Celica with a broken windshield and containing passengers who were not wearing safety belts. Trooper Walker began following the vehicle, which was later determined to be owned and driven by David Carrol Warren. Warren attempted to elude Trooper Walker, and Walker radioed his Hamilton, Alabama, Trooper Station dispatcher to advise of his pursuit. Trooper Walker continued his pursuit of the suspect from Aberdeen Road in Lamar County, Alabama, into Monroe County, Mississippi, on Vernon Road. Prior to entering the State of Mississippi, Trooper Walker radioed his Hamilton, Alabama, post, which in turn notified the Lamar County, Alabama, Sheriff's Department and the Monroe County, Mississippi, Sheriff's Department of Walker's pursuit of Warren.¹

¶ 3. After temporarily losing sight of the Toyota Celica while on Vernon Road, in Mississippi, and while still pursuing Warren, Trooper Walker came upon an accident scene. Walker quickly realized that the Toyota Celica he had been pursuing had collided with a vehicle driven by a person later identified as Jerry Wayne Duckworth, whose vehicle was knocked off the road by the impact. Duckworth was trapped inside his vehicle, and he had suffered injuries from the collision, including broken bones, dislocations, and lacerations. Upon being freed from his vehicle, Duckworth was loaded into an Emergystat, Inc., ambulance, which subsequently had an accident while transporting Duckworth.

¶ 4. The pursuit was captured on a video recorder located in Trooper Walker's police cruiser. This video revealed that the entire pursuit of Warren from Lamar County, Alabama, until his collision with Duckworth in Monroe County, Mississippi, lasted approximately six and one-half minutes, with good visibility. The average speed of the pursuit was sixty miles per hour, and it covered nearly six and one-half miles. The speed limit in the area was forty-five miles per hour. Trooper Walker came upon the collision site seconds after the accident had occurred, but he did not witness the collision, because it took place at a curvy, hilly section of Vernon Road, which is a two-lane county road in a rural area. Trooper Walker said he proceeded at all times using both sirens and blue lights; he did not encounter any pedestrian traffic; and he passed nine oncoming vehicles during the roughly six-mile stretch. During the pursuit, Trooper Walker obtained the vehicle's tag number, but he did not know the identity of the driver.

¶ 5. Jerry Wayne Duckworth filed this action against the State of Alabama, Trooper Bart Walker, David Carrol Warren, Emergystat, Inc., and Ray Stockman (the ambulance driver), alleging that their negligence and/or wantonness and/or recklessness caused his injuries and damages.² Duckworth made no effort to file suit under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (Mississippi Code Sections 11-46-1 to 11-46-19). In fact, in his complaint, Duckworth alleged that "[t]his is a tort action brought under the laws of the State of Mississippi and under the common law of the State of Mississippi."

¶ 6. On June 16, 2006, a hearing was held in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Judge Sharion R. Aycock presiding, on the motion for summary judgment filed by the State of Alabama and Alabama State Trooper Bart Walker ("Alabama defendants"); Judge Aycock denied the motion on October 30, 2006. The Alabama defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of their motion for summary judgment on June 15, 2007, based on the United States Supreme Court's April 30, 2007, decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). The trial court heard the renewed motion on July 2, 2007, and on July 5, 2007, entered its opinion and order granting the Alabama defendants' motion for summary judgment.

¶ 7. After the entry of its opinion and order granting summary judgment in favor of the Alabama defendants, but prior to the entry of a final judgment, Duckworth settled his claims against the remaining defendants, Ray Stockman and Emergystat, Inc.³ Thus, when the trial court subsequently entered a final judgment consistent with the previously entered opinion and order, the trial court stated, inter alia, in its final judgment:

[T]he Court was advised that [Duckworth] had reached a settlement of his claims against the remaining Defendants, Emergystat, Inc. and Ray Stockman.

....

[F]inal judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Bart Walker and the State of Alabama on all claims asserted against them in this suit.

....

[I]n light of the settlement between [Duckworth] and the remaining Defendants, the claims of [Duckworth] against Emergystat, Inc. and Ray Stockman are dismissed with prejudice.

¶ 8. Duckworth perfected this appeal, asserting three issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting the Alabama defendants' motion for reconsideration of their original summary judgment motion; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact supported by the record; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment when the trial court previously had denied the motion and no new evidence was presented in the record. All three assignments of error obviously pertain to the trial court's grant of summary judgment; therefore, we combine the above-stated issues and restate the issue for the sake of clarity in discussion.

DISCUSSION

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE ALABAMA DEFENDANTS.

¶ 9. In reviewing a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment, the well-established standard of review is de novo. One South, Inc. v. Hollowell, 963 So.2d 1156, 1160 (Miss.2007) (citing Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 956 (Miss. 2007)). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Johnson v. City of Cleveland, 846 So.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Miss.2003). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made." One South, 963 So.2d at 1160; Green v. Allendale Planting Co., 954 So.2d 1032, 1037 (Miss.2007) (quoting Price v. Purdue Pharma Co., 920 So.2d 479, 483 (Miss.2006)). "The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that [no] genuine issue of material fact[s] exists, and the non-moving party must be given the benefit of the doubt concerning the existence of a material fact." One South, 963 So.2d at 1160 (quoting Howard v. City of Biloxi, 943 So.2d 751, 754 (Miss.Ct.App.2006)). Further, "[s]ummary judgment is inappropriate where there are undisputed facts which are susceptible to more than one interpretation." Johnson, 846 So.2d at 1036 (quoting Canizaro v. Mobile Comms. Corp. of Am., 655 So.2d 25, 28 (Miss.1995)).

¶ 10. The trial court found that, considering the totality of the circumstances, no genuine issues of material fact existed that Trooper Walker had acted in reckless disregard for the rights of Duckworth or other motorists on Aberdeen and Vernon Roads. However, Duckworth argues that genuine issues of material fact existed on such matters as: (1) whether the pursuit was too lengthy based on the road conditions, the seriousness of the offenses for which Warren was being pursued, and alternative means of apprehension; and (2) whether the pursuit violated the State of Alabama's pursuit policy.

¶ 11. This Court has set forth ten factors which must be considered when determining whether a police pursuit was accomplished in "reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(1)(c) (Rev.2002); see Johnson, 846 So.2d at 1037 (McRae, P.J., concurring in result only). The trial court analyzed the facts according to these factors; however, a negligence theory is appropriate in the case sub judice, since Alabama State Trooper Bart Walker has no immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-46-1(f), 11-46-7 (Rev.2002). See also City of Cherokee, Alabama v. Parsons, 944 So.2d 886, 890 (Miss.2006). For purposes of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, an employee is defined as follows:

"Employee" means any officer, employee or servant of the State of Mississippi or a political subdivision of the state, including elected or appointed officials and persons acting on behalf of the state or a political subdivision in any official capacity, temporarily or permanently, in the service of the state or a political subdiv...