Dudley v. Bell

• Decision Date: 29 November 1973
• Docket Number: Docket No. 16831,No. 2,2
• Citation: 50 Mich.App. 678,213 N.W.2d 805
• Parties: Bethany DUDLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Thomas BELL, as Sheriff of Genesee County and Individually, et al., Defendants-Appellees
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 805

213 N.W.2d 805

50 Mich.App. 678

Bethany DUDLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Thomas BELL, as Sheriff of Genesee County and Individually,

et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 16831.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2.

Nov. 29, 1973.

Released for Publication Jan. 21, 1974.

William J. Hayes, Hayes & Kittendorf, Flint, for plaintiff-appellant.

Harvey D. Walker, Saginaw, for defendants-appellees.

Before McGREGOR, P.J., and BRONSON and CARLAND,* JJ.

CARLAND, Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action against the Sheriff of Genesee County and two of his deputies alleging a deprivation of civil rights actionable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and false imprisonment actionable under state law. The trial court granted the defendant deputies' motion for a partial accelerated judgment under GCR 1963, 116.1(2) holding that a state court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the action insofar as it is based on the Federal statute. The trial court also granted the defendant sheriff's motion for summary judgment under GCR 1963, 117.2(1) because of failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We reverse the partial accelerated judgment granted to the deputies and affirm the summary judgment granted to the sheriff.

The trial court held that exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is vested in the Federal courts. We find this conclusion to be erroneous. Unless it appears that Congress intended to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal courts, state and Federal curts usually have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce rights under Federal statutes. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 23 L.Ed. 833 (1876). Indeed it has been held that state courts must give effect to Federal statutes. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 S.Ct. 810, 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947). Our Supreme Court left the question of state court jurisdiction open in Hirych v. State Fair Comm., 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1965). However, courts that have considered the question have indicated that a state court may entertain such an action. Luker v. Nelson, 341 F.Supp. 111 (N.D.Ill., 1972); Judo, Inc. v. Peet, 68 Misc.2d 281, 326 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1971). We see no reason for any holding other than that a state court has jurisdiction.

While the circuit court has jurisdiction the plaintiff has not stated a claim against the sheriff upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff has not alleged that the sheriff acted in any way to deprive her of her civil rights. The plaintiff's theory is that the sheriff should be held liable for his deputies' acts simply because he is the sheriff. M.C.L.A. § 51.70; M.S.A. § 5.863 provides in part:

'* * * No sheriff shall be responsible for the acts, defaults and misconduct in office of any deputy sheriff.'

Because of the foregoing statute the sheriff cannot be liable under the plaintiff's theory of the case. The Federal act does not provide for vicarious liability simply because a person holds a certain position. If there is to be liability under this theory it must be imposed under state law. In Hesselgesser v. Reilly, 440 F.2d 901, 902--903 (CA9, 1971), the Court stated the law as follows:

'The Civil Rights Act does not itself specifically establish a basis for liability, vicarious or otherwise, against persons who do not participate in a civil rights violation. The applicable section, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, speaks only of '(e)very person who * * * subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen * * * to the deprivation of any rights * * *.' Thus if one who did not participate in such violation * * * of another on principles of vicarious liability, or by reason of statutory...