Keith v. Chrysler Corp., Docket No. 10879

• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan (US)
• Writing for the Court: R. B. BURNS and J. H. GILLIS; LEVIN
• Citation: 200 N.W.2d 764,41 Mich.App. 708
• Parties: John KEITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION and the Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendants-Appellees
• Docket Number: Docket No. 10879,No. 2,2
• Decision Date: 10 July 1972

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200 N.W.2d 764 41 Mich.App. 708 John KEITH, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRYSLER CORPORATION and the Michigan Employment Security
Commission, Defendants-Appellees. Docket No. 10879. Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 2. July 10, 1972.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 23, 1972.
Released for Publication Oct. 2, 1972.
Leave to Appeal Granted Nov. 14, 1972.

[41 Mich.App. 709]

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Stephen I. Schlossberg, John A. Fillion, Bernard F. Ashe, Stanley Lubin by Jordan Rossen, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Clifford L. Johnson, Detroit, for Chrysler Corp.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., James H. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., Detroit, for MESC.

Before LEVIN, P.J., and R. B. BURNS and J. H. GILLIS, JJ.

R. B. BURNS and J. H. GILLIS, Judges.

This case is controlled by Losada v. Chrysler Corp., 24 Mich.App. 656, 180 N.W.2d 844 (1970), leave den. 383 Mich. 827 (1970).

Affirmed. Costs to appellees.

LEVIN, Presiding Judge (dissenting).

The appellant, John [41 Mich.App. 710] Keith, was employed as a washer and degreaser machine operator at the Detroit Tank Plant of Chrysler Corporation. ¹ The plant is located in Warren, Michigan. Keith resided in that city.

Keith was laid off because of lack of work and was referred by Chrysler to its Hamtramck Assembly Plant for possible employment as an assembler at that plant. ² He refused to report for an interview.

The Employment Security Appeal Board concluded that Keith was not entitled to unemployment compensation because he had failed without good cause to report for an interview concerning available suitable work. The Circuit Court affirmed the appeal board's decision. Keith appeals.

Under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between Keith's union and Chrysler, if Keith had gone to work at the Assembly Plant he could not have obtained reemployment at the Tank Plant even if an opening occurred, unless Chrysler had first laid him off from his new employment at the Assembly Plant.

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Keith testified that he refused to report for possible employment at the Assembly Plant because he did not desire to work as an assembler and because he would not have been able to return to the Tabk Plant unless he had been laid off by the Assembly Plant. A few months after he was laid off, there was an opening in the Tank Plant and Keith was reemployed at his old job by Chrysler.

I see no need to decide whether the assembly job [41 Mich.App. 711] was 'suitable' within the meaning of § 29(1)(d) of the act, ³ as I am satisfied that Keith had 'good cause' for not accepting a transfer.

The purpose of the Employment Security Act is to protect persons who become 'unemployed through no fault of their own.' ⁴ Keith, who was laid off, clearly was a person within that intendment.

A person otherwise entitled to benefits is obliged, however, to mitigate his wage-loss damages, and may lose his right to unemployment benefits if he refuses to report for available suitable work.

This obligation to mitigate is subject to a proviso. Available suitable work may be refused for 'good cause.' Such a refusal is legally justified and does not disqualify one from benefits.

It has been argued that Keith had a choice. He could (i) accept the job at the Assembly Plant, thereby impairing his chances of returning to the Tank Plant, or (ii) refuse the job at the Assembly Plant, thereby preserving his job options but at [41 Mich.App. 712] the same time foregoing his right to unemployment compensation.

The argument begs the question. The question presented in this case is whether Keith is entitled to unemploymemt compensation benefits even though he refused the job at the Assembly Plant. The Legislature, in providing for disqualification of an unemployed person who fails without 'good cause' to report to his former employer for 'available suitable work,' clearly intended that an unemployed person could refuse available suitable work for 'good cause.'

The question presented narrows down to whether a cause not attributable to the employer--a cause personal to the employee--can constitute good cause; and, if so, whether the cause advanced by Keith was good cause.

I conclude that the term 'good cause' as used in the Employment Security Act means nothing more than good reason--a substantial reason--for refusing to accept the proffered employment, and that a cause personal to the employee can be good cause. I also conclude that on the facts of this case Keith had good cause to refuse the proffered employment.

In a recent case, In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 161 S.E.2d 1 (1968), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a mother, who had been laid off from her job on the first shift, had good cause for refusing

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like work on the second shift because her presence at home during the hours of the second shift was required to take care of her 9-year old child.

The Michigan act and the North Carolina act provide, in general, for disqualification from benefits of (1) Employed persons who leave work voluntarily without 'good cause Attributable to the [41 Mich.App. 713] employer,' and of (2) Unemployed persons who fail without 'good cause' to accept suitable work from the former employer or another source of employment.

In the Watson case, the North Carolina Supreme Court said that it was significant that the words 'attributable to the employer,' which qualify the words 'good cause' in the case of an employed person who leaves his work voluntarily, do not qualify the words 'good cause' in the case of an employed person who becomes unemployed involuntarily. The Court concluded that the omission of the qualifying words was...