Duffy v. Horton Memorial Hosp.

• Decision Date: 26 December 1985
• Parties: , 488 N.E.2d 820 Celia DUFFY, Individually and as Executrix of Joseph Duffy, Deceased, Appellant, v. HORTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al., Defendants. Horton Memorial Hospital and Benab Chau Ting, Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants. Jeanne Greenberg et al., as Executrices of Isidore Greenberg, Deceased, Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 890

497 N.Y.S.2d 890

66 N.Y.2d 473, 488 N.E.2d 820

Celia DUFFY, Individually and as Executrix of Joseph Duffy Deceased, Appellant, v. HORTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL et al., Defendants Horton Memorial Hospital and Benab Chau Ting, Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants Jeanne Greenberg et al., as Executrices of Isidore Greenberg, Deceased, Third-Party Defendants-Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 26, 1985.

Perry Gary Fish and Lester Raskin, New York City, for appellant.

Monte J. Rosenstein, for third-party plaintiffs-appellants.

Terry D. Horner and Myra I. Packman, Mount Kisco, for third-party defendants-respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Justice.

The question presented is whether a plaintiff's direct claim against a third-party defendant, which is asserted in an amended complaint, relates back to the date of service of the third-party complaint for purposes of the Statute of Limitations, pursuant to CPLR 203(e), where the third-party complaint and the amended complaint are based on the same transaction or occurrence. We hold that it does. 109 A.D.2d 927, 486 N.Y.S.2d 402.

Plaintiff and her husband commenced this medical malpractice action in August 1979, alleging that defendants had failed to recognize and diagnose an early stage of the husband's lung cancer. The husband's condition deteriorated and he died in May 1981. Special Term subsequently granted plaintiff's motion for substitution and for an amendment of the complaint to add a wrongful death claim.

In June 1981, defendants brought a timely third-party action against Dr. Isidore Greenberg, ¹ the family physician who had treated the husband before and after a 1978 hospital examination. A deposition of Dr. Greenberg was conducted in October 1982, after which plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to name him as a defendant. ² Plaintiff urged that the claim was not barred by the Statute of Limitations because of the provisions of CPLR 203(e): "A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed, at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading."

Special Term initially granted the motion, but reversed itself on reargument, properly deeming itself bound by the Third Department's decisions in Village of St. Johnsville v. Travelers Indem. Co. (93 A.D.2d 932, 462 N.Y.S.2d 317) and Knorr v. City of Albany, 58 A.D.2d 904, 396 N.Y.S.2d 507. (Mountain View Coach Lines v. Storms, 102 A.D.2d 663, 476 N.Y.S.2d 918.) The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed, adhering to its position that a plaintiff's direct claim against a third-party defendant cannot be asserted after the Statute of Limitations has run. The appeal to this court has been taken by permission of the Appellate Division, which has certified the question of whether its order was correctly made. ³

The Appellate Divisions have divided in their treatment of applications to amend complaints in these circumstances. The First and Fourth Departments have held, contrary to the Third Department, that because service of a third-party complaint gives the third-party defendant adequate notice of the transactions or occurrences underlying the litigation, for purposes of the Statute of Limitations, an amendment asserting a direct claim relates back to the service of the third-party complaint (Holst v. Edinger, 93 A.D.2d 313, 461 N.Y.S.2d 813 [1st Dept.]; Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 A.D.2d 55, 427 N.Y.S.2d 1009 [4th Dept.] ). The Second Department initially followed the same approach as the Third Department (Allstate Ins. Co. v. Emsco Homes, 93 A.D.2d 874, 461 N.Y.S.2d 429; Trybus v. Nipark Realty Corp., 26 A.D.2d 563, 271 N.Y.S.2d 5; see also, Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61, 65, n, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407), but recently attempted to distinguish the earlier cases and embraced the position of the First and Fourth Departments (Cucuzza v. Vaccaro, 109 A.D.2d 101, 490 N.Y.S.2d 518, stay denied 66 N.Y.2d 760 [Oct. 22, 1985] ).

The language of the governing statute, CPLR 203(e), is not particularly helpful, since it does not state whether or not it is applicable to an amended complaint served upon someone not named in the original complaint. Analysis should, therefore, turn on the policy considerations underlying Statutes of Limitations (see, Friedenthal, Kane, Miller, Civil Procedure § 5.27; Green, Basic Civil Procedure, at 134-135 [2d ed.]; James & Hazard, Civil Procedure § 4.16 [3d ed.] ).

We have emphasized that the primary purpose of a limitations period is fairness to a defendant (Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 248 N.E.2d 871). A defendant should " 'be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean of ancient obligations, and he ought not to be called on to resist a claim where the "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared" ' " (id., quoting Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177, 1185). There is also the need to protect the judicial system from the burden of adjudicating stale and groundless claims (see, Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61, 443 N.Y.S.2d 407, supra; Connell v. Hayden, 83 A.D.2d 30, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383; 2 Carmody-Wait 2d, N.Y.Prac. § 13:1; 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac. p 201.01; Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments, 57 Minn.L.Rev. 83, 84-85).

An amendment which merely adds a new theory of recovery or defense arising out of a transaction or occurrence already in litigation clearly does not conflict with these policies (see, Cerrato v. Crown Co., 58 A.D.2d 721, 396 N.Y.S.2d 716; Henegar v. Freudenheim, 40 A.D.2d 825, 337 N.Y.S.2d 280). A party is likely to have collected and preserved available evidence relating to the entire transaction or occurrence and the defendant's sense of security has already been disturbed by the pending action (see, e.g., Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847, 319 N.E.2d 174; Owens v. Palm Tree Nursing Home, 50 A.D.2d 865, 376 N.Y.S.2d 946; Watso v. City of New York, 39 A.D.2d 960, 333 N.Y.S.2d 492; James & Hazard, Civil Procedure op. cit., § 3.16).

The situation is far more difficult, however, when an amendment is sought to add a new party defendant. It is one thing to permit an amendment to relate back as applied to parties before the court. It is quite another thing to permit an amendment to relate back when a new party is sought to be added by the amendment against whom the Statute of Limitations has run. (Green, Basic Civil Procedure op. cit., at 135; cf. Boyd v. United States Mtge. & Trust Co., 187 N.Y. 262, 270, 79 N.E. 999.)

Thus, if the new defendant has been a complete stranger to the suit up to the point of the requested amendment, the bar of the Statute of Limitations must be applied (see, Arnold v. Mayal Realty Co., 299 N.Y. 57, 85 N.E.2d 616; Bringing in Party--Limitations, Ann., 8 A.L.R.2d 6, §§ 53, 58). But where, within the statutory period, a potential defendant is fully aware that a claim is being made against him with respect to the transaction or occurrence involved in the suit, and is, in fact, a participant in the litigation, permitting an amendment to relate back would not necessarily be at odds with the policies underlying the Statute of Limitations (Boyd v. United States Mtge. & Trust Co., 187 N.Y. 262, 270, 79 N.E. 999, supra; cf. Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 234, 236-237). In such cases, there is room for the exercise of a...