Dumas v. Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home, Inc.

• Citation: 380 N.W.2d 544
• Decision Date: 21 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. C6-85-1608,C6-85-1608
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: 106 Lab.Cas. P 55,701, 1 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 1083 John D. DUMAS, Appellant, v. KESSLER & MAGUIRE FUNERAL HOME, INC., Respondent.

Page 544

380 N.W.2d 544

106 Lab.Cas. P 55,701, 1 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. (BNA) 1083

John D. DUMAS, Appellant, v. KESSLER & MAGUIRE FUNERAL HOME, INC., Respondent.

No. C6-85-1608.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Jan. 21, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

The trial court properly granted summary judgment, determining that appellant remained an at-will employee who could be discharged without good cause, despite his supervisor's statement that they would "retire together."

Edward Q. Cassidy, St. Paul, for appellant.

Wayne A. Hergott, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by LANSING, P.J., and HUSPENI and LESLIE, JJ., with oral argument waived.

OPINION

LESLIE, Judge.

John Dumas appeals from a summary judgment determining that he was an at-will employee of Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home, Inc. We affirm.

FACTS

John Dumas began working for the Kessler & Maguire Funeral Home in June 1953. His employment agreement was oral, and did not provide for a definite term of employment.

Dumas was discharged on January 4, 1983, and in October 1983 he commenced the present action against the funeral home for wrongful termination of employment. He alleged that his employment contract had included implicit promises and covenants that he would only be terminated for good cause, and that he had been specifically informed by his supervisor upon several occasions that they would "retire together." Dumas claimed that good cause to discharge him did not exist, since he had often been complimented on and awarded for his excellent work, and that the funeral home breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing when it terminated him. In addition to this breach of contract claim, Dumas also alleged that the funeral home should be liable on a theory of promissory estoppel and for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The funeral home, on the other hand, claimed that Dumas was discharged because he was "not compatible," due to frequent displays of temper, use of profanity, and harassment of a co-worker. According to the funeral home, Dumas had been warned from time to time about his conduct, and at one time had been discharged for fighting, although he was subsequently rehired. Dumas denied that he had actually been discharged at that time.

The funeral home brought a motion for summary judgment which the trial court granted, determining that Dumas had been an "at-will" employee who could be discharged without good cause and whose contract of employment had not been otherwise modified by the actions or statements of his superiors. The trial court also indicated that Dumas was not pursuing his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dumas has appealed the portion of the judgment determining that he was an "at-will" employee.

ISSUE

Did the trial court properly determine as a matter of law that Dumas was an "at-will" employee, who could be discharged without good cause?

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate where it has been demonstrated that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03. The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is not to resolve facts, but to determine whether or not issues of fact exist. Albright v. Henry, 285 Minn. 452, 174 N.W.2d 106 (1970). Summary judgment may be granted if the facts, as a matter of law, compel only one conclusion. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn.1978). The function of the reviewing court is to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact for trial and whether the trial court erred in applying the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979).

Dumas claims that the trial court's application of the law was incorrect, and that several issues of material fact exist which should be resolved by a factfinder. He first argues that there are factual disputes regarding the length of his continuous employment by the funeral home and whether his work record was excellent or poor.

The funeral home acknowledges that these facts are in dispute, but nonetheless argues that they are not "material" since, even if Dumas' claims were accepted as true, the trial court could properly determine as a matter of law that Dumas was an at-will employee who could be discharged without good cause.

As early as 1936, the courts of this state recognized that "permanent" employment, without more, is generally thought to be at-will:

[I]n the absence of additional express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of a good consideration additional to the services contracted to be rendered, a contract for permanent employment, for life employment, for as long as the employee chooses, or for other terms purporting permanent employment, is no more than an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party.

Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co. 197 Minn. 291, 294-95, 266 N.W. 872, 874 (1936). An employee's long term of service and good performance will not convert an at-will contract of employment into one containing an implicit requirement of good cause to terminate. See Bakker v. Metropolitan Pediatric, P.A., 355 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). The reason for this rule is that the necessary bargained-for consideration is lacking:

[A]n employment condition guaranteeing tenure and job security against the whim or caprice of an employer allowing discharge only for "legal cause" * * * is a considerable sacrifice of employer discretion, and is usually arrived at only through negotiation and mutual bargaining.

Cedarstrand v. Lutheran Brotherhood, 263 Minn. 520, 533, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (1962). The Cedarstrand court noted:

The consideration for a promise, whether it be some benefit accruing to one party or some detriment suffered by the other * * * or something else * * * must be something which both parties to the contract have adopted and regarded as such.

Id. at 535, 117 N.W.2d at 222-23 (quoting from Suske v. Straka, 229 Minn. 408, 414, 39 N.W.2d 745, 750 (1949)). Here there is no indication that the funeral home expected Dumas' services to constitute consideration sufficient to turn the at-will contract into one requiring good cause for dismissal. As stated in Bakker:

If this contract has an implied term of good cause before termination, then all at-will contracts contain an implied limitation of good cause. This is not the law of Minnesota.

Bakker, 355 N.W.2d at 331. Therefore, even if Dumas' claim of continuous employment and good performance were determined valid, it would be insufficient to overturn the trial court's determination that Dumas was an at-will employee.

Dumas also claims that the funeral home's personnel practices were such that he could not be terminated without good cause. The supreme court addressed such argument in Cedarstrand and in Degen v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 110 N.W.2d 863 (1961), where it was stated that an employer's mere policy statements or practices will not turn an at-will contract of employment into one requiring good cause to discharge an employee. As explained in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn.1983):

Generally speaking, a promise of employment on particular terms of unspecified duration, if in form an offer, and if accepted by the employee, may create a binding unilateral contract. The offer must be definite in form and must be communicated to the offeree. Whether a proposal is meant to be an offer for a unilateral contract is determined by the outward manifestations of the parties, not by their subjective intentions. * * * An employer's general statements of policy are no more than that and do not meet the contractual requirements for an offer.

Id. at 626. Therefore, Dumas' argument that the funeral home's personnel practices contained certain implied terms and conditions relating to job security is an insufficient basis for his claim of wrongful termination.

Dumas has also alleged, however, that he was told by his supervisor upon several occasions that they would "retire together." He argues that within such statement was an implicit promise that he could not be fired without good cause. Although not disputing that the statement was in fact made, the funeral home argues that as a matter of law it was insufficient to constitute an agreement that Dumas could only be discharged for cause.

Although the general rule is that permanent employment is terminable at the will of either employer or employee, the parties may agree otherwise:

If the parties choose to provide in their employment contract of an indefinite duration for provisions of job security, they should be able to do so.

Pine River, 333 N.W.2d at 628. Additional consideration for a job security agreement (other than an employee's continued performance) is unnecessary if the parties "make clear their intent * * * that the...