Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.
| Decision Date | 01 May 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 30883.,30883. |
| Parties | SKAGERBERG v. BLANDIN PAPER CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Richard A. Walsh, Judge.
Action by Rutcher Skagerberg against the Blandin Paper Company. From an order sustaining defendant's demurrer, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
George W. Peterson and Joseph F. Cowern, both of St. Paul, and Charles E. Carlson, of Minneapolis, for appellant.
Oppenheimer, Dickson, Hodgson, Brown & Donnelly, of St. Paul, for respondent.
Defendant's general demurrer to plaintiff's amended complaint was sustained, and he appeals.
The challenged pleading is somewhat lengthy. The following summary, however, is deemed sufficient to provide a basis for discussion of the controlling issues:
Plaintiff is a consulting engineer, a specialist in the field of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning. As such he had developed a clientele bringing him a weekly income of approximately $200.
Defendant operates a paper manufacturing plant at Grand Rapids, this state. It had employed plaintiff in his professional capacity in 1926 and again in 1930. He was paid at the rate of $200 per week while so employed. Defendant was planning extensive enlargements of its plant, the estimated expense being about $1,000,000. Ordinarily a consulting engineer's fees for doing the necessary planning and supervision of the contemplated improvements would involve from $35,000 to $50,000. During plaintiff's employment in 1930 there was some discussion between the parties with respect of plaintiff's employment to take this work in hand. At that time, too, he was negotiating with the executive officers of Purdue University relative to taking a position as associate professor in its department of engineering, particularly that branch thereof relating to heating, ventilating, and air conditioning.
The Purdue position carried a salary of $3,300 per year and required only nine months' work in the way of instructions. This would leave plaintiff free to continue his practice as a consulting engineer during a period of three months of each calendar year. He was also privileged, if he entered that position, to continue his practice as a consulting engineer at all times in so far as his professional work at the university permitted him so to do. In addition thereto, he was privileged to contribute to engineering magazines and other publications. All income from such outside engagements was to be his in addition to the stated salary. Plaintiff considered this opportunity as one especially attractive to him. Defendant had full knowledge of all the foregoing facts.
On October 13, 1930, plaintiff, having received a telegram from Purdue University offering him the position and requiring immediate acceptance or rejection thereof, at once called an officer of defendant over the long-distance telephone informing him of the offer and the necessity on his part of making immediate response thereto. Defendant's officer agreed that if plaintiff would reject the Purdue offer and also agree to purchase the home of defendant's power superintendent it would give plaintiff permanent employment at a salary of $600 per month. Relying thereon, plaintiff rejected the Purdue offer and immediately thereafter moved to Grand Rapids and there entered upon the performance of his duties under this arrangement. He later entered into a contract for the purchase of the superintendent's home. Appropriate to note is the fact that these negotiations were entirely oral and over the long-distance telephone, plaintiff being at Minneapolis and defendant's officer at Grand Rapids. The only writing between the parties is a letter written on October 14, 1930, reading thus:
Plaintiff rendered the services for which he was thus engaged "dutifully, faithfully and to the complete satisfaction of the defendant and was paid the agreed salary, except as to a voluntary reduction, up to September 1, 1932," when, so the complaint alleges, he was "wrongfully, unlawfully and wilfully" discharged from further employment, although "ready, willing and able to perform." By reason of the alleged breach of contract he claims to have suffered general damages in the amount of $25,000, and for this he prays judgment.
From what has been stated it is clear that the issue raised by the demurrer is simply this: Do the allegations set forth in the complaint show anything more than employment of plaintiff by defendant subject to termination at the will of either party?
1. The words "permanent employment" have a well-established meaning in the law. The general rule is well stated in 18 R.C.L. p. 509, § 20: "In case the parties to a contract of service expressly agree that the employment shall be `permanent' the law implies, not that the engagement shall be continuous or for any definite period but that the term being indefinite the hiring is merely at will."
To the same effect is the statement of the rule in 35 A.L.R. 1432: "In most of the jurisdictions passing on the duration of a contract purporting to be for permanent employment, it is held that, in the absence of additional express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of a good consideration additional to the services contracted to be rendered, a contract for permanent employment, for life employment, for as long as the employee chooses or for other terms purporting permanent employment, is no more than an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party."
Numerous cases are cited under both texts. See, also, 3 Words and Phrases, Fourth Series, p. 71, and cases there cited.
Counsel for both parties are in complete accord that the general rule is as stated in the cited authorities.
2. The difficult question presented is whether the allegations set forth in the complaint bring this case within an exception to the rule stated. We find in 18 R. C.L. p. 510, the following statement:
And in 35 A.L.R. 1434, it is said: "It has been held that where an employee has given a good consideration in addition to his services, an agreement to hire him permanently should, in the absence of other terms or circumstances to the contrary, continue so long as the employee is able and willing to do his work satisfactorily." Many cases are cited under the respective texts to sustain the language quoted.
Plaintiff cites and relies upon Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117, 35 L. R.A. 512, 57 Am.St.Rep. 488; Roxana Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 109 Okl. 161, 235 P. 502, 503; Pierce v. Tennessee C., I. & R. Co., 173 U.S. 1, 19 S.Ct. 335, 43 L.Ed. 591, and other cases of similar import. A brief discussion of the cited cases upon which plaintiff relies may be helpful. In Carnig v. Carr, supra, plaintiff had been engaged in business for himself as an enameler. Defendant was a business competitor. Being such, and for his own advantage, defendant persuaded plaintiff to give up his business and sell his stock in trade to him. As consideration, in part at least, for entering into this arrangement, defendant agreed to employ plaintiff permanently at a stated salary, his work for defendant being the same as that in which plaintiff had been engaged. It is clear that what defendant sought and accomplished was to get rid of his competitor in business upon a promise on his part to give plaintiff permanent employment. The resulting situation amounted to the same thing in substance and effect as if plaintiff had purchased his job. Under such circumstances there can be no doubt that the exception to the general rule was properly invoked and applied and furnishes an illustration thereof. (Compare Campion v. B. & M. R. R., 269 Mass. 579, 169 N.E. 499.) In Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., supra, plaintiff had received an injury while employed by defendant. To settle the difficulty defendant promised employment to plaintif...
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