Duncan v. Carpenter & Phillips
| Decision Date | 11 April 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 236,236 |
| Citation | 233 N.C. 422,64 S.E.2d 410 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | DUNCAN, v. CARPENTER & PHILLIPS et al. |
McBee & McBee, Spruce Pine, and W. E. Anglin, Burnsville, for plaintiff.
Proctor & Dameron, Marion, for defendants.
The only question for decision is whether upon the facts in this case the plaintiff filed his claim with the Industrial Commission in time, in light of the provisions of G.S. § 97-58, which read as follows:
'(a) An employer shall not be liable for any compensation for asbestosis, silicosis or lead poisoning unless disablement or death results within two years after the last exposure to such disease, or, in case of death, unless death follows continuous disability from such disease, commencing within the period of two years limited herein, and for which compensation has been paid or awarded or timely claim made as hereinafter provided and results within seven years after such last exposure.
'(c) The right to compensation for occupational disease shall be barred unless a claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after death, disability, or disablement as the case may be.'
It is well to note that our Legislature has recognized the insidious character of asbestosis and silicosis. Every employer in whose business his employees or any of them are subjected to the hazards of asbestosis or silicosis, is required, by G.S. § 97-60, to provide prior to employment necessary examinations of all new employees for the purpose of ascertaining if any of them are in any degree affected by asbestosis or silicosis or peculiarly susceptible thereto; and every such employer shall from time to time, as ordered by the Industrial Commission provide similar examinations for all of his employees whose employment exposes them to the hazards of asbestosis or silicosis. And where an employee, though not actually disabled, is found by the Industrial Commission to be affected by asbestosis or silicosis, and such disease has progressed to such a degree as to make it hazardous for him to continue in his employment, the Industrial Commission may require his removal therefrom. G.S. § 97-61.
Furthermore, when compensation payments have been made and discontinued, and further compensation is claimed, whether for disablement, disability, or death from asbestosis, silicosis, or lead poisoning, the claim for such further compensation may be made within two years, but as to all other occupational diseases claim for further compensation shall be made within one year after the last payment. G.S. § 97-66.
It should also be kept in mind that there is a distinction between the words 'disablement' and 'disability', when used in connection with certain occupational diseases, under the provisions of our Workmen's Compensation Act. Disablement 'as applied to cases of asbestosis and silicosis means the event of becoming actually incapacitated, because of such occupational disease, from performing normal labor in the last occupation in which remuneratively employed; but in all other cases of occupational disease shall be equivalent to 'disability' as defined in § 97-2, paragraph (i).' G.S. § 97-54. Disability, as defined in Section 97-2(i) 'means incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other employment.' Young v. Whitehall Co., 229 N.C. 360, 49 S.E.2d 797.
The appellees seriously contend that in passing G.S. § 97-58(b), the intent of the Legislature is obvious. Thirty days is not, in the average case, sufficient time for an employee to discover, with certainty, that he is suffering from an occupational disease. Such diseases, by their nature, are gradual in their development and difficult of diagnosis. Consequently, the Legislature relieved the employee of the necessity of giving any notice pursuant to the provisions of G.S. § 97-22, to the employer in cases of asbestosis, silicosis and lead poisoning, and extended the time for giving the notice in all other cases of occupational diseases to thirty days after the employee was advised by competent medical authority that he was suffering from an occupational disease.
The appellees further contend that subsection (b) applies only to the notice to be given the employer, and does not in any way affect or extend the time in which notice and claim of death, disability or disablement must be filed with the Industrial Commission, as provided in subsection (c) of the statute.
If we concede this to be a correct interpretation of the statute, then the Legislature did a vain and useless thing when it enacted subsection (c) of the statute. For such an interpretation would make the time for filing a claim for compensation for an occupational disease identical with that fixed for filing a claim for an accident, resulting in injury or death, as provided in G.S. § 97-24, irrespective of the date the employee was advised by competent medical authority that he had such disease.
Statutes in pari materia are to be construed together and where the language is ambiguous, the court must construe it to ascertain the true legislative intent. Young v. Whitehall Co., supra; Mullen v. Town of Louisburg, 225 N.C. 53, 33 S.E.2d 484; Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, Com'r of Revenue, 212 N.C. 624, 194 S.E. 117; State v. Humphries, 210 N.C. 406, 186 S.E. 473. And where a strict literal interpretation of the...
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State v. Spencer
...control and the strict letter thereof should be disregarded. State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 107 S.E. 505; Duncan v. Carpenter and Phillips, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410. And, where possible, 'the language of a statute will be interpreted so as to avoid an absurd consequence. Young v. Whit......
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State ex rel. Com'r of Ins. v. North Carolina Rate Bureau
...when possible, and any irreconcilable ambiguity should be resolved so as to effectuate the true legislative intent. Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951). Applying the foregoing, we first note that neither G.S. 58-124.18(d) nor G.S. 58-124.20(c), the statutes dealing with ......
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State v. Fletcher
...ex rel. Comm’r of Ins. v. N.C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office , 287 N.C. 192, 202, 214 S.E.2d 98, 104 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Carpenter & Phillips , 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951), overruled on other grounds by Taylor v. J. P. Stevens & Co. , 300 N.C. 94, 265 S.E.2d 144 (1980), McLean v. Dur......
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IN RE DECLARATORY RULING BY COM'R OF INS.
...should be resolved so as to effectuate the true legislative intent." Rate Bureau at 400, 269 S.E.2d at 561; Duncan v. Carpenter, 233 N.C. 422, 64 S.E.2d 410 (1951). A review of the statutory insurance regulatory scheme reveals a legislative intent to grant the Commissioner broad authority t......