Duncan v. Duncan

Citation374 S.W.2d 800
Decision Date10 January 1964
Docket NumberNo. 3786,3786
PartiesClyde DUNCAN, Appellant, v. Eunice DUNCAN, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

R. E. Murphey, Coleman, Callaway & Callaway, Brownwood, for appellant.

O'Neal Dendy, San Angelo, for appellee.

GRISSOM, Chief Justice.

In a trial to the court, Eunice Duncan was granted a divorce and her husband, Clyde Duncan, who occupied the position of plaintiff in the case, was denied a divorce. The homestead was awarded to the wife, subject ot the unpaid portion of the purchase price. The wife was awarded a judgment for $1750.00, as partial reimbursement for her separate funds spent in improving the properties of the parties and for her interest in other community property. She was also awarded a judgment for $750.00 attorney's fee. A lien was fixed against the property awarded the husband to secure payment of said amounts. The husband has appealed. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were not requested.

Appellant's first point is that the court erred in denying him a divorce. It woudl serve no good purpose to state the sordid facts from which the court, unquestionably, had the right to award the wife a divorce. The evidence certainly did not require the award of a divorce to the husband. That point is overruled.

Appellant's second point is that the court erred in requiring the parties to file written verified statements concerning their separate and community properties for consideration by the court. Said point is overruled. The court did not require the filing of such statements, on the contrary, it was stipulated that they should do so and that the court might consider them.

Appellant's third point is that the court erred in awarding the homestead to Eunice Duncan on the theory that it was community property. Point 7 is to the effect that the court erred in holding that the $1200.00 cash paid on the purchase price of the homestead and the $200.00 closing fee were paid from community funds, because the uncontradicted evidence showed said money was paid out of the separate funds of the plaintiff. There was evidence from the plaintiff to the effect that said money was cash which he dug up on his farm where he had buried it before he married the defendant. However, he also testified to the effect that he started burying money when he became suspicious that his wife was trying to get his property, and that he buried this after the marriage. It is undisputed that he told his wife shortly before they were married that his income ranged from $200.00 to $1,000.00 per month. It is undisputed that he spent very little. Mr. Duncan was an interested witness. The homestead awarded to the wife was acquired during marriage. The deed was made to both the husband and wife as grantees and both signed the deed of trust and the notes which constituted the major portion of the consideration for the home. The total consideration was $4,000.00, Sec.1,200.00 was paid at the time the property was purchased. The court was not required to believe that the cash spent in concluding the purchase came from the separate funds of the plaintiff, nor was the court required to conclude that the home was the separate property of the plaintiff. By virtue of Article 4619, Section 1, all property acquired during marriage is deemed to be the common property of both until the contrary is satisfactorily proved. All property that the husband and wife possess at the time the marriage is dissolved is deemed community property. 12 Tex.Jur.2d 211. The burden of rebutting that presumption rested on the plaintiff. It has been held that the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property is very strong and can be overcome only by clear and convincing proof. 30 Tex.Jur.2d 280; Harkness v. McQueen, Tex.Civ.App., 232 S.W.2d 629; Lindemood v. Evans,...

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28 cases
  • Mogford v. Mogford
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
    • 11 d3 Fevereiro d3 1981
    ...of the proceeds, there is no divestive title to such real estate. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 331 S.W.2d 299 (1960); Duncan v. Duncan, 374 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1964, no writ); Puckett v. Puckett, 205 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1947, no Here, the court's order did no......
  • Short v. United States, P-73-CA-14.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • 15 d3 Janeiro d3 1975
    ......Texas Family Code § 5.02. See also Duncan v. Duncan, 374 S. W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1964); Kitchens v. Kitchens, 407 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1966). Since the ......
  • Davis v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue
    • United States
    • United States Tax Court
    • 11 d4 Junho d4 1987
    ...623 S.W.2d 462, 466 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981); Poulter v. Poulter, 565 S.W.2d 107, 110-111 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978); Duncan v. Duncan, 374 S.W.2d 800, 801-802 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964); Smith v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tex. Ct. App. 1945). In this case, a right of reimbursement was found to exist in ......
  • Murff v. Murff
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • 29 d3 Abril d3 1981
    ...holding of the court of civil appeals on the issue of whether fault may be considered in dividing the property, conflicts with Duncan v. Duncan, 374 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Civ.App. Eastland 1964, no writ) and on the issue of whether disparity in earning power or capacity may be considered in divid......
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