Duncan v. Oklahoma Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 06 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 98,295.,98,295.
• Citation: 2004 OK 58,95 P.3d 1076
• Parties: Teddy DUNCAN, for himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of Oklahoma, and Ron Ward, Director, Defendants/Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

95 P.3d 1076

2004 OK 58

Teddy DUNCAN, for himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, an agency of the State of Oklahoma, and Ron Ward, Director, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 98,295.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 6, 2004.

William H. Stout of Carpenter & Laquer, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant.

Charles K. Babb, Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants/Appellees.

¶ 0 Plaintiff/appellant/inmate, Teddy Duncan sued defendants/appellees, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) and its Director. He challenged DOC's right to retain, for costs of incarceration, the full amount of workers' compensation permanent total disability (PTD) benefits paid to him during his incarceration. Plaintiff was awarded the PTD benefits by order of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court for work-related injury occurring before his imprisonment while employed by O G & E Energy Corporation. Interpreting 85 O.S.2001, § 22(13)(b) to allow distribution to and retention by DOC of all, i.e., one hundred percent (100%), of the PTD benefits paid during his incarceration, the trial court, upon defendants' motion, dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff argued in the trial court that § 22(13)(b) did not allow DOC to retain all the PTD benefits so paid. He asserted the controlling statute was 57 O.S.2001, § 549(B)(1), which allows DOC to charge, for costs of incarceration, no more than fifty percent (50%) of amounts from an inmate's prison employment or other income, including workers' compensation benefits, received by an inmate and deposited to his/her DOC-maintained inmate account. Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division III, affirmed. He then sought certiorari review which we previously granted. We hold plaintiff's suit was properly dismissed. As to workers' compensation PTD benefits, an irreconcilable conflict exists between § 22(13)(b) and § 549(B). Section 22(13)(b) controls as the more specific and most recent expression of legislative intent.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; TRIAL COURT ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED.

LAVENDER, J.

¶ 1 Plaintiff/appellant/inmate, Teddy Duncan sued defendants/appellees, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) and its Director, Ron Ward. He challenged DOC's right to retain, for costs of incarceration, one hundred percent (100%) of workers' compensation permanent total disability (PTD) benefits paid to him during his incarceration. The PTD benefits were awarded to plaintiff by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) for work-related injury occurring prior to his imprisonment while he was employed by O G & E Energy Corporation.¹ Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to 12 O.S.2001, § 2012(B)(6), arguing plaintiff's trial court petition was subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In essence, interpreting 85 O.S.2001, § 22(13)(b) to allow DOC to retain all PTD benefits paid during his incarceration, the trial court issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.²

¶ 2 Plaintiff appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA), Division III, affirmed. He sought certiorari review which we previously granted because the case involves a first impression question. We hold, although 57 O.S.2001, § 549(B)(1) allows DOC to charge, for costs of incarceration, no more than fifty percent (50%) of amounts from an inmate's prison employment or other income, including workers' compensation benefits, received on behalf of an inmate and deposited to his/her DOC-maintained inmate account, § 22(13)(b), a more specific and recent expression of legislative intent, mandates DOC retention, for costs of incarceration, of all workers' compensation PTD benefits paid to an inmate during his/her incarceration. Thus, we affirm the trial court's dismissal.

PART I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION JURISPRUDENCE.

¶ 3 In this case we gauge the meaning of § 549(B)(1) and § 22(13)(b), and decide which controls the fate of plaintiff's PTD benefits paid during his imprisonment. Confronting us is a question of law. "A legal question involving statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review ..., i.e., a non-deferential, plenary and independent review of the trial court's legal ruling." Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶ 2, 81 P.3d 652, 654, citing Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 8 and n. 5, 33 P.3d 302, 305 and n. 5.

¶ 4 The appellate review standard regarding a trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is also de novo, as the ultimate inquiry revolves around ascertaining the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's petition. Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 1995 OK 108, 905 P.2d 778, 780. Hayes stated:

Review of a trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is de novo and involves consideration of whether a plaintiff's petition is legally sufficient. Gay v. Akin, 766 P.2d 985, 989 f.n. 13 (Okla.1988). When reviewing such a dismissal an appellate court must take as true all of the challenged pleading's allegations together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from them. Great Plains Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Dabney, 846 P.2d 1088, 1090 f.n. 3 (Okla.1993). "A pleading must not be dismissed for failure to state a legally cognizable claim unless the allegations indicate beyond any doubt that the litigant can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief." Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hospital Authority, 775 P.2d 281, 287 (Okla.1989) (emphasis in original).

Hayes, 905 P.2d at 780.

¶ 5 We also keep in mind when reviewing this matter, the primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and follow the Legislature's intention. See Fulsom, 2003 OK 96,

at ¶ 7, 81 P.3d at 655; see also TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 1992 OK 31, 829 P.2d 15, 20. "[T]he plain meaning of a statute's language is conclusive except in the rare case when literal construction produces a result demonstrably at odds with legislative intent." Samman, 2001 OK 71, at ¶ 13, 33 P.3d at 307, relying on City of Tulsa v. Public Employees Relations Board, 1998 OK 92, ¶ 14, 967 P.2d 1214, 1220. A court is duty-bound to give effect to legislative acts, not amend, repeal or circumvent them. City of Tulsa,

1998 OK 92, at ¶ 18, 967 P.2d at 1221. When a court is called on to interpret a statute, the court has no authority to rewrite the enactment merely because it does not comport with the court's view of prudent public policy. See id. Also, the wisdom of choices made within the Legislature's law-making sphere are not our concern, because those choices — absent constitutional or other recognized infirmity — rightly lie within the legislative domain. See Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, at ¶ 14, 81 P.3d at 658.

¶ 6 It is also the settled rule when a court is construing seemingly conflicting statutes that a specific statute controls over one of more general applicability and the most recent enactment controls over an earlier one. Milton v. Hayes, 1989 OK 12, 770 P.2d 14, 15. It is further understood that only when two statutory provisions irreconcilably conflict will an implied repeal of the earlier or more general provision be found. City of Sand Springs v. Department of Public Welfare, 1980 OK 36, 608 P.2d 1139, 1151. Finally, the more recent and specific statute will be determined to modify or supercede an earlier, more general statute only to the extent necessary to avoid the irreconcilable conflict or inconsistency. Id.; see also Upton v. State ex. rel. Department of Corrections, 2000 OK 46, ¶ 11-13, 9 P.3d 84, 88

.

PART II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

¶ 7 We set forth pertinent factual allegations, or reasonable inferences from them, contained in plaintiff's trial court petition, as we must take same as true in reviewing the trial court's dismissal.³ In 1983 plaintiff was injured while working for O G & E Energy Corporation.⁴ He was determined to be permanently and totally disabled by order of the WCC in 1991 and began receiving PTD benefits. In September 1999 he became an inmate of DOC.⁵ In 2000 plaintiff learned that all, i.e., 100%, of his PTD benefits were being deposited to DOC's clearing account for transfer to its "revolving fund" for costs of his incarceration.⁶ ¶ 8 Via his lawsuit plaintiff asserted § 549(B)(1) allowed DOC to retain no more than 50% of his workers' compensation benefits for costs of incarceration. He sought an accounting from DOC concerning the PTD benefits it had received and retained, recovery of the amount he claimed had been overcharged (i.e., in effect, anything over 50% of the PTD benefits paid since his incarceration in September 1999) and injunctive relief to prohibit DOC from future retention of more than 50% of any PTD benefits paid during his incarceration.⁷ He also attacked DOC OP 120230(I)(B)(5)(b), a DOC rule or operating policy, that allows DOC to retain all of an inmate's PTD benefits for costs of incarceration, as being inconsistent with his interpretation of § 22(13)(b) and § 549(B)(1), which he asserted could be harmonized in regard to PTD benefits.⁸ In effect, plaintiff argued in the trial court that the language contained in § 22(13)(b) was only intended as a procedural device by which the PTD benefits were to be directed to his inmate account, rather than as a mandate as to the ultimate disposition of those benefits. He asserted the controlling statute as to DOC's authority on retention of the PTD benefits for costs of incarceration was, instead, § 549(B)(1), which allows DOC to charge not more than 50% of amounts from an inmate's prison employment or other income, including workers' compensation benefits, received on behalf of an inmate and deposited to his/her DOC-maintained inmate account.

¶ 9 D...