Duncan v. State
Decision Date | 30 January 2018 |
Docket Number | WD 80522 |
Citation | 539 S.W.3d 95 |
Parties | Bryan L. DUNCAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
F.A. White, Jr., Kansas City, MO, Attorney for Appellant.
Joshua D. Hawley, Attorney General, and Julia E. Neidhardt, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondent.
Before Division One: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge, and Victor C. Howard and Karen King Mitchell, Judges
Bryan Duncan appeals the denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of his Rule 24.0351 motion for post-conviction relief. Duncan raises three claims2 on appeal: (1) his plea was involuntary because his counsel misled him regarding the sentence he would receive; (2) his counsel was ineffective in failing to call Duncan's treating physician at sentencing in mitigation of a lengthy sentence; and (3) Duncan's concurrent sentences of twelve and three years' imprisonment constituted a de facto death sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment in light of Duncan's significant health issues. Finding no error, we affirm.
According to the probable cause statement filed in the underlying criminal matter, on June 24, 2013, Duncan drove to 5650 Norton Avenue in Jackson County, Missouri, to confront Norris Payne. Upon his arrival, Duncan approached Payne and the two argued. When Payne attempted to get back into his vehicle and leave the confrontation, Duncan pulled out a handgun, fatally shot Payne five times, and then fled the scene. Duncan was subsequently charged, as a prior felony offender, with second-degree murder (§ 565.021) and armed criminal action (§ 571.015).4
On the morning of jury selection for Duncan's trial, Duncan decided to withdraw his plea of not guilty and, instead, enter a guilty plea pursuant to an agreement with the State. In exchange for Duncan's guilty pleas, the State agreed to argue for a maximum sentence of twelve years on the second-degree murder charge to run concurrently with the mandatory minimum of three years on the armed criminal action charge. The State further agreed that Duncan would be allowed to argue for a suspended sentence and probation, as well as remain on house arrest pending sentencing. The prosecutor noted that Duncan's case presented "a very unusual situation" and that she had obtained special permission for the terms of the agreement "based on [Duncan's] health." The prosecutor advised the court that Duncan
During the plea hearing, Duncan advised the court that he was "clear headed" and wished to withdraw his not-guilty plea and enter a guilty plea. The court specifically noted its understanding that Duncan was "in complete renal failure
." The court advised Duncan that the range of punishment for the murder charge was ten-to-thirty years or life imprisonment and that it was three years to life for armed criminal action. The court further advised Duncan that both charges contained mandatory minimums for the amount of time he must serve before becoming parole eligible, and Duncan indicated that he understood. The court specifically discussed with Duncan the effect of the plea agreement on sentencing:
The court then discussed the various constitutional rights attendant to trial that Duncan was relinquishing through his guilty pleas, and Duncan acknowledged understanding them and that he was waiving them by pleading guilty. The court then returned to the issue of sentencing:
Duncan acknowledged shooting Payne five times with a deadly weapon, knowing that it likely would result in Payne's death. Duncan advised the court that he was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty, and he further indicated that no one had forced or coerced his pleas. Duncan denied having any complaints or criticisms of counsel before the court returned, once again, to the issue of sentencing.
The court accepted Duncan's pleas and set the matter for sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, the court received victim impact evidence and testimony from Duncan. During his testimony, Duncan attempted to justify his conduct by claiming that he shot Payne only because he feared for his own life. Duncan also relayed that he was in renal failure
and had been since 2009. He further testified to the effects of his renal failure on his diet and medications. Duncan's Counsel offered various medical records into evidence to support Duncan's assertions regarding his renal failure.5
The court permitted the parties to argue for appropriate punishment, and the State offered the following argument:
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