Duncantell v. State

Decision Date17 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 14-04-00971-CR.,14-04-00971-CR.
Citation230 S.W.3d 835
PartiesOvide DUNCANTELL, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

David Alan Disher, La Marque, for Appellant.

Shirley Cornelius, Houston, for State.

Panel consists of Justices YATES, ANDERSON, and HUDSON.

OPINION

JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice.

Appellant, Ovide Duncantell, appeals his conviction for the misdemeanor offense of interference with the duties of a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Houston Police Officer R.C. Haney was the first witness to testify. According to Officer Haney, late in the evening of February 17, 2004, he and his probationary officer partner, J. Wooley, were parked in their police car in the parking lot of the Super Star Club located at the corner of Scott and Stassen Streets. Officer Wooley was completing paperwork for an unrelated narcotics arrest made a short distance from the Super Star Club. The narcotics suspect was in the backseat of the police car. While sitting in the front passenger seat, Officer Haney observed a vehicle, which Officer Haney later learned belonged to appellant, back into a parked Camaro. When appellant's vehicle failed to stop and attempted to leave the parking lot, Officer Haney exited the police car and attempted to stop the vehicle. The driver of the vehicle initially tried to drive around Officer Haney and only stopped when Officer Haney positioned himself directly in the front of the vehicle.

Officer Haney initiated an investigation into the accident and had the driver of appellant's vehicle, who he eventually learned was Barry Thompson, exit the vehicle. Appellant, who was 68 at the time, was in the front passenger seat. As part of his investigation, as well as for his own safety while he conducted the investigation, Officer Haney sought to control the area around the two vehicles.1 Thompson would not cooperate with Officer Haney, refusing to even provide his name. Officer Haney suspected Thompson was intoxicated so he initiated a DWI investigation. Thompson remained uncooperative and became increasingly belligerent. Ultimately, Officer Haney arrested Thompson and he was handcuffed and placed in the back seat of the police car along with the narcotics suspect.

While Officer Haney tried to deal with Thompson and the owner of the Camaro, appellant exited his vehicle and approached Officer Haney, informing him he owned the vehicle driven by Thompson. Officer Haney told appellant if Thompson was arrested, and appellant was the owner of the vehicle, he would release the vehicle to appellant. Officer Haney then informed appellant he was in a crime scene, a DWI investigation, that he was a witness to the accident, and was not free to go. Officer Haney instructed appellant to move to the other side of his vehicle and go back ten feet, and he would be with him as soon as possible. Appellant complied and moved to the other side of his vehicle.

While attempting to question Thompson through the open back door of the police car, Officer Haney observed appellant move to the back of the police car. While still quite upset, Thompson informed Officer Haney his identification was in a briefcase in the back seat of appellant's vehicle. Leaving Officer Wooley to try to calm down Thompson, Officer Haney went to appellant's vehicle and began looking through the briefcase in the back seat for Thompson's identification. Sensing someone behind him, Officer Haney turned around and was surprised to find himself standing face to face with appellant. Appellant, standing on Officer Haney's gun side and no more than a few inches away, shoved his identification in Officer Haney's face. Officer Haney told appellant to step back. Officer Haney then warned appellant not to walk up behind a police officer like that and told him to go back by the patrol car and to stay there until he was ready to speak with him. At that point appellant, who did not move away, became extremely agitated and aggressive, and began cursing at Officer Haney. Officer Haney again told appellant he was in a crime scene and instructed appellant to move away until he was ready to talk to him. Appellant again refused and began berating and threatening Officer Haney with consequences if he continued with his investigation.2 Officer Haney stepped back several times to create distance between himself and appellant, telling appellant to calm down and get back, but appellant advanced each time to remain in close proximity to Officer Haney.

At this point, Officer Haney, who had decided appellant would be arrested for interfering, called for back-up to assist with his three suspects, two of whom were belligerent and potentially violent. Officer Haney then escorted appellant back to the rear of the patrol car. Officer Wooley stood with appellant until the back-up, Officer J.B. Sweatt, arrived. When Officer Sweatt drove up, appellant left the back of the patrol car and hurried toward Officer Sweatt's vehicle. After a loud exchange with Officer Sweatt, appellant returned to the patrol car. Officer Sweatt then moved over to Officer Haney. While Officer Haney briefed Officer Sweatt, appellant again approached the scene, yelling vulgarities. Officer Wooley intercepted him and prevented appellant from moving further into the crime scene. Finally, appellant attempted to leave the area, walking toward the entrance to the Super Star Club. Officer Sweatt pursued appellant, with Officer Haney following. After a brief struggle, in which appellant attempted to grab Officer Sweatt's genitals, appellant was handcuffed and arrested.

According to Officer Haney, his accident and DWI investigations were essentially shut down until he got the appellant in the backseat of a police car in handcuffs. Until then, because of appellant's actions, Officer Haney could not get the driver of appellant's vehicle identified, search the vehicle for identification or evidence, or conduct field sobriety tests on Mr. Thompson. Officer Haney testified that appellant's actions that night interrupted, impeded, and disrupted his investigation. In addition, Officer Haney testified on the amount of time lost as a result of appellant's conduct that night. According to Officer Haney, of the approximately forty-five minutes he spent at the scene, thirty to forty minutes were devoted to dealing with appellant.

Officer Haney also testified regarding the extent of the crime scene that evening in the Super Star Club parking lot. Initially, the crime scene encompassed the two vehicles involved in the accident as well as the area where Officer Haney was standing interviewing Mr. Thompson. Once he arrested Mr. Thompson and placed him in the back of the police car, Officer Haney testified the crime scene expanded to include the police car. According to Officer Haney, appellant was the only civilian, other than those brought in by the officers, who entered the crime scene area. Finally, Officer Haney testified that appellant entered the crime scene area more than once and was told more than once to leave the crime scene area.

The next witness to testify was Don Seward. Mr. Seward testified he was inside the Super Star Club talking to the lady who owned the Camaro hit by appellant's vehicle and she asked him to accompany her outside when the police came into the club to find her. Mr. Seward then remained outside and was able to observe appellant's conduct. Mr. Seward testified that a police officer told appellant to stay in a specified area because they were conducting an investigation. Mr. Seward also testified that appellant kept moving and would not do what the officer asked him to do even though the officer asked him to stay out of the area three, four, or even five times.

Officer Sweatt also testified during appellant's trial. Officer Sweatt testified that, around midnight of February 17, 2004, Officer Haney requested that he come to the Super Star Club. As Officer Sweatt pulled into the parking lot, appellant rushed to his vehicle and he had to hurriedly exit. When Officer Sweatt placed his hand on appellant's chest to maintain space between them and told appellant to step back over to the patrol car, appellant became very agitated, but reluctantly did what he was told. Officer Sweatt then testified that he moved over to Officer Haney to be briefed on the situation and as they talked, appellant moved toward them two or three times, forcing Officer Haney to stop his investigation and focus on appellant. According to Officer Sweatt, although the crime scene was not roped off as would be the case for a murder investigation, it was adjacent to the two vehicles involved in the accident. Officer Sweatt also testified that appellant was told by both Officer Haney and himself, at different times, to stay at the back of the patrol car.

Appellant called Officer Wooley to testify. Officer Wooley testified that he remained in the police car to complete the paperwork related to the narcotics arrest while Officer Haney conducted the accident investigation. Officer Wooley testified he exited the police car when he heard Mr. Thompson, the driver of appellant's vehicle, become loud and belligerent. After Mr. Thompson was placed in the back of the patrol car with the narcotics suspect, Officer Wooley testified he moved over to appellant's car where Officer Haney was leaning into the car and appellant was standing right behind him. When Officer Haney saw appellant and told him to return to where he had been standing, stay out of the crime scene, and permit the officers to continue their investigation, appellant initially refused and responded with abusive language. Officer Wooley eventually escorted appellant back to the rear of the patrol car. Officer Wooley testified that appellant attempted to walk back toward Officers Haney and Sweatt several times but he prevented him from doing so.

Finally, ap...

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