Dunlop Tire Corp. v. Allen

• Decision Date: 02 October 1998
• Citation: 725 So.2d 960
• Parties: DUNLOP TIRE CORPORATION v. Mickey ALLEN.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

725 So.2d 960

DUNLOP TIRE CORPORATION v. Mickey ALLEN.

1941845.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

October 2, 1998.

Rehearing Denied November 20, 1998.

D. Edward Starnes III and Jeffrey T. Kelly of Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, P.C., Huntsville, for appellant.

Jimmy Alexander and Robert M. Baker of Alexander, Corder, Plunk & Baker, P.C., Athens, for appellee.

SHORES, Justice.

Mickey Allen filed a retaliatory-discharge action against Dunlop Tire Corporation (hereinafter "Dunlop") pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, claiming that his employment with Dunlop had been terminated solely because he had instituted an action against Dunlop to recover workers' compensation benefits. After a trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict for Allen, awarding him $65,000 in past damages, $735,000 in future damages, and $1.2 million in punitive damages. Dunlop appealed the trial court's denial of its alternative motions for a JNOV, for a new trial, for a remittitur of the compensatory damages award, or to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. On April 24, 1998, the plaintiff moved this Court to "reduce and remit the award of punitive damages awarded in the trial court from $1.2 million to $250,000, being a total remittitur of $950,000.00 from the award of punitive damages."

First, Dunlop argues that it is entitled to a new trial because three members of the jury venire, who were eventually selected as jurors, failed to disclose on voir dire examination that they had been involved in previous litigation. The trial court, in exercising its discretion, determined that the jurors' failure to respond had resulted in no actual prejudice to Dunlop. A reversal based on Dunlop's contention requires a showing of probable prejudice, and we will reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion. Land & Associates, Inc. v. Simmons, 562 So.2d 140 (Ala.1989).

The trial court held an extensive hearing on this issue, and it was in the best position to determine whether probable prejudice occurred as a result of the jurors' failure to respond to questions during voir dire. Land & Associates, 562 So.2d at 149. Under the facts of this case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Dunlop was not prejudiced as a result of what the court considered a misunderstanding, on the part of the jurors, of Dunlop's questions. Their failure to respond was clearly due to confusion over the questions and inadvertence, and was not due to willfulness or an attempt at falsification. We also find that the trial court's use of the term "actual prejudice," instead of probable prejudice, is not reversible error, because the record showed no evidence of prejudice, either actual or probable, to Dunlop.

Dunlop next contends that the trial court should have granted its motion for a JNOV, because, it argues, Allen had failed to present substantial evidence in support of his retaliatory-discharge claim. Reviewing Dunlop's contention requires us to apply the same standards the trial court applied when it ruled on the motion. Motion Industries, Inc. v. Pate, 678 So.2d 724 (Ala.1996). Like a motion for a directed verdict presented during trial, a JNOV motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is appraised by applying the "substantial evidence rule." § 12-21-12(a), Ala.Code 1975; Med Plus Properties v. Colcock Constr. Group, Inc., 628 So.2d 370, 373-74 (Ala.1993). The ultimate question is whether the party bearing the burden of proof presented substantial evidence in support of its position. Med Plus Properties, 628 So.2d at 373-74, citing § 12-21-12(d), Ala.Code 1975. "`Substantial evidence' is `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.'" Id., quoting West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). Our analysis requires us to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict and to consider the reasonable evidentiary inferences that the jury could have drawn. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350, 1353 (Ala. 1992).

Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, provides:

"No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits under this chapter...."

Initially, we note that the legislature's purpose in enacting this section was to offset the harsh effects of the employment-at-will doctrine. Morgan v. Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center, 624 So.2d 560 (Ala. 1993). Because this is remedial legislation, intended to prevent instances of retaliatory discharge, "we apply the rule that the statute is to be construed liberally to effect its purposes." Twilley v. Daubert Coated Products, Inc., 536 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Ala.1988). In Twilley, 536 So.2d 1364, 1369 (Ala.1988), the Court interpreted this section as it regards the prohibition against discharging an employee "solely" because the employee has made a workers' compensation claim. Culbreth v. Woodham Plumbing Co., 599 So.2d 1120, 1122 (Ala.1992). The Twilley court established the following test:

"We hold that an employee may establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge by proving that he was `terminated' because he sought to recover [workers'] compensation benefits, which would be an impermissible reason. The burden would then shift to the defendant employer to come forward with evidence that the employee was terminated for a legitimate reason, whereupon the plaintiff [employee] must prove that the reason [given by the employer] was not true but a pretext for an otherwise impermissible termination."

Twilley, 536 So.2d at 1369. The Court of Civil Appeals has added:

"[I]n the prima facie stage of a retaliatory discharge case, a plaintiff need not `prove' that his employment was terminated for seeking workers' compensation benefits. If this were true, there would be no need to shift the burden. The prima facie level of the analysis is an initial inquiry that allows a court to determine whether there may be a valid claim and whether the case should proceed."

Beaulieu of America, Inc. v. Kilgore, 680 So.2d 288, 296 (Ala.Civ.App.1996). Chesser v. Mid-South Electrics, Inc., 652 So.2d 240, 242 (Ala.1994).

Under the facts presented here, the trial court correctly submitted the issue to the jury. Chesser v. Mid-South Electrics, Inc., 652 So.2d 240, 242 (Ala.1994). The court determines initially whether the employee has presented substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude "that he was `terminated' because he sought to recover [workers'] compensation benefits," Twilley, supra. The employee cannot leave that as an assumption for the court to make. See Hayden v. Bruno's, Inc., 588 So.2d 874 (Ala. 1991); Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12(a).

In Culbreth, supra, this Court elaborated on its holding in Twilley, addressing the method to follow after the employee has established a prima facie case:

"We note that it would be more appropriate to say that, after the defendant has met his burden of coming forward with evidence of a legitimate reason, `"[t]he plaintiff then has the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence showing that the defendant's [stated] reasons"' for terminating the plaintiff are not true. The plaintiff does not have to `prove' that the employer's stated reason is not true unless the defendant's evidence is sufficiently certain, without more evidence from the plaintiff, to support a directed verdict. If the plaintiff's prima facie case is strong, and the defendant's evidence of an asserted reason is weak or equivocal, the jury might simply disbelieve the defendant."

Culbreth, 599 So.2d at 1122 (citations omitted). In other words, after the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the defendant must present, by substantial evidence, Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12(a), a legitimate reason for the termination, sufficient to establish that there is no genuine issue as to that fact and that the defendant is therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. Only if the defendant satisfies this burden does the plaintiff have to produce enough evidence to refute that showing. Culbreth, 599 So.2d at 1122; Motion Industries, Inc. v. Pate, 678 So.2d 724 (Ala. 1996).

The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Allen, Carter, supra, tends to show the following: Allen began working at Dunlop in 1975. On August 20, 1982, Allen injured his left shoulder while working as a tire builder. He was off work intermittently and received workers' compensation benefits for two years. Having been medically disqualified from the tire-building position, he was assigned to a position as a machine cleaner.

On March 24, 1988, Allen injured his left knee while working as a machine cleaner. He was off work most of the time until February 12, 1990. During that period, he received workers' compensation benefits. In September 1988, Dr. Howard Miller performed arthroscopic surgery on Allen's knee. The surgery revealed a condoral fracture around the knee cartilage. Dr. Louis Horn concluded that Allen had a knee strain, chondromalacia of the patella, and crepitation. On February 15, 1989, Dr. Robert Mitchell performed surgery on Allen's knee in order to shave and smooth loosened cartilage that was affecting the injured area. From February through March 21, 1990, Dr. Mitchell treated Allen for complaints of swelling, soreness, and pain due to both the injury and the consequential reduction in muscle mass in Allen's left leg. Dr. Mitchell provided steroid injections to reduce the swelling and the pain and had Allen regularly attend physical therapy sessions to increase strength in the knee joint. Dr. Miller again examined Allen's knee on March 2, 1989. He agreed that Allen had a permanent partial impairment to the knee that was consistent with Allen's...