Dunn v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPT. OF TRANSP., 20090317.
Decision Date | 16 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 20090317.,20090317. |
Citation | 779 NW 2d 628,2010 ND 41 |
Parties | Ines M. DUNN, Plaintiff and Appellant v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant and Appellee. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Danny Lee Herbel, Bismarck, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.
Michael Trent Pitcher, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellee.
¶ 1 Ines Dunn appeals from a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation's revocation of her driving privileges for one year and denying her request for costs and attorney's fees. We affirm.
¶ 2 Dunn was arrested for driving under the influence of an intoxicating liquor on January 1, 2009. On January 2, 2009, Dunn requested a hearing on the proposed suspension of her driving privileges. Dunn's request was made through her attorney, and a hearing was scheduled for 4:00 p.m. on January 20, 2009. In an unknown sequence on January 20, 2009, Dunn fired her attorney and her attorney's secretary called the Department, cancelling Dunn's 4:00 p.m. hearing. Following the cancellation but before the scheduled time for Dunn's hearing, the chief hearing officer drafted a decision, stating that Dunn withdrew her hearing request and that no decision was made. Dunn arrived at the Department of Transportation at 3:40 p.m. for her hearing, but she was turned away without a hearing because the hearing had been cancelled and the paperwork was completed. Dunn again requested a hearing by letter dated February 19, 2009, and the chief hearing officer responded stating,
¶ 3 Dunn applied for a writ of mandamus from the district court, requesting an order requiring the Department to hold a hearing regarding the revocation of her driving privileges. The district court determined Dunn was entitled to relief and ordered the Department to conduct a hearing within fourteen days of June 12, 2009.
¶ 4 The Department held a hearing on June 24, 2009. Dunn appeared and submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing her driving privileges should be reinstated because the hearing was not timely held in relation to her arrest on January 1, 2009. Dunn's motion was denied by the hearing officer, who indicated the Department would comply with the district court's order that a hearing be held. The only witness called at the hearing was Dunn's arresting officer, Sergeant Gary Schaffer with the Burleigh County Sheriff's Department. Dunn's attorney made many objections to officer Schaffer's testimony and repeatedly asked the hearing officer for an explanation why the objections were overruled. Dunn took offense to one of the hearing officer's explanations. The hearing officer apologized, but informed Dunn that no more time would be spent explaining why Dunn's repetitive objections were overruled and that the issue could be taken up on appeal if Dunn was dissatisfied with the explanations. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer determined Dunn had refused to consent to a blood draw and revoked her driving privileges for one year.
¶ 5 Dunn appealed the Department's revocation to the district court, assigning error to the timing of her administrative hearing, claiming she was denied a full and fair hearing and seeking costs and attorney's fees. The district court initially entered a judgment granting Dunn's appeal "for the sole reason that the Department failed to file a timely response to the appeal." The Department moved for reconsideration, arguing its reply brief was timely because Dunn served her brief on the Department by mail, resulting in three additional days of response time. Based on the Department's argument, the district court vacated its initial order and judgment, doing so without analysis or statement of authority. On September 29, 2009, the district court dismissed Dunn's appeal and upheld the revocation of her driving privileges, finding that Dunn's hearing was timely held because it complied with the district court's writ of mandamus, that the hearing officer was not biased against Dunn and that costs and attorney's fees were not appropriate. Dunn timely filed this appeal.
¶ 6 Dunn argues the Department's order revoking her privileges is not in accordance with the law because her hearing did not take place within 30 days of her arrest and because the Department did not have a compelling reason for the delay. This Court reviews an administrative revocation of a driver's license under N.D.C.C. § 28-32-46, which requires the affirmance of the agency's order unless:
¶ 7 After Dunn's January 20, 2009 hearing was cancelled and she was notified by the Department that a hearing would not be held, she applied for a peremptory writ of mandamus from the Burleigh County District Court. Dunn's application requested an order requiring the Department to hold an administrative hearing on the revocation of Dunn's driving privileges. On June 12, 2009, the district court ordered the Department to "hold an administrative hearing for Petitioner Dunn expeditiously and not later than fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order."
¶ 8 The Department held Dunn's hearing on June 24, 2009. At the outset of her hearing, Dunn moved for dismissal, claiming the hearing was not timely held. The Department cited the district court's order and proceeded with the hearing, eventually revoking Dunn's driving privileges. Dunn appealed the timeliness of her hearing to the district court, which upheld the revocation and ruled, "The issues regarding whether Dunn should have had a hearing on January 20, 2009 were resolved by the district court's Order date June 12, 2009 and are res judicata." Dunn advances the same timeliness argument on this appeal.
¶ 9 "Res judicata ... prohibits relitigation of claims that were raised or could have been raised in a prior proceeding between the same parties or their privies, and which were resolved by a final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction." Cridland v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 1997 ND 223, ¶ 17, 571 N.W.2d 351. While the district court may have properly determined res judicata prevented its review of Dunn's timeliness argument, we are unable to perform the same legal analysis because of the scant record on review. We do not have Dunn's application for a writ; we do not have the parties' arguments concerning the propriety of issuing a writ; we do not have a transcript of the hearing concerning the writ; and we do not have any of the evidence considered by the district court. We have only the district court's order reciting Dunn's requested relief and directing the Department to grant Dunn a hearing. The information we do have, however, is sufficient to apply judicial estoppel and affirm the Department's ruling that Dunn's hearing was timely.
¶ 10 "Judicial estoppel prohibits a party from assuming inconsistent or contradictory positions during the course of litigation." BTA Oil Producers v. MDU Res. Group, Inc., 2002 ND 55, ¶ 14, 642 N.W.2d 873. The doctrine protects the integrity of the judicial process by preventing litigants from prevailing twice on contradictious legal theories. Id.; see also New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) ( ). This Court has consistently assumed, without deciding, the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies in North Dakota. See DeMers v. DeMers, 2006 ND 142, ¶¶ 18-19, 717 N.W.2d 545 ( ); Ingebretson v. Ingebretson, 2005 ND 41, ¶¶ 16-18, 693 N.W.2d 1 ( ); Meide v. Stenehjem ex rel. State of N.D., 2002 ND 128, ¶¶ 13-15, 649 N.W.2d 532 ( ); BTA Oil Producers, 2002 ND 55, ¶¶ 13-18, 642 N.W.2d 873 ( ).
¶ 11 In her application for a writ of mandamus, Dunn argued the proper remedy was ordering the Department to provide her a hearing posthaste. When the district court granted Dunn's request and ordered a hearing within 14 days, Dunn changed her position and argued to the Department the proper remedy was dismissal of the action...
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