Dunn v. PETER L. LEEPSON, PC
| Decision Date | 09 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | (AC 23106) |
| Citation | 830 A.2d 325,79 Conn. App. 366 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CHRISTOPHER DUNN ET AL. v. PETER L. LEEPSON, P.C. |
Lavery, C.J., and Bishop and McLachlan, Js. Christopher M. Dunn, pro se, and Nga N. Dunn, pro se, the appellants (plaintiffs).
Paul E. Pollock, for the appellee (defendant).
The plaintiffs, Christopher M. Dunn and Nga N. Dunn, appeal from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a trial to the court, in favor of the defendant, Peter L. Leepson, P.C., on four counts of their five count complaint, and on the defendant's counterclaim, stemming from the defendant's representation of the plaintiffs in a real estate transaction. On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court improperly (1) construed the retainer agreement entered into by the parties, (2) found for the defendant on their legal malpractice and negligence claims, (3) awarded $4000 to the defendant as the fair value of its legal services, (4) failed to award them punitive damages and (5) failed to award them counsel fees pursuant to General Statutes § 52-251a. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The dispute between the pro se plaintiffs and their former attorney arose out of the defendant's representation of the plaintiffs in what the court described as a "massive" real estate transaction. On December 4, 2000, Christopher Dunn and Peter L. Leepson, the principal of the defendant law firm, had a conversation concerning Leepson's representation of the plaintiff in connection with the purchase of residential real property and a related tax free exchange. Leepson testified that the fee for the transaction would be $1500 plus expenses and, if the transaction became complicated, requiring additional time, there would be additional fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the conversation called for a flat fee of $1500. The retainer letter, which Leepson sent to Christopher Dunn on December 7, 2000, called for a fee of $1500 plus $175 per hour for every hour he worked on the matter in excess of twenty hours. The real estate transaction became very complicated. The plaintiff discharged the defendant before the closing occurred when the defendant held in escrow $8319.71, which had been returned during the negotiations to the defendant by the seller's attorney.
The plaintiffs commenced the present action in the small claims session of the Superior Court, which subsequently was transferred to the regular docket of the Superior Court on July 9, 2001. The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, legal malpractice and negligence, and sought damages, attorney's fees and punitive damages. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging breach of contract. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the count alleging breach of fiduciary duty and for the defendant on the remaining counts and on its counterclaim, awarding damages to the defendant in the amount of $4000 as the reasonable value of the fees owed to the defendant by the plaintiffs. The court also ordered the defendant to return to the plaintiffs the $8319.71 held in escrow less the $4000 in fees owed. The court denied attorney's fees and punitive damages to the plaintiffs. This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs' first claim is that the court improperly found that the retainer agreement between the parties was for other than a flat fee of $1500. We disagree.
The standard of review to be applied by this court is whether the finding of fact was clearly erroneous. See Hart v. Carruthers, 77 Conn. App. 610, 612-13, 823 A.2d 1284 (2003). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 615. Our review of the record indicates that there was ample evidence to support the finding of the court that the retainer agreement was not limited to a flat fee.
The plaintiffs next assert that the court, as a matter of law, improperly found in favor of the defendant on their legal malpractice and negligence claims due to their failure to offer expert testimony as to the standard of care applicable to Leepson's conduct or that any alleged failure by Leepson was the proximate cause of any damages they suffered. We disagree.
"As a general rule, for a plaintiff to prevail in a legal malpractice case in Connecticut, he must present expert testimony to establish the standard of proper professional skill or care." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vona v. Lerner, 72 Conn. App. 179, 188, 804 A.2d 1018 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 938, 815 A.2d 138 (2003). Not only must the plaintiffs establish the standard of care, but they must also establish that the defendant's conduct "`legally caused'" the injury of which they complain. Id., 189. The plaintiffs offered no expert evidence with respect to either element. Our courts do recognize that in certain cases, the legal malpractice is so clear that expert testimony is not required. See Paul v. Gordon, 58 Conn. App. 724, 727, 754 A.2d 851 (2000). Here, however, the court found that this was not such a case because the real estate transaction at issue was "massive."
The plaintiffs argue that the court's finding in their favor on their claim of breach of fiduciary duty constituted sufficient proof of the defendant's legal malpractice. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs cite numerous cases regarding an attorney's obligation of loyalty to clients. None of those cases, however, holds that an attorney's breach of an ethical duty creates a separate cause of action for malpractice.1 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gagne v. Vaccaro, 255 Conn. 390, 403, 766 A.2d 416 (2001).
We conclude, therefore, that the court did not improperly find for the defendant on the legal malpractice and negligence claims.
The plaintiffs next claim that the...
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