Dunnegan v. Laramie County Com'rs

Decision Date20 May 1993
Docket NumberNos. 91-169,92-88,s. 91-169
Citation852 P.2d 1138
PartiesGerald L. DUNNEGAN, d/b/a J & G Wholesale and Leo Holmes, Petitioners, v. LARAMIE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and Laramie County Sheriff, Respondents, and Leo HOLMES, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). LARAMIE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; Laramie County Sheriff; and State of Wyoming, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Gerald L. DUNNEGAN, d/b/a J & G WHOLESALE and Leo Holmes, Appellees (Defendants).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Roger McDaniel, Cheyenne, argued by Mr. McDaniel, for Gerald L. Dunnegan, d/b/a J & G Wholesale and Leo Holmes.

Roberta A. Coates, Cheyenne, argued by Ms. Coates, for Laramie County Com'rs and Laramie County Sheriff.

Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Lawrence A. Bobbitt, III, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for state of Wyo.

Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

Appellant Leo Holmes was convicted of selling fireworks in violation of a county resolution regulating fireworks and assessed a $750 fine. An appeal was taken from the conviction, and a suit was filed seeking a declaratory judgment that the county resolution was unenforceable. The cases were consolidated. After argument in this court and remand, the trial court entered an order affirming appellant's conviction but vacating the $750 fine and affirming the county's authority to regulate fireworks. Laramie County appeals that part of the order vacating the fine.

These consolidated appeals present the essential question of the validity of a Laramie County Commissioners' resolution regulating the use, sale and possession of fireworks in Laramie County. In determining the validity of the resolution, we revisit the question of a county's authority to regulate in this area.

We reverse appellant Leo Holmes' county court conviction, and reverse in part and affirm in part the district court's April 30, 1992 judgment and order.

Appellant Leo Holmes and appellee J & G Wholesale present the following issues for review:

A. The language used in the Laramie County Resolution when read in conjunction with the provisions of the Wyoming fireworks act (W.S. §§ 35-10-201 through 207), (the "Fireworks Act") specifically W.S. §§ 35-10-201(a), 35-10-204(a)(iii) and 35-10-204(a)(iv) is ambiguous, inconsistent and unconstitutionally vague and violates the due process provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, Article 1, §§ 3 and 6, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

B. Did the District Court, in responding to this Court's Order Remanding Case for Consideration of Additional Certification filed March 20, 1992, exceed its subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that it went beyond the authority contained in the request on remand that it certify, or decline to certify, the threshold question set forth in the Supreme Court's Order of March 20, 1992? Alternatively, if the District Court acted within its jurisdiction, did the District Court correctly conclude that the County does not have authority to impose criminal sanctions?

The appellant Laramie County presents only one issue for review:

Does the grant of a police power for the protection of the health and welfare of the citizens of a county of the State of Wyoming necessarily include the right to carry such power into effect, and does it empower the county to use proper means to enforce its Resolution, subject to judicial review as to the reasonableness of such means?

On April 3, 1991, following a bench trial in county court, Leo Holmes was found guilty of violating the Laramie County fireworks resolution. Holmes timely appealed to the district court and, along with J & G Wholesale, filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief in the district court seeking to enjoin the county from enforcing the county resolution in a manner contrary to its plain and ordinary meaning. For purposes of appeal to this court, the district court consolidated Holmes' appeal from his conviction with the following certified question from the civil action for an injunction:

Do the provisions of W.S. § 35-10-201(a), and the provisions of W.S. § 35-10-204(a)(iv) when read and interpreted in conjunction with the Laramie County Resolution violate the due process provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, Art. 1, Sections 3 and 6, and the United States Constitution, under the 14th Amendment, such that the resolution in its entirety is void for vagueness and the conviction must be set aside?

We heard oral argument on the certified question on December 10, 1991, and on March 20, 1992, we issued an Order Remanding Case for Consideration of Additional Certification. In that order, we asked the district court to consider the certification of a constitutional question to this court regarding the county's authority to exercise the police power of the State of Wyoming by resolution regulating the sale of fireworks in the county.

The district court denied additional certification and issued an order affirming the county's authority to regulate fireworks but denying its authority to impose criminal sanctions for violation of the county resolution. Laramie County appeals from the portion of the district court's judgment denying the county's authority to impose criminal sanctions. No cross appeal was filed challenging the district court's determination that a county may, under W.S. 35-10-201 through -207, regulate the use, sale and possession of fireworks. However, because the question of a county's authority to regulate the use, sale and possession of fireworks so closely relates to the county's authority to impose criminal sanctions, we take this opportunity to reexamine our prior decisions in Haddenham v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 679 P.2d 429 (Wyo.1984) (Haddenham II ) and Gueke v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 728 P.2d 167 (Wyo.1986).

In Haddenham II and Gueke, we held that counties possess the authority to regulate the use, sale and possession of fireworks. The doctrine of stare decisis requires adherence to established precedence. Burns v. Burns, 67 Wyo. 314, 224 P.2d 178, 183 (1950); Worthington v. State, 598 P.2d 796, 803-04 (Wyo.1979). However, as a principle of policy, not an inexorable command, stare decisis does not create a mechanical formula for adherence to prior decisions and should not be rigid in its application. Cook v. State, 841 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Wyo.1992); Burns, 224 P.2d at 183. The principle reasons for disregarding the rule of stare decisis and departing from precedent are to prevent the perpetuation of error and "to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law." Cook, 841 P.2d at 1353; see also Worthington, 598 P.2d at 804.

This appeal presents an occasion when departure from precedent is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law. To the extent they hold that W.S. 35-10-205 authorizes county governments to regulate the sale of fireworks not otherwise regulated by state law, Haddenham II and Gueke misstate the law. Continued adherence to this misanalysis of the law cannot be justified by a commitment to precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.

Wyoming Statute 35-10-205 states:

This act [ §§ 35-10-201 through 35-10-207] shall not be construed to prohibit the imposition by municipal ordinance of further regulations or prohibitions upon the sale, use and possession of fireworks within the corporate limits of any city or town, but no such city or town shall permit or authorize the sale, use, or possession of any fireworks in violation of this act. [emphasis added, brackets in original]

Our general rules of statutory construction are well settled. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we must abide by the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used. Deloges v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div., 750 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Wyo.1988). Wyoming Statute 35-10-205 clearly authorizes cities or towns to adopt more stringent bans upon the use, sale and possession of fireworks, but it contains no similar grant of authority to counties. Our decisions in Haddenham II and Gueke ignore the distinction between counties and municipalities, both in the state statutes governing fireworks regulation and in well established definitions of the terms. The term "municipality" can never include a county government and they "should not be compared any more than apples and oranges, as it is fruitless." Gueke, 728 P.2d at 172 (Macy, J., dissenting).

A municipality has been defined as a "city, borough, town, township or village [and] [a]lso [as] the body of officers taken collectively, belonging to a city, who are appointed to manage its affairs and defend its interests." Black's Law Dictionary 918 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that "[i]n common parlance, and even in legislative and judicial language, the word 'municipality' is applied to towns as well as to cities and incorporated villages." Miller v. Town of Jacobs, 70 Wis. 122, 35 N.W. 324, 325 (1887); see also 27A Words & Phrases 527 et seq. (1961) and (Cum.Supp.1991).

This Court outlined clearly the difference between a city and a county when we stated:

The line of distinction between corporations of a public character, such as counties, townships, and school districts, and municipal corporations proper, such as cities and towns, is clearly marked. The former class of corporations are subdivisions of the state for governmental and other public purposes, while the latter class is called into existence by the will of the people, within the limits expressed by petition, by vote, or by the representatives of the people in the legislature.

Board of Comm'rs v. Searight Cattle Co., 31 P. 268, 277 (Wyo.1892).

Wyoming cities and counties differ in the functions they perform, the authority they possess, and in the way they are created. In his treatise on Wyoming local government, Professor Rudolph explains:

Counties, by reason of their state mandated responsibilities, serve as...

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