Dupree v. State
| Decision Date | 16 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 06–13–00067–CR.,06–13–00067–CR. |
| Citation | 433 S.W.3d 788 |
| Parties | Johaun DUPREE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lew Dunn, Longview, for Appellant.
Zan Colson Brown, Asst. Dist. Atty., Longview, for Appellee.
Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.
Following a trial to the bench, Johaun Dupree was convicted of possession of a weapon in a prohibited place—more specifically, possession of a firearm on the campus of Kilgore College. SeeTex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.03(a), (a)(1) (West 2011). On appeal, Dupree argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant him a new trial due to his lack of competence at the time the case was tried. Because we find the evidence legally insufficient, we reverse Dupree's conviction.
Section 46.03 of the Texas Penal Code, under which Dupree was prosecuted, states,
(a) A person commits an offense if the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possesses or goes with a firearm, illegal knife, club, or prohibited weapon listed in Section 46.05(a):
(1) on the physical premises of a school or educational institution, any grounds or building on which an activity sponsored by a school or educational institution is being conducted, or a passenger transportation vehicle of a school or educational institution, whether the school or educational institution is public or private, unless pursuant to written regulations or written authorization of the institution ....
Id. The word “premises,” as used in Section 46.03(c)(1), means
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.03(c)(1) (West 2011), § 46.035(f)(3) (West Supp.2013).
The indictment against Dupree alleged that he “intentionally or knowingly possess[ed] or [went] with a firearm, on the physical premises of an educational institution, namely Kilgore College.” Dupree argues that there is no evidence that he entered a building or a portion of a building and that, consequently, the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After thoroughly examining the evidence, we agree; there is simply no evidence in the record that Dupree entered a building or a portion of a building on the Kilgore College campus while possessing a handgun.
Two Kilgore College students, William Abt and Brandon Demings, testified that, on the night of April 4, 2012, Dupree confronted them with a pistol on the campus. At trial, Abt and Demings identified Dupree as the man that confronted them.1 Video recordings from April 4 captured by different security cameras located on the Kilgore College campus show a person matching Dupree's description at various locations around the campus. One video recording depicts Dupree sitting on a retaining wall behind a group of students. The video recording also shows Abt approaching the group of students and, shortly thereafter, the students leaving the area. Abt testified that, when he approached the students, he informed them that the individual sitting behind them had a gun. This same video recording also captured Dupree walking on a retaining wall and then walking on a grassy area near the retaining wall.
Demings, who was a resident assistant for one of the Kilgore College dormitories, testified about efforts to corral students and move them away from Dupree and toward safety. He generally identified the on-campus locations where he observed Dupree on April 4, but there is nothing in his testimony that even suggests Dupree entered a building or a portion of a building. Similarly, Wilson testified that he saw Dupree twice, once in a parking lot and once running between some buildings. During Abt's testimony, he indicated on a campus map where he and Wilson encountered Dupree on a grassy area. Neither the trial testimony nor the video-recorded surveillance footage places Dupree in a building or a portion of a building. The State candidly acknowledges that it failed to prove that Dupree entered any building or portion of a building on campus.2
III. AnalysisA. Standard of Review
In evaluating a legal sufficiency challenge, we must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Dupree was guilty of possession of a weapon in a prohibited place. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd) (citing Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury “to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781).
Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge “sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. To prove that Dupree possessed a weapon in a prohibited place, the State was required to prove that (1) he (2) intentionally or knowingly (3) possessed a firearm (4) on the physical premises of an educational institution.
B. Statutory Construction
Dupree argues that the actions he took on April 4, 2012, do not violate Section 46.03 of the Texas Penal Code. He urges an interpretation of Section 46.03 under which only the possession of a prohibited weapon in a building or portion of a building is criminal conduct.3
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, delineating the approach courts should use in construing the meaning of Texas statutes, has stated,
“Under the canons of statutory construction, we are to construe a statute according to its plain language, unless the language is ambiguous or the interpretation would lead to absurd results that the legislature could not have intended.” To do so, we focus on the literal text of the statutory language in question, reading it in context and construing it “according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” In an attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of the text at the time of its enactment, “[w]e assume that every word has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence should be given effect if reasonably possible.” “Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.” It is...
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Thomas v. State
...Court has noted that "[t]he plain meaning of the phrase 'building or a portion of a building' is clear and unambiguous." Dupree v. State, 433 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)The plain meaning of the phrase "building or a portion of a building" is clear and unambiguous. Se......