Hartsfield v. State
Decision Date | 04 February 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 06-09-00006-CR.,06-09-00006-CR. |
Citation | 305 SW 3d 859 |
Parties | Darnell HARTSFIELD, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Donald F. Killingsworth, Killingsworth Law Office, Tyler, for appellant.
Lisa Tanner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Michael E. Jimerson, Rusk County Dist./County Atty., Henderson, for appellee.
Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.
The murder of five persons at the Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) restaurant in Kilgore, Texas, remained an unsolved mystery for more than twenty years. After the advent of DNA technology, Darnell Hartsfield was linked to the crime scene by deposits of his blood on a box. See Hartsfield v. State, 200 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd). A Brazos County1 jury found Hartsfield guilty of capital murder. The death penalty had been waived; Hartsfield was sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals,2 raising two issues: (1) the evidence was not legally or factually sufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an extraneous offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. This appeal involves the death of Opie Hughes.
Between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. on September 23, 1983, Star Spagano was waiting in line to order at the Kentucky Fried Chicken in Kilgore, Texas. Star and the two young men behind her in line were close enough to the front counter to overhear the telephone conversation between KFC employee Kim Tyler and her mother, KFC manager Mary Tyler, wherein Kim told Mary that the afternoon deposit had not been made and that there was $2,000.00 in the register. Spagano identified Hartsfield as the man immediately behind her in line at the KFC.
After the KFC closed for the night, several persons entered the restaurant, and a struggle ensued, resulting in a large dent in the wall and significant amounts of Mary's blood on the floor and in the KFC office. The perpetrators took the money from the registers as well as the bank deposit bags. Three of the five victims, Opie Hughes, Mary Tyler, and Joey Johnson, were employees working at the time. David Maxwell was at the restaurant to give Johnson a ride home, and Monty Landers accompanied Maxwell. When Mary did not return home at the usual time, her worried husband drove to the KFC and found no one there and the cash registers open and emptied. The next morning, the bodies of the victims were found in an oil field in Rusk County. Each had been shot several times and was dead.
In Hartsfield's first and second points of error, he contends that the evidence supporting his conviction was legally and factually insufficient. We disagree.
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512 (Tex.Crim.App.2009); Roberts v. State, 273 S.W.3d 322 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). This standard mandates that the reviewing court accord deference to the fact-finder's duty to resolve conflicts in testimony and other evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.App.2007). In our review, we must evaluate all of the evidence in the record, both properly and improperly admitted, both direct and circumstantial, to determine whether the cumulative force of all the evidence (direct, circumstantial, or both) supports the verdict when such evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to that verdict. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007); Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
"Evidence may be factually insufficient if: `1) it is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or 2) the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence.'" Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847, 854 (Tex. Crim.App.2007) (quoting Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 11). Under this standard, we must afford "due deference" to the fact-finder's determinations. Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); see Young v. State, 242 S.W.3d 192, 198 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2007, no pet.). And although when we review the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we have the ability to second-guess the fact-finder to a limited degree, we should nonetheless be deferential, with a high level of skepticism about the fact-finder's verdict required before a reversal can occur. Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); Young, 242 S.W.3d at 198-99. We use a hypothetically correct jury charge to evaluate both the legal and factual sufficiency of evidence. Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).
The standard of factual review to be applied on appeal is the same regardless of whether the State uses direct or circumstantial evidence. King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we should look at "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); see Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (); Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex.Crim. App.1994); Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Earls v. State, 707 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) ( ). "Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).
A person commits capital murder if he or she intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual while in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(1) (Vernon 2003), § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.2009); Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 535 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Frank v. State, 183 S.W.3d 63, 72 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd). The law of parties applies to the offense of capital murder. Johnson, 853 S.W.2d at 534; Frank, 183 S.W.3d at 72.
Under the law of parties, "a person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 2003); Frank, 183 S.W.3d at 72. A person is "criminally responsible" for an offense committed by the conduct of another, if acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he or she solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003); Frank, 183 S.W.3d at 72. Evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties when the defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its commission by words or other agreement. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (op. on reh'g); Frank, 183 S.W.3d at 72-73. In determining whether a defendant participated in an offense as a party, the fact-finder may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant that show an understanding and common design to commit the offense. Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302; Cordova, 698 S.W.2d at 111; Frank, 183 S.W.3d at 73.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(b) (Vernon 2003); Frank, 183 S.W.3d at 73.
The primary points of contention are Spagano's identification of Hartsfield, the box with Hartsfield's blood on it, Hartsfield's connection to a white van on the premises, and the totality of the physical evidence linking Hartsfield to the crime.
While Spagano and her boyfriend waited in line at the KFC (he was in front of her in line), she was a mere foot or two away from the two young African-American men immediately behind her. She testified that she "actually turned around and looked at him" and that she "was sure" that the photograph she picked out (Hartsfield) was the man standing immediately behind her in line. Ranger Glenn Elliott's notes describe her identification as "she is sure." At trial, she testified that she...
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