Dupuis v. Vanguard Car Rental Usa, Inc.

• Decision Date: 24 September 2007
• Docket Number: No. 6:06-cv-1360-Orl-18KRS.,6:06-cv-1360-Orl-18KRS.
• Citation: 510 F.Supp.2d 980
• Parties: Jeanette DUPUIS, Frank Carra, Plaintiffs, v. VANGUARD CAR RENTAL USA, INC., d/b/a Alamo Rent-A-Car, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

510 F.Supp.2d 980

Jeanette DUPUIS, Frank Carra, Plaintiffs, v. VANGUARD CAR RENTAL USA, INC., d/b/a Alamo Rent-A-Car, Defendant.

No. 6:06-cv-1360-Orl-18KRS.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Orlando Division.

September 24, 2007.

Andre M. Mura, John Vail, Center for Constitutional Litigation, PC, Washington, DC, Paul B. Irvin, Troutman, Williams, Irvin, Green, Helms & Polich, PA, Winter Park, FL, for Plaintiffs.

James Paul Waczewski, Paul S. Jones, Luks, Santaniello, Perez, Petrillo & Gold, Orlando, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

G. KENDALL SHARP, Senior District Judge.

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant Vanguard Car Rental USA. Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27, filed June 29, 2007), to winch Plaintiffs Jeanette Dupuis and Frank Carra responded in opposition. (Doc. 31, filed July 30, 2007.) Plaintiffs Jeanette Dupuis and Frank Carra ("Plaintiffs") bring this action against Defendant Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc. ("Defendant") to recover tort damages. After reviewing the motions and memoranda provided by each party, the Court grants Defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant is a corporation that rents automobiles on a short-term basis (for a period of less than one year). On December 8, 2005. Defendant entered into a rental agreement with Michelle H. Ross. Ross took possession of a 2006 Pontiac G6 under the rental agreement as a shortterm lessee. Later that same day, Ross was involved in a two-car collision with a vehicle driven by Plaintiff Jeanette Dupuis. There is no dispute that Dupuis suffered injuries as a result of the collision. Plaintiffs further allege that Carra. Dupuis's husband, suffered from loss of consortium of his spouse. Plaintiffs do not allege that any act of negligence or criminal wrongdoing by the Defendant contributed to the collision. Plaintiffs initiated this action to recover damages from Defendant, as owner and lessor of the vehicle driven by Ross. (Doc. 2, filed September 8, 2006.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court will grant summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see, e.g., Stachel v. City of Cape Canaveral, 51 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1329 (M.D.Fla.1999). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Disputed issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary judgment, but factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary do not. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether the moving party has satisfied its burden, the Court considers all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolves all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538. 587-88 (1986). The moving party may rely solely on the pleading to satisfy its burden. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548. A non-moving party bearing the burden of proof, however, must go beyond the pleadings and submit affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions that designate specific facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the evidence offered by the non-moving party is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, the Court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Similarly, summary judgment is mandated against a party who fails to prove an essential element of its case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

This controversy is appropriate for summary judgment, as no issue exists as to any material fact. The parties raise two issues to be decided as matters of law: first, whether the Graves Amendment preempts Florida's strict vicarious liability scheme for lessors of motor vehicles and second, whether such preemption is a constitutional exercise of congressional power. (Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 31 at 3-4.)

B. Florida's Strict Vicarious Liability Scheme

Florida's strict vicarious liability for motor vehicle owners emerged from the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 626, 631 (1920). "Among the principles of the common law ... are those that require the exercise of due care in the use of the public highways of instrumentalities that re peculiarly dangerous ... and impose upon the owner of such an instrumentality liability ... for injuries ... proximately caused by the negligent use of the instrumentality ... by anyone who has the authority or permission of the owner to use or operate it." Id. at 636 (Whitfield, J. concurring). Lessors, as owners of the vehicle, were not able to avoid application of this doctrine through lease agreements. Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832, 836 (Fla.1959). Thus, a lessor was subject to strict vicarious liability for the negligence of its lessee and other permissive users. Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Fla.1993). However, the Florida Legislature set specific limits on the liability of lessors in Fla. Stat. § 324.021(9)(b)(2). Caps of $350,000 and $500,000 (depending on the insurance carried by the driver and lessor) protect the innocent lessor from the negligence of a short-term lessee. Id.

C The Graves Amendment

On August 10, 2005. the Safe. Accountable, Flexible. Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users ("SAFETEA-LU"). Pub.L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005), was signed into law. Among the provisions of SAFETEA-LU is a section dealing with rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility, codified as 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2006) ("the Graves Amendment"). The Graves Amendment provides:

(a) In general. — An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—

(1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles: and

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

Id.

There is no dispute that Defendant is engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles. (Doc. 27 at 1; Doc. 31 at 11.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant committed any act of negligence or criminal wrongdoing. (See Doc. 2.) The Graves Amendment expressly preempts any state law holding vehicle owners liable for the negligence of drivers during a short-term lease of the vehicle, provided that the owner is engaged in the business of leasing vehicles and has not committed any wrong. However. § 30106(b) provides two exceptions for "financial responsibility laws." The first applies to state laws that "impos[e] financial responsibility or insurance standards on the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and operating a motor vehicle." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(1). The second applies to state laws "imposing liability [on lessors] for failure to meet the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements." 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2). These exceptions preserve state requirements for liability insurance or other forms of financial accountability prior to vehicle licensing or registration (in the first subsection) and allow enforcement of those requirements specifically against "those engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles" (in the second subsection). Id.

D. Preemption of Florida's Vicarious Liability Scheme

In determining how the Graves Amendment should be given effect in Florida, "[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917). Plaintiffs have sought to introduce ambiguity into the Graves Amendment by offering a reading of 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b)(2) that would preserve state laws that impose post-accident liability for lessors.¹ (Doc. 31 at 10.) Such a broad reading would allow the exception to swallow the rule. "In construing provisions ... in which a general statement of policy is qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision." Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989). See also A.H. Phillips. Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493, 65 S.Ct. 807, 89 L.Ed. 1095 (1945) ("To extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process and to frustrate the announced will of the people.")

As the meaning of 49 U.S.C. § 30106 is clear from the statute's language, no further interpretation is required or even allowable. The Graves Amendment is a clear expression of congressional intent to preempt Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine as applied to short-term motor vehicle lessors. Accord Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA. Inc., No. 5:06-cv-220-Oc-10GRJ, 510 F.Supp.2d 821, 833-34, 2007 WL 686625, at *9 (M.D.Fla. Mar.5,...