Duran v. Vigil (In re Estate of Vigil)

• Decision Date: 01 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 31,184.,31,184.
• Citation: 296 P.3d 1209
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Eligio VIGIL, Deceased, Benjamin M. Duran, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Pilar Vigil, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Tony Vigil, Personal Representative of the Estate of Eligio Vigil, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

296 P.3d 1209

In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Eligio VIGIL, Deceased,
Benjamin M. Duran, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Pilar Vigil, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Tony Vigil, Personal Representative of the Estate of Eligio Vigil, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 31,184.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Sept. 17, 2012.
Certiorari Denied, Nov. 1, 2012, No. 33,858.

Ben A. Longwill, Las Cruces, NM, for Appellant.

Jane B. Yohalem, Santa Fe, NM, Leof T. Strand, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee.

OPINION
VANZI, Judge.

{1} Appellant Benjamin M. Duran (Duran) appeals from a district court order concerning the distribution of the Estate of Eligio Vigil (the Estate). We address three issues on appeal: (1) whether the Legislature intended that statutory allowances that were not claimed while the surviving spouse was alive be transferred to the estate of the surviving spouse after her death, (2) whether the district court erred in finding that Appellant

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failed to prove that he made tax payments on the homestead owned by the Estate from his personal funds, and (3) whether the district court erred in directing distribution of the remaining assets in the Estate directly to the heirs of the surviving spouse rather than to the personal representative of her estate. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} The following facts are undisputed. Eligio Vigil (Eligio) died intestate on September 23, 1999. At the time of his death, Eligio was married to Pilar Vigil (Pilar). Eligio and Pilar had no children together as this was a second marriage for each of them, but they each had three children from prior marriages.

{3} On May 1, 2000, Pilar petitioned the district court to appoint her as the sole personal representative of the Estate. Eligio's son, Tony Vigil (Tony), responded and also asked to be appointed personal representative and that the administration be supervised. The district court appointed both Pilar and Tony as co-personal representatives of the Estate, ordered unsupervised administration without bond, and ordered that letters of administration be issued to both personal representatives upon qualification and acceptance.

{4} Pilar died intestate on May 18, 2006, having survived Eligio by seven years. At the time of her death, the case involving the Estate had been administratively closed due to inaction. Tony filed a motion to reopen on June 9, 2009. The motion stated that Pilar had died, that her son, Duran, was appointed as the personal representative of his mother's estate by the Doña Ana County Probate Court, and that Duran intended to replace Pilar as the co-personal representative of Eligio's Estate. The motion was granted, and the district court entered an order of substitution of co-personal representative and substitution of counsel on July 14, 2009.

{5} On May 20, 2010, Tony moved to set aside Duran's appointment of substitution of co-personal representative on the basis that no letters testamentary and acceptance were ever issued to Pilar. Before the motion was ruled on, Duran filed a petition for order of complete settlement adjudicating final distribution of the Estate. The petition provided that the only asset remaining in the Estate of any value was property (Rinconada property). The Rinconada property was sold in March 2010 for $150,000, netting $136,026.12 for the Estate. Duran stated that “disagreements have arisen between the [c]o-[p]ersonal [r]epresentatives” about the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the property that were “resting in the trust account” of Tony's attorney. The petition requested payment to Pilar's estate of a $30,000 statutory family allowance and a $15,000 personal property allowance, prior to distribution of the remaining assets pursuant to the Probate Code's rules of intestate succession. SeeNMSA 1978, §§ 45–2–402 (1995), 45–2–403 (1999) (amended 2011). Further, Duran asked to be personally reimbursed in the amount of $3,967.35 for property taxes that he claimed to have paid on the Rinconada property from 2000–2009. Finally, in his capacity as personal representative of Pilar's estate, Duran requested distribution of Pilar's one-fourth intestate share and reimbursement of attorney fees.

{6} Tony also filed a proposal for distribution of the Estate's remaining assets and an accompanying memorandum in support. The proposal agreed that one-fourth of the intestate share should be distributed to the heirs of Pilar but opposed the granting of either a personal property or family allowance to Pilar's estate. With regard to Duran's claim for reimbursement of the $3,967.35 in property taxes, Tony's proposal asked the district court to consider the request in light of the limitation on presentation of claims set forth in NMSA 1978, Section 45–3–803 (1993) (amended 2011).

{7} The district court held a hearing on January 3, 2011, and the parties presented evidence and argument. After allowing both sides to submit requested findings and conclusions, the court ruled that (1) the statutory allowance claims by Pilar's estate were precluded by laches and equitable estoppel and that, alternatively, it would be inconsistent with the Legislature's intent to award these allowances to Pilar's estate or heirs of a surviving spouse after her death; and (2) although principles of equity would generally

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require reimbursement for payment of taxes, in this case, Duran had not provided sufficient evidence that he had actually paid the taxes and, therefore, his claim was denied. The district court also ordered distribution of the Estate by intestate succession and right of representation directly to the heirs. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

{8} Duran raises three issues on appeal. He contends that (1) the district court erred in denying the family and personal property allowances to the estate of Pilar, (2) the district court erred in denying Duran's claim for reimbursement for property taxes paid by him individually, and (3) the district court erred in directing distribution to the heirs of the surviving spouse rather than to the personal representative of her estate. We take each of Duran's arguments in turn.

Our Legislature Did Not Intend That Statutory Allowances Be Transferred to the Estate of the Surviving Spouse

{9} Duran's first issue on appeal is that the district court erred in denying the family and personal property allowances to Pilar's estate. The district court found that, based on the conduct of Pilar and/or her then attorney, her estate's statutory allowance claims were precluded by the doctrines of laches and equitable estoppel. In the alternative, the court ruled that it would be inconsistent with the Legislature's intent that the statutory allowances, which are meant to provide for a surviving spouse during her lifetime, should be awarded to Pilar's estate or heirs after her death. We conclude that the Legislature did not intend that the personal allowances be transferred from the estate of the first spouse to the estate of the surviving spouse. Accordingly, we do not reach the question of whether our Legislature intended to immunize the statutory allowances from all equitable and legal defenses.

{10} Because our review requires us to interpret provisions of the Probate Code, our review is de novo. United Rentals Nw., Inc. v. Yearout Mech., Inc., 2010–NMSC–030, ¶ 7, 148 N.M. 426, 237 P.3d 728. “The principal objective in the judicial construction of statutes is to determine and give effect to the intent of the [L]egislature.” Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed'n of Teachers, 1998–NMSC–020, ¶ 28, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that when a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” United Rentals, 2010–NMSC–030, ¶ 9, 148 N.M. 426, 237 P.3d 728 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Further, we construe the Probate Code in light of its purpose and interpret it “to mean what the Legislature intended it to mean, and to accomplish the ends sought to be accomplished by it.” San Juan Agric. Water Users Ass'n v. KNME–TV, 2011–NMSC–011, ¶ 14, 150 N.M. 64, 257 P.3d 884 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{11} Sections 45–2–402 and –403 govern the family and personal property allowance provisions at issue in this case. Section 45–2–402 states, in relevant part, that “[a] decedent's surviving spouse is entitled to a family allowance of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000). If there is no surviving spouse, each minor child and each dependent child of the decedent is entitled to a family allowance.” Section 45–2–403 similarly provides a personal property allowance in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects to the surviving spouse in an amount not to exceed $15,000.

{12} Neither provision specifically addresses what happens if the allowances are not claimed prior to the death of the surviving spouse. What is clear, however, is that these separate allowances are designated specifically for the personal well being of the surviving spouse and are not treated the same as amounts inherited from the decedent by will or intestate succession. See§§ 45–2–402, –403; In re Estate of Jewell, 2001–NMCA–008, ¶ 9, 130 N.M. 93, 18 P.3d 334 (“The purpose of the [statutory] allowances is to ensure that a surviving spouse is not left penniless and abandoned by the death of a spouse.” (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted)). It would serve no statutory purpose to transfer the allowances to the surviving—and in this case unrelated—heirs of a surviving spouse. “It is fundamental that statutes will be construed so that their application will be neither absurd nor unreasonable.” ...