Dwelle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

• Decision Date: 13 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1D02-1683.,1D02-1683.
• Citation: 839 So.2d 897
• Parties: Scott DWELLE, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

839 So.2d 897

Scott DWELLE, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 1D02-1683.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 13, 2003.

Virginia M. Buchanan of Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Ecshner & Proctor, P.A., and Louis K. Rosenbloum of Louis K. Rosenbloum, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellant.

Michael D. Hook of Hook, Bolton, Mitchell, Kirkland & McGhee, Pensacola, for Appellee.

ERVIN, J.

This is an appeal from a final declaratory judgment determining that appellant, Scott Dwelle, was not a resident relative of his parents' household for the purpose of his entitlement to uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. Because we conclude he was a resident relative, we reverse and remand with directions that judgment be entered for appellant.

This appeal arises from a suit filed by appellee, State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, relating to UM coverage extended by two contracts of automobile liability insurance that State Farm had provided to Dwelle's parents. These two contracts were in force on September 23, 2000, when Dwelle was injured in a collision with another vehicle driven by an intoxicated uninsured motorist. The accident occurred approximately six hours after Dwelle's marriage to Lori Dwelle, who was killed in the accident, while the two were en route to their honeymoon destination. After Dwelle had made demand for UM benefits provided under his parents' policies, State Farm sought a declaratory judgment declaring Dwelle was not a "relative" of his parents' household as defined in the policies, because at the time of the accident he was not "a person related to [them] ... who resided primarily with [them]." Both Dwelle and State Farm filed motions for summary judgment. In granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm, the trial court agreed with its primary argument that Dwelle did not meet the policies' definition of relative because he was a resident of his own separate household, as shown by his sworn statement of January 11, 2001, disclosing that upon his return from his honeymoon, he intended to share an apartment in Alabama leased by his wife.

Because we are reviewing the propriety of the grant of summary judgment, our review standard is de novo. Therefore, we are not obliged to defer to the trial court's findings in that we apply the same standard as that imposed by the trial court, meaning that summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000).

In entering judgment for State Farm, we conclude that the lower court too narrowly focused on Dwelle's statement of where he intended to reside in the future, and not upon other salient facts. All of the relevant facts must be taken into consideration for the purpose of establishing the following three aspects of household or residency under an insurance policy: (1) close ties of kinship, (2) fixed dwelling unit, and (3) enjoyment of all the living facilities. Row v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 474 So.2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Gen. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Broxsie, 239 So.2d 595, 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1970).

Applying these three elements to the facts at bar, it is obvious that the first is easily established. Appellant is the biological son of the named insureds in the two policies. Likewise, the third element is indisputably borne out in that Dwelle at all times maintained a key to his parents' residence and enjoyed the use of his room, as well as the entire house and all the utilities. He was also able to drive any of the family's four vehicles. It is the second element that is in question in this case, because Dwelle stayed at places other than his parents' home from time to time.

The determination of whether the second aspect has been satisfied turns on the application of two alternative theories: (1) that Dwelle was a relative living primarily with his insured parents at the time of the accident, and (2) that he maintained his residency at his parents' household as a dependent child living away from home while attending school. In our judgment, either of these two theories, when applied to the pertinent facts, adequately demonstrate that Dwelle, at the time of the accident, maintained his residency at his parents' fixed dwelling.

Dwelle testified that he had grown up in his parents' home in Pensacola. After graduating from high school, he attended Pensacola Junior College for two years while continuing to live at home. Thereafter, he attended the University of South Alabama and lived on campus in a dormitory. At the time of his January 2001 statement, he had been continuously enrolled at South Alabama and expected to graduate in May 2001. In May 2000, before the accident, he was required to move out of the dormitory due to renovations, so he returned home and lived with his parents, driving back and forth from Pensacola to Mobile for part-time schooling and work during the summer of 2000. Most of his personal belongings were in his parents' home and remained there at the time of the accident. Dwelle's future spouse, Lori, also moved from the dormitory in May 2000, and took out a one-year lease on an apartment in nearby Daphne, Alabama, where she intended to reside while working in Theodore, Alabama, and finishing graduate school.

After Lori obtained the apartment, Dwelle stayed there periodically, but also spent several nights a week and weekends at his parents' home. Two-and-a-half weeks before the September 23 wedding, Dwelle procured a part-time job with the City of Mobile, giving Pensacola as his permanent address. He testified that he planned to move into the apartment in Daphne after the honeymoon. Nevertheless, because the couple had no fixed plan of where to live, Dwelle believed they would probably return to Pensacola, where both had been raised. Living with either set of parents was an option open to them. Dwelle testified that he was still financially dependent on his parents at the time of the accident, as was Lori on hers. His parents paid the expenses for his school, dormitory, food, and car, and they would continue to pay his expenses after the marriage until the couple could become financially independent. He...