Dworning v. Euclid
Decision Date | 08 July 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 2007-0307.,2007-0307. |
Parties | DWORNING, Appellee, v. CITY OF EUCLID et al., Appellants. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Christopher R. Geidner and Robert J. Krummen, Deputy Solicitors, and Duffy Jamieson, Assistant Attorney General, urging affirmance for amicus curiae state of Ohio.
Fortney & Klingshirn and Neil E. Klingshirn, Akron; Gittes & Schulte, Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro, Columbus, urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Employment Lawyers' Association, Ohio NOW Legal Education Defense Fund, Committee Against Sexual Harassment, Ohio State Legal Services Association, and Columbus Branch of the Ohio NAACP.
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we are asked to determine whether a public employee who alleges discriminatory practices must first exhaust the public employer's administrative remedies before pursuing the civil action allowed by R.C. Chapter 4112. We hold that the employee need not do so.
{¶ 2} Appellee Michael Dworning was employed by appellant city of Euclid for almost 30 years as a firefighter and was serving as fire chief at the time of his separation from employment. Under Section 7, Article V, Charter of the City of Euclid, the fire chief is a member of the classified service. On March 4, 2004, the mayor of Euclid sent a letter to the Euclid Civil Service Commission, stating that Dworning was terminated from his position effective February 20, 2004. A few days later, the mayor sent another letter to the commission, indicating that Dworning had submitted a retirement notice on March 8, 2004, effective as of February 20, 2004.
{¶ 3} Dworning did not file an appeal with the commission to contest his employment termination. Instead, he instituted this action on October 26, 2004, against appellants, the city of Euclid, Thomas Cosgriff, Jim Slivers, and two John Does. The complaint alleged claims of discrimination based on disability, aiding unlawful discriminatory practices, invasion of privacy through disclosure of privileged medical information, defamation, breach of employment contract, and civil conspiracy.
{¶ 4} Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Dworning's complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies when he did not appeal his alleged constructive discharge to the commission. The trial court granted appellants' motion for summary judgment on this ground.
{¶ 5} The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed. The appellate court concluded:
{¶ 6} Dworning v. Euclid, 8th Dist. No. 87757, 2006-Ohio-6772, 2006 WL 3743822, ¶ 65.
{¶ 7} We accepted this case as a discretionary appeal. Appellants contend that to sustain the utility of civil service procedures to redress alleged employment wrongs in the public employment setting, this court should require public employees to exhaust internal administrative remedies before launching premature, expansive, and potentially unnecessary employment lawsuits against public employers. Dworning responds that because the statutory language of R.C. Chapter 4112 is clear and unambiguous, we should not allow a municipality to defeat the chapter's purpose by requiring a public employee to exhaust internal administrative remedies before filing civil a action against the employer. We agree with Dworning.
{¶ 8} As the Eighth District correctly noted, this case involves the interaction between two public policies: the policy requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies and the policy against discrimination in an employment setting, which is codified in R.C. Chapter 4112. Each policy will be analyzed before we determine their relationship to each other.
{¶ 9} It is a well-established principle of Ohio law that a party seeking relief from an administrative decision must pursue available administrative remedies before pursuing action in a court. Noernberg v. Brook Park (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 26, 29, 17 O.O.3d 16, 406 N.E.2d 1095, citing State ex rel. Lieux v. Westlake (1951), 154 Ohio St. 412, 43 O.O. 343, 96 N.E.2d 414. We have stated, Nemazee v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr. (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 109, 111-112, 564 N.E.2d 477.
{¶ 10} The exhaustion doctrine is not without exception. For instance, when there is a judicial remedy that is intended to be separate from the administrative remedy, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply. Basic Distrib. Corp. v. Ohio Dept. of Taxation (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 287, 290, 762 N.E.2d 979.
{¶ 11} The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional defect but is rather an affirmative defense, if timely asserted and maintained. Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388, syllabus. In this case, appellants asserted the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies in their answer and then sought summary judgment based on the defense.
{¶ 12} Pursuant to the home rule powers granted to municipalities by Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the city of Euclid has adopted a charter that gives the mayor the power to remove any officer or employee of the city. Section 2(D), Article IV, Euclid Charter. That power is subject to the commission's duty under Section 7, Article V, Euclid Charter, to hear appeals from a decision by the mayor to remove an employee.
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 124.40, the commission has the authority to promulgate rules not inconsistent with R.C. Chapter 124. The Local Rules of the Civil Service Commission provide:
{¶ 14} "8.2 DISCHARGE OR REDUCTION IN RANK OR COMPENSATION. No person in the classified service shall be discharged or reduced in rank or compensation without being notified, in writing, by the Appointing Authority or officer of the reasons of such discharge or reduction.
{¶ 15} "8.3 REQUEST FOR HEARING UPON SUSPENSION, DISCHARGE OR REDUCTION. Any employee, officer or holder of a position in the classified service may request a hearing before the Appointing Authority to appeal the notice of suspension, discharge or reduction in rank or compensation.
{¶ 16} "(A) Time Requirement for Defense of Charge. Any employee, officer, or holder of a position in the classified service requesting a hearing before the Appointing Authority on discharge or reduction in rank or compensation of such employee, officer, or holder must make such request within ten days of receiving notice from the appointing officer of discharge or reduction.
{¶ 17} "(B) Time Schedule for Hearing before Appointing Authority. The appointing officer shall, within ten days of receiving a request by an employee for a hearing on the discharge or reduction, set the date for such hearing.
{¶ 18} "8.4 APPEAL TO COMMISSION. In the event of an adverse decision made or affirmed against an employee in the appeal to the Appointing Authority or officer, said employee may file an appeal with the commission. Such appeal for the Commission must be filed in writing within ten days after the date of the adverse decision.
{¶ 19} "(A) Time Schedule for Hearing Before the Commission. Upon receipt of notice of appeal, the Commission shall forthwith notify the Appointing Authority or officer and shall have a hearing on the issue no later than thirty days from the filing of the appeal with the Commission.
{¶ 20} "(B) Decision of Commission. The Commission, upon hearing testimony, may affirm,...
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