Dwyer v. State

• Decision Date: 17 January 1956
• Citation: 151 Me. 382,120 A.2d 276
• Parties: Paul N. DWYER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 276

120 A.2d 276

151 Me. 382

Paul N. DWYER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 17, 1956.

Verrill, Dana, Walker, Philbrick & Whitehouse, Portland, for petitioner.

Frank F. Harding, Atty. Gen., Roger A. Putnam, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Before FELLOWS, C. J., and WILLIAMSON, WEBBER, BELIVEAU, TAPLEY and CLARKE, JJ.

FELLOWS, Chief Justice.

This is a petition filed at the November term, 1955 of the Superior Court for Oxford County, asking that a writ of error coram nobis issue; that a hearing be had on the writ, and that the petitioner's plea of guilty to an indictment for murder, made at the November term, 1937, of said Superior Court, be stricken from the record. Questions of law having arisen as to whether the Court has the jurisdiction to hear such a petition, and to issue the writ of error coram nobis thereon, and the parties agreeing thereto, the presiding Justice ordered the case reported to the Law Court for decision. The order of the presiding Justice states that 'if the Law Court is of the opinion that this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this petition, this matter to stand for hearing on the petition,' and if the Court does not have jurisdiction, the petition to be dismissed.

The claims of the petitioner, Paul N. Dwyer, as alleged in this petition for the writ of error coram nobis, are 'that your petitioner was indicted by the Grand Jury of the County of Oxford on November 5, 1937 for the murder of one Dr. Littlefield; that after a plea of not guilty had been entered by your petitioner and a jury trial had been commenced, your petitioner, under conditions hereinafter related, changed his plea to guilty; that the plea of guilty to murder was accepted by the court; that he was subsequently sentenced on December 2, 1937 to the State Prison at Thomaston for a life sentence; that your petitioner has for the eighteen years since said date, and currently is, serving this sentence at said prison.'

'That your petitioner was coerced into making a plea of guilty by duress and threats of violence by one Francis M. Carroll, an official of the State of Maine, viz., a Deputy Sheriff of Oxford County duly appointed according to law, subsequently convicted by a jury of his peers for the crime to which your petitioner pleaded guilty.'

'The duress involved was the culmination of a long series of events which effectively deprived your petitioner, then a minor of seventeen years of age of independent action when he felt himself under the immediate control of the said Francis M. Carroll.'

'The period preceding the actual murder of Dr. Littlefield was marked by several instances where Francis M. Carroll imposed his will upon your petitioner. In the winter of 1936 the said Carroll with threats of physical violence and by other intimidations coerced your petitioner into typing certain threatening letters to one George R. Morton, president of a manufacturing concern in South Paris, Maine for the purpose of frightening the said Morton into hiring Francis Carroll for a guard's position.'

'Again on October 7, 1937 the said Carroll threatened to 'ruin' your petitioner and his mother unless certain letters incriminating Francis M. Carroll of the crime of incest in the possession of your petitioner were relinquished to Carroll.'

'Your petitioner states that the dominance over him by Francis M. Carroll was heightened by the threats of Carroll to destroy the romance between your petitioner and Barbara Carroll, and by the emotional shock of witnessing the murders of Dr. and Mrs. Littlefield.'

'During the period between the murder of Dr. Littlefield and the arrest of your petitioner, there were many direct threats to the lives of your petitioner and his mother by Francis Carroll. Your petitioner believed and was reasonable in believing that Carroll was able to, and intended to, carry out his threats against your petitioner and those dear to him.'

'After your petitioner's arrest he made efforts to keep from being returned to the custody of the said Carroll by deliberately confessing to crimes which he did not commit in order to place the crimes in jurisdictions other than Oxford County.'

'Your petitioner alleges that the effect of the combined threats, intimidations, influences, etc., resulting in the following events, such as causing him in the winter of 1936 to type the threatening 'Morton' letters; causing him to betray confidences; on October 10, 1937, forcing the surrender of incriminating evidence of Carroll's criminal acts upon his children; on October 15, 1937, causing the making of false statements in New Jersey and New Cloucester; on October 17, 1937, forcing him to utter the false story of robbers and narcotics rings at Augusta State Hospital; forcing him to recant his assertions to his attorney, Abbott; finally culminated on December 1, 1937 in the forcing from your petitioner a plea of guilty to a crime which your petitioner did not commit and of which he is entirely innocent.'

'Wherefore your petitioner prays; that a writ of Coram Nobis issue; that this matter be set for hearing before this Honorable Court as soon as feasible; that the Warden of the State Prison at Thomaston Maine be ordered to deliver your petitioner at the time and place set for such hearing so that he may be present and testify thereat; and that the aforesaid plea of guilty be stricken from the records of this case and that he be discharged.'

The above petition for the writ of error coram nobis was signed by the petitioner on September 13, 1955, and his affidavit then taken before a Notary Public.

The petitioner, who has been in prison seventeen years under a life sentence, imposed after his plea of guilty to an indictment for the murder of Dr. Littlefield, seeks to have his plea adjudged void for duress under the common-law writ of error coram nobis. The petition discloses the grounds on which the writ is sought. In brief, the petitioner contends that the then deputy sheriff most closely connected with petitioner's surveillance prior to this trial for murder, one Francis Carroll, who was later himself convicted of the same murder by a jury, caused petitioner, although innocent, to plead guilty to avoid harm to himself and his mother.

The error sought to be attacked by the proposed use of the writ is an error of fact or mixed fact and law, not known and not appearing at the time of trial, and thus not one of record. Although the writ has sometimes been applied for in criminal cases in the Superior Court of Maine, and the writ of coram nobis has issued, the question as to whether or not the remedy still exists in Maine has not been directly decided.

The issues in this case are whether or not the ancient remedy of writ of error coram nobis is available to a petitioner who wishes to attack a criminal judgment for errors not known or not appearing at the time, and not apparent of record, which if known would have prevented the judgment, and whether the writ should issue on the petition.

Is the writ of error coram nobis a proper procedural remedy for this petitioner in order to raise in the Courts of this State the question as to deprivation of his constitutional rights, both State and Federal, before, at, and during his trial?

The status of the law on this particular issue is in doubt, and this is the first time that this issue has been clearly presented to the Law Court for determination.

Since the recent advent of Federal review of State criminal proceedings in Maine, the State's position has been (according to the State's brief) that a prisoner in a State penal institution has not exhausted his State remedies until he has asked for a writ of error coram nobis. It is the State's position that the prisoner does not necessarily exhaust his State remedies by resorting to habeas corpus.

Habeas corpus was the remedy pursued in this State by one Green (See Green v. Robbins, D.C., 120 F.Supp. 61, affirmed in Robbins v. Green, 1 Cir., 218 F.2d 192) and is the remedy which is repeatedly used by prisoners. Generally speaking, the writ of habeas corpus will lie to test jurisdiction. It is jurisdiction of two things, (1) of the crime, viz.: Did the Court that tried this case acquire jurisdiction of the crime and does it have jurisdiction over the crime? (2) of the person, viz.: Did the Court have jurisdiction of the accused? If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, then the Court has the right and duty in habeas corpus to remand the prisoner in execution of his sentence. See Wallace v. White, 115 Me. 513, 99 A. 452. It was long ago settled that persons imprisoned on criminal process are not to be released on habeas corpus for defects in matters of form only. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a plea in abatement, or a motion to quash. Nor can it be substituted for an appeal. A writ of error may be the proper remedy. An application for the writ of habeas corpus is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court; and the writ will not be granted unless the real and substantial justice of the case demands it. O'Malia v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 129, 132.

As a technical proposition, habeas corpus dismissed after hearing, is not res adjudicata, Turgeon v. Bean, 109 Me. 189, 83 A. 557, but as a practical proposition it does so operate. After one Judge has dismissed a petition, or dismissed the writ, and the same petitioner files the same or similar petition to the same or another Judge, the first decision (if known by the presiding Justice) will generally be followed and dismissal ordered. Dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus has also been properly ordered by a Judge in habeas corpus proceedings, when a writ of error was more suitable.

The U. S. Supreme Court has pointed out many times that there should be a post-conviction procedure within the various states which will be broad enough to cover all deprivations of constitutional rights under the ...