Dwyer v. State (In re Dwyer)

• Decision Date: 21 September 2015
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 15SA22
• Citation: 357 P.3d 185,2015 CO 58
• Parties: In re: Lindi DWYER and Paul Dwyer, as individuals and parents of Jayda Dwyer, Joslyn Dwyer, Janesha Dwyer, and Jentri Dwyer; Terri Siewiyumptewa, as an individual and as parent and natural guardian of Shane Siewiyumptewa and Kristen Johnson; Tracey Weeks and Monty Weeks, as individuals and as parents of Jared Weeks and Jordyn Weeks; Terri Piland and Jeffrey Piland, as individuals and as parents of Joseph Piland and George Piland; Colorado Rural Schools Caucus a/k/a Rural Alliance ; East Central Board of Cooperative Educational Services; Colorado PTA ; Boulder Valley School District; Colorado Springs School District No. 11 ; Mancos School District; Holyoke School District ; and Plateau Valley School District 50, Plaintiffs, v. The STATE of Colorado; Robert Hammond, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Education of the State of Colorado; and John Hickenlooper, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado, Defendants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

357 P.3d 185

2015 CO 58

In re: Lindi DWYER and Paul Dwyer, as individuals and parents of Jayda Dwyer, Joslyn Dwyer, Janesha Dwyer, and Jentri Dwyer; Terri Siewiyumptewa, as an individual and as parent and natural guardian of Shane Siewiyumptewa and Kristen Johnson; Tracey Weeks and Monty Weeks, as individuals and as parents of Jared Weeks and Jordyn Weeks; Terri Piland and Jeffrey Piland, as individuals and as parents of Joseph Piland and George Piland; Colorado Rural Schools Caucus a/k/a Rural Alliance ; East Central Board of Cooperative Educational Services; Colorado PTA ; Boulder Valley School District; Colorado Springs School District No. 11 ; Mancos School District; Holyoke School District ; and Plateau Valley School District 50, Plaintiffs

v.The STATE of Colorado; Robert Hammond, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Education of the State of Colorado; and John Hickenlooper, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado, Defendants.

Supreme Court Case No. 15SA22

Supreme Court of Colorado.

September 21, 2015

Attorneys for Plaintiffs: Arnold & Porter LLP, Timothy P. Macdonald, Nathaniel J. Hake, Reilly Pozner LLP, Sean Connelly, Bryan Cave LLP, Zhonette M. Brown, Denver, Colorado, Kathleen J. Gebhardt LLC, Kathleen J. Gebhardt, Boulder, Colorado.

Attorneys for Defendants: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General, Michelle Merz–Hutchinson, First Assistant Attorney General, Antony B. Dyl, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, Jonathan P. Fero, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Assistant Solicitor General, William V. Allen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Davin Dahl, Assistant Attorney General, Kathryn Starnella, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Association of School Boards, Colorado Association of School Executives, and Colorado BOCES Association: Colorado Association of School Boards, Kathleen A. Sullivan, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Concern, Denver Metro Chamber of Commerce, Colorado Competitive Council, Colorado Mining Association, Colorado Association of Mechanical and Plumbing Contractors, National Federation of Independent Business, and Associated General Contractors of Colorado: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Jason R. Dunn, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Education Association: Colorado Education Association, Kris Gomez, Denver, Colorado, National Education Association, Alice O'Brien, Eric Harrington, Kristen Hollar, Washington, DC.

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Fiscal Institute: Heizer Paul LLP, Edward T. Ramey, Denver, Colorado.

Attorney for Amicus Curiae The Colorado Hispanic Bar Association: Daniel Spivey, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Department of Business Officials of the Colorado Association of School Executives: Davis Graham & Stubbs, LLP, Terry R. Miller, Kenzo Kawanabe, Anna–Liisa Mullis, Emily Wasserman, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Great Education Colorado, Education Foundation of Eagle County, Grassroots St. Vrain, and Colorado Latino Forum's Denver Metro Chapter: Faegre Baker Daniels LLP, David W. Stark, Jennifer K. Harrison, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

Opinion

CHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this original proceeding, we consider the legality of the “negative factor,” a legislative enactment that operates to reduce education funding across all Colorado school districts. Plaintiffs below sued the State of Colorado, the Commissioner of Education, and the Governor (collectively, “the State”), arguing that the negative factor is unconstitutional because it violates Amendment 23, a constitutional provision requiring annual increases to “statewide base per pupil funding.” After the trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss, we issued a rule to show cause why the motion should not be granted. We now conclude that Plaintiffs' complaint misconstrues the relationship between the negative factor and Amendment 23. By its plain language, Amendment 23 only requires increases to statewide base per pupil funding, not to total per pupil funding. We therefore hold that the negative factor does not violate Amendment 23. Accordingly, we make the rule absolute, and we remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 2 In 2000, Colorado voters passed Amendment 23, which requires annual increases to “statewide base per pupil funding” for public education. See Colo. Const. art. IX, § 17 (1) (“Amendment 23”). Ten years later, the General Assembly determined that “stabilization of the state budget requires a reduction in the amount of the annual appropriation to fund the state's share of total [education] funding.” § 22–54–104(5)(g)(I), C.R.S. (2010). To accomplish this, it implemented the negative factor. See § 22–54–104(5)(g), C.R.S. (2011). The negative factor effectuates the General Assembly's goal by reducing each district's school funding by a fixed percentage. See infra ¶ 11.

¶ 3 Plaintiffs sued the State for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the negative factor violates Amendment 23 and is thus unconstitutional. The trial court denied the State's motion to dismiss, finding that “Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts.” The State petitioned us to exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21. We issued a rule to show cause why the motion to dismiss should not be granted.¹

II. Original Jurisdiction

¶ 4 “Original relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy that is limited both in purpose and availability.” People v. Kailey, 2014 CO 50, ¶ 9, 333 P.3d 89, 92. Despite this, we “generally elect to hear C.A.R. 21 cases that raise issues of first impression and that are of significant public importance.” In re Marriage of Wiggins, 2012 CO 44, ¶ 12, 279 P.3d 1, 5. The question presented in this case—which implicates the apportionment of nearly one billion dollars of state funding—is undeniably such an issue. Furthermore, because Plaintiffs' complaint presents a pure question of law, the existing record is sufficient, and allowing the case to proceed to trial would not further clarify the question of the negative factor's constitutionality.

III. Standard of Review

¶ 5 The constitutionality of the negative factor is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Kailey, ¶ 12, 333 P.3d at 93. We presume that the negative factor is constitutional, and we will only void it if we deem it to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. See Justus v. State, 2014 CO 75, ¶ 17, 336 P.3d 202, 208.

IV. Analysis

¶ 6 To resolve the constitutionality of the negative factor, we begin by charting the recent history of education funding in Colorado, examining Amendment 23, the negative factor, and their respective impacts on the State's school funding formula. We then consider whether the negative factor violates Amendment 23's constitutional mandate. We conclude that, because Amendment 23 only requires increases to base per pupil funding, the negative factor does not violate the amendment.

A. Education Funding in Colorado

¶ 7 Colorado awards education funding to individual school districts pursuant to the Public School Finance Act of 1994 (“the Act”). See §§ 22–54–101 to –137, C.R.S. (2015). Prior to the passage of Amendment 23, the Act calculated the “total program” funding for each district. See § 22–54–104(1), C.R.S. (2000). To do so, it first calculated a district's per pupil funding. See § 22–54–104(3), C.R.S. (2000). Per pupil funding could be broken into two main components: base funding and factor funding. Base funding, as designated by the term “statewide base per pupil funding,” was uniform for all districts. See § 22–54–104(5)(a), C.R.S. (2000) (specifying the amount of base per pupil funding for seven different budget years, including $3,878 (plus $123.70 to account for inflation) for 2000–01). Factor funding, in contrast, varied for each district based on four factors: the personnel costs factor, the cost of living factor, the nonpersonnel costs factor, and the size factor. See § 22–54–104(5)(b)–(e), C.R.S. (2000). The Act created a detailed framework to calculate these factors for each district. See id. It then combined these two components, computing each district's total per pupil funding according to the following formula:

((Statewide base per pupil funding x District personnel costs factor x District cost of living factor) + (Statewide base per pupil funding x District nonpersonnel costs factor)) x District size factor.

§ 22–54–104(3), C.R.S. (2000).

¶ 8 In addition to calculating per pupil funding, the Act determined each district's “at-risk funding,” a computation involving a fifth factor, dubbed the “at-risk factor.” See § 22–54–104(4), (5)(f), C.R.S. (2000). Finally, to derive the total program funding amount for each district, the Act multiplied the district's total per pupil funding by its “funded pupil count,” then added the district's at-risk funding to that product. See § 22–54–104(2), C.R.S. (2000).

¶ 9 In 2000, voters passed Amendment 23. Although the amendment mandated changes to education funding, it did not alter the Act's formula. Rather, it required regular increases to one of the variables within that formula: statewide base per pupil funding. In particular, Amendment 23 provided that from 2001–02 through 2010–11, “the statewide base per pupil funding, as defined by the [Act] on the effective date of this section, for public education from preschool through the twelfth grade ... shall grow annually at least by the rate of inflation plus an additional one percentage point” (emphasis added). The amendment further provided that for 2011–12 “and each fiscal year thereafter, the statewide base per pupil funding for public education” shall grow by at least the rate of inflation (thereby eliminating the “additional one percentage point” increase). In...