Dyous v. Psychiatric Security Review Board

• Decision Date: 22 July 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16925)
• Citation: 264 Conn. 766,826 A.2d 138
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ANTHONY DYOUS v. PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD.

264 Conn. 766

826 A.2d 138

ANTHONY DYOUS v. PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD.

(SC 16925)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 24, 2003.

Officially released July 22, 2003

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js. Suzanne L. McAlpine, deputy assistant public defender, with whom was Monte P. Radler, public defender, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Maite Barainca, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Richard J. Lynch, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the appeal by the plaintiff, Anthony Dyous, from the decision of the defendant, the psychiatric security review board (board), transferring him to a maximum security mental health facility. The plaintiff appeals¹ from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-186 (f)² and 17a-597 (a),³ the board's order transferring him to a maximum security hospital was not appealable. The plaintiff also claims that, pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183 (a),⁴ an order transferring an acquittee⁵ to a maximum security facility is a final decision in a contested case and, therefore, is appealable to the Superior Court. We disagree and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history relevant to the issues in this appeal. On November 9, 1984, the plaintiff was acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect of the charges of two counts of kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-92,⁶ two counts of threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62,⁷ and one count of carrying a dangerous weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53-206.⁸ Thereafter, on March 22, 1985, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-582,⁹ the plaintiff was placed under the jurisdiction of the board for a period not to exceed twenty-five years. In March, 2000, the board transferred the plaintiff from Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting), a maximum security mental health facility, to the less restrictive setting of Dutcher Service at Connecticut Valley Hospital (Dutcher). On November 16, 2001, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-585,¹⁰ which requires the board to review the status of acquittees; see footnote 5 of this opinion; at least once every two years, the board conducted a hearing to review the plaintiff's status. Section 17a-585 also requires the board, at the status hearing, to "make a finding and act pursuant to [General Statutes §] 17a-584,"¹¹ which requires the board: (1) to discharge the acquittee from the custody of the board; (2) to conditionally release the acquittee; or (3) to continue the acquittee's confinement.

The board issued a memorandum of decision, determining that the plaintiff was mentally ill and required continued confinement. The board further determined that the plaintiff "potentially [is] so violent and non-compliant with treatment that he currently poses a risk to the staff and patients of [Dutcher] and requires immediate transfer to maximum security." Thereafter, the board denied the plaintiff's application for reconsideration of its decision. On January 8, 2002, the plaintiff filed an administrative appeal in the Superior Court appealing from the decision of the board transferring him to a maximum security facility. The board then moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because § 17a-597 did not allow an appeal from its transfer decision. The trial court granted the board's motion to dismiss concluding that the board's decision regarding the level of confinement was not encompassed within the meaning of "confinement" as that term is defined in the statutes and, therefore, was not appealable. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment in favor of the board. This appeal followed.

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that § 17a-597 does not allow him to appeal from the board's decision transferring him to a maximum security facility. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that General Statutes § 17a-599,¹² the provision requiring the board to make a further determination as to whether to place an acquittee in a maximum security facility, cannot be viewed in isolation from its context within the entire statutory scheme. Rather, the plaintiff argues, once the board determines, pursuant to § 17a-584 (3) that a person is mentally ill and should be confined, § 17a-599 requires the board to make a "further determination" as to whether the acquittee should be placed in a maximum security facility. The plaintiff claims that this "further determination" made pursuant to § 17a-599 is also an appealable order as an extension of the confinement decision made pursuant to § 17a-584 (3). Accordingly, the plaintiff claims, the placement of an acquittee in a maximum security facility is an appealable decision pursuant to § 17a-597. The board claims in response that, pursuant to the plain language of § 17a-597, a decision of the board transferring an acquittee to a maximum security facility, made pursuant to § 17a-599, is not appealable.

"As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is ... well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Brookridge District Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 610-11, 793 A.2d 215 (2002). Accordingly, "[b]ecause [a] determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 611.

Moreover, "[t]here is no absolute right of appeal to the courts from a decision of an administrative agency.... The [Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq.] grants the Superior Court jurisdiction over appeals of agency appeals only in certain limited and well delineated circumstances." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Gaming Policy Board, 224 Conn. 693, 699-700, 620 A.2d 780 (1993); see also Figueroa v. C & S Ball Bearing, 237 Conn. 1, 4, 675 A.2d 845 (1996) ("[i]t is a familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

We begin our analysis of the plaintiff's claim by examining the language of the statutory scheme at issue. Judicial review of an administrative decision generally is governed by § 4-183 (a) of the UAPA, which provides that "[a] person who has exhausted all administrative remedies ... and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court...." Section 4-186, however, carves out exemptions to § 4-183 (a). Specifically, § 4-186 (f) provides that "[t]he provisions of section 4-183 shall apply to the [board] in the manner described in section 17a-597...." Accordingly, appeals from the decisions of the board are governed by § 17a-597 (a), which provides that "[a]ny order of the board entered pursuant to subdivision (2) or (3) of section 17a-584 ... may be appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to section 4-183." Section 17a-584 requires the board, at any hearing considering the discharge, conditional release, or confinement of an acquittee, to make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and: (1) to recommend that the acquittee be discharged; (2) to order the acquittee conditionally released; or (3) to order the person confined in a hospital for persons with psychiatric disabilities. See footnote 11 of this opinion. Finally, § 17a-599 provides that "[a]t any time the court or the board determines that the acquittee is a person who should be confined, it shall make a further determination of whether the acquittee is so violent as to require confinement under conditions of maximum security."

With this statutory scheme in mind, we conclude that there is no administrative appeal from the decision of the board transferring the plaintiff to a maximum security facility. First, we note that the language of § 17a-597 (a), the provision delineating the right to appeal a decision of the board to the Superior Court, is clear and unequivocal. Section 17a-597 (a) limits the right to appeal to "[a]ny order of the board entered pursuant to subdivision (2) or (3) of section 17a-584 or pursuant to section 17a-587...." (Emphasis added.) Both parties agree, however, that the decision of the board in the present case, transferring the plaintiff to Whiting, was made pursuant to § 17a-599, which is not enumerated as an appealable decision in § 17a-597. Second, "[w]e have stated that [u]nless there is evidence to the contrary, statutory itemization indicates that the legislature intended [a] list to be exclusive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 33-34, 818 A.2d 37 (2003); see also Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit District, 235 Conn. 1, 40, 664 A.2d 719 (1995) (list of available remedies for antitrust violations exclusive). As there is no evidence to the contrary, either in the language of the statute or in the relevant legislative history,¹³ we conclude that those board ...