Spears v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 01 April 2003
• Docket Number: No. 16676.,16676.
• Citation: 263 Conn. 22,818 A.2d 37
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Tonisha SPEARS, et al. v. Beniga GARCIA, et al.

Page 37

818 A.2d 37

263 Conn. 22

Tonisha SPEARS, et al. v. Beniga GARCIA, et al.

No. 16676.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 4, 2002.

Decided April 1, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

SULLIVAN, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

Arthur C. Laske III, assistant city attorney, for the appellants (defendant city of Bridgeport et al.).

Karen E. Souza, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Mary-Michelle U. Hirschoff filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.

Kathryn Calibey and Douglas W. Hammond filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

KATZ, J.

The defendants,¹ the city of Bridgeport and the Bridgeport fire department, appeal, upon our grant of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the summary judgment in favor of the defendants rendered by the trial court based upon the failure of the plaintiffs, Tonisha Spears and Medina Spears,² to cite in their complaint General Statutes § 525-57n³ as statutory authority abrogating the defendants' governmental immunity. Spears v. Garcia, 66 Conn. App. 669, 785 A.2d 1181 (2001). The defendants claim that, even if the Appellate Court properly determined that they otherwise had been given adequate notice of the plaintiffs' reliance on § 52-557n, that statute does not abrogate governmental immunity. We agree with the Appellate Court that § 52-557n allows the plaintiffs to bring a direct cause of action for negligence against the defendants and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants for injuries that Tonisha Spears sustained on June 28, 1994. On that date, a motor vehicle struck her after she was pushed into the road by a high pressure stream of water flowing from a fire hydrant, which had been opened by an unauthorized person. The hydrant did not have a safety device or a cap to prevent unauthorized openings as of the date of the incident.

"In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were negligent for failing to install safety devices on the hydrant and for failing to inspect it. The plaintiffs' complaint, however, did not mention any statutory authority that abrogated the defendants' governmental immunity. The defendants, in their answer, pleaded that immunity as a special defense.

"On December 16, 1998, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity because they failed to cite any statute in their complaint that abrogated the immunity. To advance that position, the defendants cited Williams v. New Haven, [243 Conn. 763, 707 A.2d 1251 (1998)], in their memorandum of law supporting the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs, in response, filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In the memorandum, the plaintiffs mentioned for the first time § 52-557n as abrogating the defendants' immunity. The plaintiffs also distinguished Williams, noting that the plaintiffs in that case never relied on § 52-557n throughout the proceedings. See id., 766, 707 A.2d 1251. In contrast, the plaintiffs [in the Appellate Court] emphasize[d] that although they did not specifically plead the statute in the complaint, the defendants were sufficiently apprised of the statute in the plaintiffs' memorandum.

"During oral arguments on the motion for summary judgment, the parties reiterated their positions. The defendants also claimed at oral argument [on their motion] that pursuant to Practice Book § 10-3(a), `[w]hen any claim made in a complaint ... is grounded on a statute, the statute shall be specifically identified by its number.' The [trial] court, in response, noted that the language of that section has been interpreted to be directory rather than mandatory. In addition, the court found the facts of the present case to be remarkably similar to those of Williams and [found] that in both Williams and the present case, the plaintiffs relied solely on their claim of common-law negligence and, at no time, advanced any statutory basis for the defendants' liability.

"The [trial] court granted the defendants' motion, holding that although Practice Book § 10-3(a) has been read as directory rather than mandatory, Williams is controlling on the present case." Spears v. Garcia, supra, 66 Conn.App. at 671-73, 785 A.2d 1181. Thereafter, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs' failure to plead § 52-557n in their complaint was not fatal under the circumstances of this case. Id., at 676, 785 A.2d 1181. Specifically, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court improperly had relied on Williams v. New Haven, supra, 243 Conn. at 763, 707 A.2d 1251, because, unlike the plaintiff in Williams, the plaintiffs in the present case had apprised the defendants sufficiently of their reliance on § 52-557n by raising the statute in their memorandum of law in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and in oral argument before the trial court.⁴ Spears v. Garcia, supra, at 676, 785 A.2d 1181.

As an alternate ground for affirmance, the defendants contended that the plaintiffs' reliance on § 52-557n as a basis for abrogating the defendants' immunity was improper. Id., at 677, 785 A.2d 1181. The Appellate Court disagreed, determining that § 52-557n abrogates governmental immunity, thus allowing a direct cause of action for negligence against the defendants. Id., at 680, 785 A.2d 1181. Thereafter, we granted the defendants' petition for certification, limited to the following question: "Does ... § 52-557n permit a plaintiff to bring a direct cause of action in negligence against a municipality?" Spears v. Garcia, 259 Conn. 915, 792 A.2d 852 (2002).

The certified question on appeal raises an issue of statutory construction and, therefore, our review is plenary. State v. Russo, 259 Conn. 436, 447, 790 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 79, 154 L.Ed. 2d 134 (2002). "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 260 Conn. 21, 34, 792 A.2d 835 (2002).

Of particular relevance in this case is the related principle that "[w]hen a statute is in derogation of common law or creates a liability where formerly none existed, it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended, modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of [statutory] construction. ... In determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 257 Conn. 365, 381, 778 A.2d 829 (2001).

"This court has previously stated that [a] municipality itself was generally immune from liability for its tortious acts at common law.... We have also long recognized that, [u]nder our rule, the principle of governmental immunity extends to the construction and maintenance of fire equipment as well as to its use for fire protection.... We have also recognized, however, that governmental immunity may be abrogated by statute.... Thus, the general rule developed in our case law is that a municipality is immune from liability for negligence unless the legislature has enacted a statute abrogating that immunity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. New Haven, supra, 243 Conn. at 766-67, 707 A.2d 1251.

Against this background, we turn to the certified question: whether § 52-557n permits a plaintiff to bring a direct cause of action in negligence against a municipality. "As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gipson v. Commissioner of Correction, 257 Conn. 632, 639, 778 A.2d 121 (2001). The language of § 52-557n (a)(1) provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties...."

This language clearly and expressly abrogates the traditional common-law doctrine in this state that municipalities are immune from suit for torts committed by their employees and agents. Cf. Babes v. Bennett, 247 Conn. 256, 263-64, 721 A.2d 511 (1998) (noting General Statutes § 52-556 is statutory waiver of state's immunity in wrongful death action); Skinner v. Angliker, 211 Conn. 370, 381, 559 A.2d 701 (1989) (noting legislature's waiver of state's immunity under General Statutes § 31-51g for employer's discharge of employee exercising constitutional rights). The presence of the savings clause, "except as otherwise provided by law," pertains only to state and federal statutes, not to the common law. Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 191-92, 592 A.2d 912 (1991). Therefore, the legislature has manifested its intention to abrogate governmental immunity under the...