Wiseman v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 29 June 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 16988).
• Citation: 850 A.2d 114,269 Conn. 802
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ELAINE WISEMAN, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF BRYANT WISEMAN) v. JOHN J. ARMSTRONG ET AL.

269 Conn. 802

850 A.2d 114

ELAINE WISEMAN, ADMINISTRATOR (ESTATE OF BRYANT WISEMAN) v. JOHN J. ARMSTRONG ET AL.

(SC 16988).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued February 11, 2004.

Officially released June 29, 2004.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

Ann E. Lynch, assistant attorney general, with whom were Terrence M. O'Neill, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Gregory T. D'Auria, associate attorney general, for the appellants (defendants).

Antonio Ponvert III, for the appellee (plaintiff).

C. Joan Parker, assistant commission counsel II, filed a brief for the commission on human rights and opportunities as amicus curiae.

Nancy B. Alisberg filed a brief for the office of protection and advocacy for persons with disabilities as amicus curiae.

Christopher G. Wall filed a brief for the Lieutenant's Union of the state of Connecticut as amicus curiae.

Ben A. Solnit filed a brief for the Connecticut Psychiatric Society et al. as amici curiae.

Stephen E. Nevas filed a brief for the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. as amici curiae.

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that the provisions of General Statutes §§ 17a-540 through 17a-550, which is known as the patients' bill of rights, apply to correctional institutions operated by the state department of correction. We answer that question in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of trial court.

This appeal arises out of the following factual background. On November 17, 1999, twenty-eight year old Bryant Wiseman died while he was incarcerated at the Garner correctional institution (Garner). The decedent was mentally ill, and at the time of his death, he had been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. On December 10, 2002, the plaintiff, Elaine Wiseman, as administrator of the decedent's estate, filed a twelve count complaint against the defendants,¹ alleging that the department of correction's physicians, nurses and other medical workers failed to provide adequate and proper medical care, supervision and medication to the decedent, allowed his mental illness to go untreated or inadequately treated, and permitted the decedent to become paranoid and aggressive under circumstances that they knew would lead to a violent confrontation with other inmates and correction staff.² On January 10, 2002, the defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss, claiming, inter alia, that the ninth,³ tenth⁴ and eleventh⁵ counts of the plaintiff's complaint were improper because the patients' bill of rights does not apply to correctional institutions. Those three counts were all based upon the plaintiff's claim that "[t]he facilities of the Connecticut [d]epartment of [c]orrection, including the Garner [c]orrectional [i]nstitution, and the University of Connecticut [h]ealth [c]enter are `[f]acilities' within the meaning of . . . § 17a-540(a)." On February 27, 2003, the trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, noting that the term "other facility," as that term is used in the patients' bill of rights,⁶ was "broad enough to include the facilities of the [d]epartment of [c]orrection. This is clear on its face."⁷ On March 11, 2003, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration or articulation in light of this court's subsequent opinion in State v. Courchesne, 262 Conn. 537, 577, 816 A.2d 562 (2003), which "restat[ed] the process by which we interpret statutes . . . ."⁸ The trial court denied the defendants' request for reconsideration, yet provided an articulation of its decision in light of Courchesne. More specifically, the trial court found that even under the purposive approach to statutory interpretation set forth in Courchesne, "the legislative history is not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the plain language of the statute." The defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court. Prior to argument before the Appellate Court, Chief Justice Sullivan granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 52-265a.⁹ This appeal followed.

On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly: (1) concluded that a correctional institution is a "facility" subject to the provisions of the patients' bill of rights; (2) disregarded the well settled tenet of statutory interpretation that a statutory scheme is to be considered as a whole; (3) disregarded No. 97-016 of the Opinions of the Connecticut Attorney General, which concluded that the patients' bill of rights did not apply to correctional institutions; and (4) disregarded this court's opinion in Mahoney v. Lensink, 213 Conn. 548, 569 A.2d 518 (1990), which thoroughly reviewed the history of the patients' bill of rights. In response, the plaintiff claims that: (1) the legislative history of the patients' bill of rights contains no "`strong'" or "`persuasive'" support to overcome the plain language of the statute, as required by State v. Courchesne, supra, 262 Conn. 537; (2) the application of the patients' bill of rights to correctional institutions does not present an insurmountable conflict with regard to other statutes concerning the rights of prisoners; (3) No. 97-016 of the Opinions of the Connecticut Attorney General is irrelevant to the issue presented in this appeal; and (4) the defendants' interpretation of the patients' bill of rights (a) conflicts with the plain language of the statute, as well as the decisions of this court and other state and federal courts, (b) poses severe practical difficulties and inconsistent standards for psychiatrists and other mental health workers, and (c) violates the public policy of this state. We agree with the defendants. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. The defendants' claims involve the meaning of the term "facility" as that term is used in our patients' bill of rights. "Issues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we exercise plenary review." Celentano v. Oaks Condominium Assn., 265 Conn. 579, 588, 830 A.2d 164 (2003). "The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Kramer, 267 Conn. 336, 343, 838 A.2d 170 (2004).¹⁰ In addition, "[b]ecause the patients' bill of rights is remedial in nature, its provisions should be liberally construed in favor of the class sought to be benefited." Mahoney v. Lensink, supra, 213 Conn. 556.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the defendants' claims. "As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 28-29, 818 A.2d 37 (2003). A "`[f]acility'" subject to the provisions of the patients' bill of rights is defined as "any inpatient or outpatient hospital, clinic, or other facility for the diagnosis, observation or treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-540 (a). In ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that the term "`other facility' is broad enough to include the facilities of the [d]epartment of correction. This is clear on its face." We disagree.¹¹

As an initial matter, we note that the trial court improperly circumscribed its analysis to an interpretation of the term "other facility" in the abstract, rather than properly analyzing that term within the context of the statute in which it is contained. A statute is enacted as a whole and must be read as a whole rather than as separate parts or sections. Badolato v. New Britain, 250 Conn. 753, 760, 738 A.2d 618 (1999). Further, "[w]ords in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. . . unless the context indicates that a different meaning was intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gelinas v. West Hartford, 225 Conn. 575, 584, 626 A.2d 259 (1993). While the term "other facility" might be very broad in the abstract, within the context of § 17a-540 (a), the legislature narrowed its meaning by modifying it with the words "for the diagnosis, observation or treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities. . . ." (Emphasis added.) The word "for" requires that any "other facility" subject to the patients' bill of rights must be one for which the main purpose is "diagnosis, observation or treatment."¹² Thus, in order to qualify as a "facility" subject to the provisions of the patients' bill of rights, a correctional institute must not be just any "other facility," but rather must be any "other facility for the diagnosis, observation or treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities . . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 17a-540 (a).¹³ When viewed in this proper context, we are not persuaded that the meaning of "other facility for the diagnosis, observation or treatment of persons with psychiatric disabilities," as used by the patients' bill of rights in § 17a-540 (a), plainly encompasses facilities operated by the department of correction, namely, correctional institutions.

The dictionary references the entry for "correctional institution" to the entry for "prison," which is defined as "[a] state or federal facility of confinement for convicted...