Dzuris v. Pierce

• Decision Date: 25 November 1913
• Citation: 103 N.E. 296,216 Mass. 132
• Parties: DZURIS v. PIERCE et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

216 Mass. 132

103 N.E. 296

DZURIS v. PIERCE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

November 25, 1913

COUNSEL

R. J. Morrissey and J. L. Gray, both of Westfield for appellant.

H. W Ely and J. B. Ely, both of Westfield, for appellees.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

The plaintiff seeks to set aside an exchange of real estate between himself and the defendants. The case was sent to a master. No objections or exceptions to his report were claimed and it has been confirmed. The material facts therein narrated must be taken as true because no evidence is reported. The plaintiff, an Hungarian by birth, being unable to write anything in English except his own name and unable to read English to any extent, owned a farm which he placed in the hands of three agents, Fenton, Brown and Berman, to sell. These same agents earlier had been employed by the defendants to make sale of an apartment house of sixteen tenements. There is no finding that the plaintiff knew of this double employment. A few days later Fenton sent to the plaintiff a letter in which he gave correctly the street numbers of the defendants' house, and described it as having 'marble entrance and stairs,' and further said, 'income per year $6,480.' The building did not have a marble entrance and stairs and the income named was based on the theory that all the apartments were rented. In fact, 4 out of the 16 apartments were vacant at the time of the transactions here in question.

The statement as to the marble stairs was made by mistake and was in no wise authorized by the defendants. But this is an immaterial circumstance, for if such misstatement is of consequence the principal is bound by it. Weeks v. Currier, 172 Mass. 55, 51 N.E. 416; Haskell v. Starbird, 152 Mass. 117, 25 N.E. 14, 23 Am. St. Rep. 809. The agent Brown took the plaintiff and his wife to the defendants' property in an automobile, but none of the party alighted, and they stopped only a moment in the street to examine it. Adjoining the defendants' block was one built from the same plans and of the same size, having marble stairs and cement pillars and apparently more valuable. Although the agent Brown pointed out to the plaintiff the block actually owned by the defendants, the plaintiff thought that the block with the pillars and marble stairs was pointed out and he continued to understand, until after the deeds were passed, that that was the block which he was buying rather than the one actually owned by the defendants. The plaintiff did not again visit or make any examination of the defendants' block. He relied upon the statements contained in the Fenton letter and other representations made to him. This letter contained the only misrepresentation made to the plaintiff by the defendants or the agents. But the master finds 'that the plaintiff with his limited education and experience, and his poor knowledge of English, was somewhat confused in dealing with so many agents and parties, and I find and believe that through the solicitations of Mr. Berman he was overpersuaded to enter into a transaction which for him was somewhat hazardous and unwise. * * * In regard to Mr. Berman I do not find that any misstatements were made by him, but considering the people with whom he was dealing, his methods of solicitation were open to criticism.' Although finding that the plaintiff was mistaken as to the block he was buying, the master also states that 'it is a fair question whether this mistake was not due to the fact that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable caution in examining the property he purchased before he made his agreement to purchase.' This is a neutral expression and leaves the existence of negligence to be determined from the other facts.

It is an elementary principle of the law of contracts that, if one party thinks he is buying one thing and the other party thinks he is selling another thing, there is no meeting of minds on the subject matter of the sale. When there is no agreement as to the identity of the subject matter of the contract there can be no contract. Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356, 4 Am. Rep. 560; Bridgewater Iron Co. v. Enterprise Ins. Co., 134 Mass. 433. Where a conveyance has been made based upon such a misunderstanding, even though it may be innocent on both sides, equity in proper cases will grant relief. Spurr v. Benedict, 99 Mass. 463; Long v. Athol, 196 Mass. 497, 504, 82 N.E. 665, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 96. This branch of equitable relief is distinct from the reformation of contracts entered into by mistake, which must be mutual by all parties before relief can be granted. 'Mutual mistake' in that connection means a mistake common to all the parties to the contract. Page v. Higgins, 150 Mass. 27, 31, 22 N.E. 63, 5 L. R. A. 152; Loud v. Barnes, 154 Mass. 344, 28 N.E. 271. Further, such a misunderstanding between the parties touching the identity of the subject matter of the contract, in order to be ground for relief in equity must not have arisen from the voluntary megligence or failure to obtain reasonably accessible knowledge on the part of the complaining party in the absence of fraud or duress. Clark v. Boston, 179 Mass. 409, 60 N.E. 793; Grymes v. Sanders 93 U.S. 55, 61, 23 L.Ed. 798; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 23 L Ed. 203.

If the parties to the transaction stood at arms length as to each other, probably the plaintiff could not prevail. Boyden v. Hill, 198 Mass. 477, 483, 85 N.E. 413; Mabardy v McHugh, 202 Mass. 148, 151, 88 N.E. 894, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 487, 132 Am. St. Rep. 484, 16 Ann. Cas. 500. But the relations of the parties are complicated by the circumstances that the agents, Fenton, Brown and Berman, whom the plaintiff employed to act for him, were at the same time acting as agents for the defendants in disposing of their estate, and so...