E.E.O.C. v. Allendale Nursing Centre

• Decision Date: 06 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1:97-CV-64.,1:97-CV-64.
• Citation: 996 F.Supp. 712
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. ALLENDALE NURSING CENTRE d/b/a CCG Allendale, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

996 F.Supp. 712

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. ALLENDALE NURSING CENTRE d/b/a CCG Allendale, Inc., Defendant.

No. 1:97-CV-64.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

March 6, 1998.

Laura A. Brodeur, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Detroit District Office, Detroit, MI, for plaintiff.

David M. Foy, Francis J. Newton, Jr., Barry, Moorman, King & Hudson, PC, Detroit, MI, for defendant.

OPINION

ROBERT HOLMES BELL, District Judge.

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this action against Defendant Allendale Nursing Centre alleging that the Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In its complaint the EEOC alleges that the Defendant discriminated against its employee, Stephanie Rhoads, when it terminated her employment because she failed to obtain a social security number. Rhoads, who had been hired by the Defendant as a competency evaluation nurse aide on June 12, 1995, claims that her religious beliefs prevent her from obtaining a social security number. She was terminated from her employment by the Defendant on August 31, 1995.

Before the Court are a number of motions. The Plaintiff has filed a motion for partial summary judgment claiming that it has established a prima facie case of religious discrimination and that the Defendant is unable to demonstrate that an accommodation of Rhoads' religious beliefs would cause undue hardship. In response, the Defendant challenges each element of the Plaintiff's claim and states that it is entitled to summary judgment on the underlying claim. In addition to its response/cross-motion, the Defendant has filed a motion for partial summary judgment in which it claims that the Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that it is entitled to punitive damages. Also before the Court are Plaintiff's motions to strike the affidavit of Steve Armstrong and to strike the Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

I.

The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant's cross-motion as to liability should be stricken as untimely because it was filed after the November 20, 1997 cut-off date for dispositive motions. The motion in question was filed by the Defendant on January 30, 1998, as part of its response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, the Plaintiff claims that there are no issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In contesting Plaintiff's motion, the Defendant could have argued that there are issues of material fact or it could have argued that there are no issues of fact but the law should be decided in its favor. The Defendant chose the latter option. If the Defendant had styled its motion only as a response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment it is clear that this Court would have the authority to raise and grant a summary judgment motion in favor of the Defendant, the non-moving party. See Underwriters at Interest v. SCI Steelcon, 905 F.Supp. 441, 443 (W.D.Mich.1995) (citing Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2nd Cir.1991); McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir. 1991); Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co. v. APCOM, Inc., 782 F.Supp. 389, 394-95 (N.D.Ill.1992); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 56.12). If, after reviewing the motion of the moving party, a court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the law is on the side of the non-moving party, the court may grant summary judgment in favor of the non-moving party. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Horten, 965 F.Supp. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Because this Court has the authority to grant summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, whether or not the Defendant makes such a motion, the fact that the Defendant styled its response as a response/counter-motion does not form a basis to strike its motion. This Court notes that in its motion to strike, the Plaintiff has not argued that the facts before this Court are not fully developed. Nor has the Plaintiff argued that it has not had an adequate opportunity to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Rather, the Plaintiff has only alleged that Defendant's response/cross-motion was not timely filed. Consequently, this Court finds that Plaintiff's motion to strike must be denied.

II.

A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that when considering the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits," there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 64 F.3d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1995). The movant may satisfy this initial burden by demonstrating that the non-moving party has failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the cause of action alleged. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, the party against whom the motion is brought has the burden of proving that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (1986). Material facts are facts which might affect the outcome of the action under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When a court makes this determination, inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the opposing party's motion is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, instead, an issue is genuine if there is evidence such that a reasonable jury could find for the party opposing summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir.1992). As stated above, a court may award summary judgment to the non-moving party if it finds there are no genuine issues of material fact and the law is on the side of the non-moving party. Orix Credit Alliance, 965 F.Supp. at 484.

III.

The employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of religious discrimination. The elements that an employee must establish are: (1) she holds a sincere religious belief which conflicts with an employment requirement, (2) she informed her employer of the conflict, (3) and she was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. EEOC v. Arlington Transit Mix, Inc., 957 F.2d 219, 221 (6th Cir.1991). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship in the conduct of its business. Id.

First, this Court will address whether Rhoads holds a sincere religious belief which conflicts with an employment requirement. Rhoads contends that her religious beliefs do not allow her to obtain a Social Security Number (SSN). Rhoads explains that she "does not have a problem with supporting [her] government in it's duty to protect it's citizens from foreign threat and to uphold justice." However, she states that "the Social Security Administration is not a governmental administration that strives to protect United States citizens or uphold justice. Instead, the Social Security Administration heads up programs, such as welfare, which basically confiscate the money that one has earned and gives it to those who are unable or unwilling to work." She concludes that "[m]y religious objection to this is that stealing is wrong." Rhoads also contends that "according to the Bible, it is the family and/or church's responsibility, not the government's, to care for those who are truly unable to work." In conclusion, she states "[b]y not having a Social Security Number, I am not willingly participating in any of these unbiblical Social Security programs." (P's ex. 22) (emphasis in original).

In her affidavit and brief, Rhoads' views on the issue of willing participation are explained. In her deposition, she states "I have no control whether social security taxes are withheld from my check or not." The Plaintiff's brief explains that "[s]he does not object to paying social security taxes, as she has no control over that." The brief goes on to explain that "[u]nlike social security taxes, she believes she has control over the issue of whether or not to have a SSN."

In the context of religious discrimination claims, courts have been reluctant to scrutinize an individual's religious beliefs and have not required that the beliefs in question be based upon organized or recognized teachings of a particular sect. See Shpargel v. Stage Co., 914 F.Supp. 1468 (E.D.Mich.1996); Lambert v. Condor Manufacturing, Inc., 768 F.Supp. 600 (E.D.Mich.1991).

Rhoads' beliefs can be divided into two separate parts. First, she believes that the Social Security System is an unbiblical program. The record indicates that Petitioner has come to this conclusion based upon her understanding of what the Bible teaches. As case law suggests, this Court will not scrutinize the logic and sincerity of this belief.

Second, Rhoads believes that it would be a sin to willingly participate in the Social Security System. Again, the Court will not interpret the passages cited by Rhoads to determine if this belief is a sincere religious belief. However, Rhoads combines this belief with two legal conclusions. Her first conclusion is that she does not have any control over the fact that she must pay social security taxes. There does not appear to be any dispute that Rhoads has come to the correct legal conclusion on this issue. Her second...