Eaddy v. State

• Decision Date: 23 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009–KA–02035–SCT.,2009–KA–02035–SCT.
• Citation: 63 So.3d 1209
• Parties: Terrance EADDYv.STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

63 So.3d 1209

Terrance EADDY

v.STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2009–KA–02035–SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 23, 2011.

Office of Indigent Appeals by W. Daniel Hinchcliff, attorney for appellant.Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, Jackson, John R. Henry, Jr., attorneys for appellee.Before WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., and KITCHENS, J.WALLER, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. This case involves the search and seizure of evidence from Terrance Eaddy after officers had stopped him to execute arrest warrants for Wendell Barnes. Because the trial court committed clear error in denying Eaddy's motion to suppress, we reverse and render his conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. A caller informed Claiborne County Sheriff's Department deputies James Jefferson and Willie Edwards that Wendell Barnes was in Port Gibson driving a red Cadillac with Texas plates. The officers knew Barnes had three arrest warrants. Soon, they happened upon a vehicle that fit the caller's description and initiated an investigatory stop. The parties dispute the order of the remaining sequence of events, but ultimately, Officer Jefferson searched and arrested the driver, Terrance Eaddy, for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Eaddy filed a motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine and the gun discovered in the search.

Motion–to–Suppress Hearing

¶ 3. Officer Jefferson provided the only testimony at Eaddy's motion-to-suppress hearing. He explained that, on the day of Eaddy's arrest, an unnamed informant ¹ had called Officer Edwards on his personal cell phone and had stated that Wendell Barnes was in town driving a red Cadillac with Texas plates. Officer Edwards had related the caller's information to Officer Jefferson. Both officers knew that Wendell Barnes had three arrest warrants, ² but only Officer Edwards could identify Barnes. Eventually, the officers stopped a vehicle fitting the caller's description. According to Officer Jefferson, when he approached the car, he saw the butt of a gun under the driver's seat, smelled alcohol, and saw an empty liquor bottle. So, he took the driver from the vehicle to pat him down for officer safety. During the search, he discovered two pill bottles that each appeared to hold cocaine. He explained that one pill bottle contained a “white substance” separated into individual bags, and the other bottle contained a white substance cut into blocks. After he had conducted the search, Officer Edwards told him the suspect was not Barnes.

¶ 4. On cross-examination, Eaddy's counsel pointed out that Officer Jefferson's arrest report contained a different version of the events. In his report, Officer Jefferson explained that he had “noticed” the driver was not Wendell Barnes after he had asked him to exit the car. But since he had seen a liquor bottle by the driver's seat, he had frisked the driver for his safety. Officer Jefferson's report further explained that, after finding the two pill bottles with cocaine, he then had handcuffed Eaddy, had searched the car, and had discovered the gun. Aside from the report, Eaddy's counsel questioned Officer Jefferson as to the validity of Barnes's arrest warrants.

¶ 5. Officer Jefferson attempted to clarify the differences between his report and his testimony before the court. He explained that his report stated when he had told Eaddy that he had seen the gun and not when he actually had seen it. In other words, although his report indicated that the liquor bottle had prompted the protective search, the gun was actually the reason. Thus, Officer Jefferson did not collect the liquor bottle from the car, and Eaddy was not charged with driving under the influence. He further explained that “any time you stop a car, you're going to search the individual and get [him] out of the car for officer safety.”

¶ 6. In ruling on Eaddy's motion to suppress, the court recognized that Officer Jefferson's report recounted a different version of the events; typically, an officer's report would clearly reflect that the presence of a firearm had raised the officer's suspicion. But the trial court noted that an arrest report does not represent the officer's entire description of the arrest, and that no evidence contradicted Officer Jefferson's testimony before the court. More specifically, the court found that the officers had acted on a warrant in stopping the vehicle. After Officer Jefferson had seen a firearm and had smelled alcohol, he had conducted a protective search for his safety. Therefore, the court denied Eaddy's motion to suppress evidence of the cocaine and the gun derived from the search.

Eaddy's Trial

¶ 7. Officer Jefferson provided the same testimony regarding the incident at Eaddy's trial. Additionally, Eaddy gave his version of the search and arrest. According to Eaddy, on the day of his arrest, he had been dating Wendell Barnes's sister, Thandiwe. When Thandiwe had picked him up in Wendell's car for lunch that day, Eaddy explained that he did not see any drugs or a gun when he entered the car. On their way to lunch, the officers pulled them over. According to Eaddy, Officer Jefferson never asked him his name during the encounter. Eaddy explained, in relevant part, that he did not have any drugs on him and that if he had possessed drugs on his person, he would have disposed of them before a police search. Instead, Eaddy testified that Officer Jefferson had removed both the gun and the drugs from the car. Eaddy implied that Officer Edwards had encouraged Officer Jefferson to misrepresent where he had found the drugs.

¶ 8. The State called Officer Edwards to rebut Eaddy's accusations. Officer Edwards explained that he did not ask Officer Jefferson to misrepresent where he had found the drugs. Officer Edwards further testified that after they had made the traffic stop and had approached the car, he had told Officer Jefferson that Wendell Barnes was not in the car. In other words, Officer Edwards had identified Eaddy as the driver before Officer Jefferson had conducted the search.

¶ 9. The jury found Eaddy guilty of possession with intent to distribute and acquitted him of possession of a weapon by a felon. Eaddy was sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The court denied Eaddy's Alternative Motion for a JNOV or a New Trial, and Eaddy appealed.

ISSUES

¶ 10. Eaddy asserts the following issues, which we have rephrased for clarity:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Eaddy's motion to suppress.

II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Eaddy's motion for a directed verdict or JNOV where the State provided insufficient evidence on the intent to distribute.

As the first issue decides Eaddy's appeal, we decline to address the second issue. See M.R.A.P. 17(h).

DISCUSSION

¶ 11. The Court applies a mixed standard of review to Fourth–Amendment claims. Dies v. State, 926 So.2d 910, 917 (Miss.2006). Whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is subject to a de novo review. Id. But the Court limits the de novo review of the trial court's determination to “historical facts reviewed under the substantial evidence and clearly erroneous standards.” Id.

¶ 12. Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution protect an individual's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 917–18. See also U.S. Const. amend. IV; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23; Graves v. State, 708 So.2d 858, 861 (Miss.1997) (noting that Mississippi's constitution provides greater protection from unreasonable search and seizure than the federal constitution). The Court uses a two-part inquiry to determine the reasonableness of a search and seizure: “(1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Gonzales v. State, 963 So.2d 1138, 1141 (Miss.2007). As a general rule, the state and federal constitutions prohibit warrantless searches unless an exception applies. Id. at 1142. Unless the State proves that a warrantless search comes within an exception, all evidence seized from the search is inadmissible. Jackson v. State, 418 So.2d 827, 829 (Miss.1982). We address the investigatory stop and good-faith exceptions as they relate to the sequence of events in Eaddy's search and arrest.

I. Investigatory Stops

¶ 13. Eaddy argues that the trial court erred in not making findings on the informant's reliability, and that information from an unnamed informant with undisclosed reliability does not establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. In response, the State contends that Officer Jefferson's personal knowledge of Barnes's warrants provided reasonable suspicion for the investigatory stop.

¶ 14. Police officers may detain a person for a brief, investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment when the officers have “reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts ...” that allows the officers to conclude the suspect is wanted in connection with criminal behavior. Walker v. State, 881 So.2d 820, 826 (Miss.2004) (citation omitted). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Haddox v. State, 636 So.2d 1229, 1234 (Miss.1994) (citation omitted) (“Vehicles also may be the subject of an investigative stop.”).

¶ 15. Grounds for reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop generally come from two sources: either the officers' “personal observation” or an informant's tip. Williamson v. State, 876 So.2d 353, 355 (Miss.2004) (citation omitted). See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). The officer's personal observation includes information from other law-enforcement personnel. See Dies, 926 So.2d at 920 (“[R]easonable suspicion...