Eans-Snoderly v. Snoderly

• Decision Date: 18 August 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CV 18-0447 FC,1 CA-CV 18-0447 FC
• Citation: 249 Ariz. 552,473 P.3d 337
• Parties: In re the Marriage of: Diane Kay EANS-SNODERLY, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Michael Charles SNODERLY, Respondent/Appellee.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

249 Ariz. 552

473 P.3d 337

In re the Marriage of: Diane Kay EANS-SNODERLY, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.Michael Charles SNODERLY, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 18-0447 FC

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED August 18, 2020

Pangerl Law Firm PLLC, Phoenix, By Regina M. Pangerl, Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Owens & Perkins PC, Scottsdale, By Max Nicholas Hanson, Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

OPINION

BROWN, Judge:

¶1 Diane Kay Eans-Snoderly ("Wife") appeals the superior court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Michael Charles Snoderly ("Husband") on her petition for contempt and motion to enforce matters relating to a consent decree of dissolution. The issues we address are (1) whether the court had jurisdiction to consider Wife's petition insofar as it sought contempt remedies for Husband's failure to pay the balance of his equalization debt, and (2) whether her petition and motion were barred by Arizona's judgment renewal statute or by laches. Because we conclude the court erred in granting summary judgment, we vacate the court's order and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 After Wife petitioned for divorce, the parties mediated their disputes, resulting in an agreement addressing their "community and separate property and obligations." Under the agreement, which was incorporated into a consent decree of dissolution entered in 2006, the community business, Snoderly Distributing, Inc., was awarded to Husband, and Wife was awarded a $300,000 equalization payment. The decree ordered Husband to maintain the business as a going concern and keep a life insurance policy in place until the equalization debt was fully paid.¹ The decree further stated that Husband would pay Wife his share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence, less $50,000, and then make monthly installment payments on the remaining balance. The agreement, however, left the amount and duration of the monthly installment payments blank, along with the date when interest would start accruing. If Husband failed to pay the debt, the decree stated that Wife could file a contempt action.

¶3 In January 2007, the parties signed a handwritten agreement addressing, among other things, additional payment terms for the $300,000 equalization debt. Husband agreed (1) he would pay $5,000 per month to Wife beginning 30 days after closing on the sale of the marital residence, and (2) by February 2, 2007, he would name Wife as the beneficiary on his life insurance policy up to the amount still owing on the equalization debt. Husband paid Wife $70,000 from the sale of the marital residence in June 2007 and $5,000 per month from July 2007 through November 2009. He then made two more partial payments in December 2009 and January 2010, according to Wife's calculations. In May 2015, Husband filed for personal bankruptcy, and a discharge was entered a few months later; according to Wife, however, the equalization debt was not discharged.

¶4 Wife took no further court action to collect the remaining debt until October 2015, when she filed the 2007 agreement with the superior court under Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure ("Rule") 69.² In December 2016, Wife filed a "post-decree petition for contempt and motion to enforce Rule 69 agreement," later amended in August 2017 (referred to hereinafter as the "Petition" unless otherwise noted). Wife asked the court to find Husband in contempt for (1) failing to pay the balance of the equalization debt, and (2) failing to maintain the business as a going concern by transferring it to a third party without her knowledge. She alleged Husband owed her $81,250 plus interest, for a total of $136,161.35, as of October 31, 2016. Wife also sought an order compelling Husband to fund the life insurance policy as he previously agreed, or alternatively, to provide other equitable relief to remedy his failure to comply with that agreement.

¶5 Husband moved for summary judgment, asserting the judgment renewal limitations period in A.R.S. § 12-1551 barred Wife's Petition because his last installment payment was due on April 30, 2011, and Wife filed the Petition after the five-year period for renewing or enforcing judgments. Husband also raised a laches defense.

¶6 The superior court granted Husband's motion, concluding the judgment renewal statute barred Wife's Petition on the outstanding debt. In denying Wife's subsequent motion to amend the judgment, the court (1) clarified that § 12-1551 applied because the $300,000 award was not for spousal maintenance, and (2) found that laches also barred the Petition. The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Husband and entered a final judgment. Wife filed a timely notice of appeal. We later issued an order directing the parties to provide supplemental briefing on whether the superior court had jurisdiction to consider Wife's petition for contempt based on Husband's failure to pay the full amount of his equalization debt.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 79(a). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, considering the facts and any inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Tierra Ranchos Homeowners Ass'n v. Kitchukov , 216 Ariz. 195, 199, ¶ 15, 165 P.3d 173, 177 (App. 2007). We also review the interpretation of a statute de novo. Jensen v. Beirne, 241 Ariz. 225, 228, ¶ 9, 386 P.3d 411, 414 (App. 2016). We review the superior court's decision on laches for an abuse of discretion. Rash v. Town of Mammoth , 233 Ariz. 577, 583, ¶ 17, 315 P.3d 1234, 1240 (App. 2013).

A. Jurisdiction—Petition for Contempt

¶8 In seeking to enforce the terms of the consent decree and the Rule 69 agreement, Wife's Petition requested, inter alia, that the court find Husband in contempt for failing to finish paying the equalization debt and failing to maintain the business as a going concern. The law is clear that this court lacks jurisdiction "over an appeal from a civil contempt adjudication." Danielson v. Evans , 201 Ariz. 401, 411, ¶ 35, 36 P.3d 749, 759 (App. 2001). Thus, we do not have jurisdiction to consider Wife's appeal of the superior court's ruling denying her petition for contempt. In our discretion, however, we will treat Wife's appeal from the court's ruling as a petition for special action and accept jurisdiction. See id.

¶9 We next decide whether the superior court had jurisdiction to enter the order from which this appeal was taken. See Bates & Springer of Ariz., Inc. v. Friermood , 109 Ariz. 203, 204, 507 P.2d 668, 669 (1973). "In Arizona, dissolution of marriage proceedings are creatures of statute, and jurisdiction to decide such cases is conferred on the courts by the legislature." In re Marriage of Waldren , 217 Ariz. 173, 175, ¶ 8, 171 P.3d 1214, 1216 (2007) ; accord Weaver v. Weaver , 131 Ariz. 586, 587, 643 P.2d 499, 500 (1982) ("Title 25 defines the boundaries of a dissolution court's jurisdiction, and the court may not exceed its jurisdiction even when exercising its equitable powers."). Thus, the issue here is whether Wife's petition for contempt falls within the jurisdictional boundaries of Title 25.

¶10 In 1973, our legislature adopted A.R.S. § 25-317, which provides in relevant part:

A. To promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage, the parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property owned by either of them, maintenance of either of them, and support, custody and parenting time of their children.

....

D. If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unfair as to disposition of property ..., the separation agreement shall be set forth or incorporated by reference in the decree of dissolution or legal separation and the parties shall be ordered to perform them.

....

E. Terms of the agreement set forth or incorporated by reference in the decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt .

(Emphasis added.)³ To our knowledge, the meaning of § 25-317(E) has not been previously interpreted in any reported decision, except to recognize the constitutional prohibition of ordering imprisonment for nonpayment of property settlement payments. See infra ¶¶ 11–13. But the statute's language yields only one reasonable meaning; it unambiguously provides that the terms of a written separation agreement are enforceable by all remedies available to enforce judgments, including contempt. See Glazer v. State , 237 Ariz. 160, 163, ¶ 12, 347 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2015) ("If the statute is subject to only one reasonable interpretation, we apply it without further analysis."). The legislature could have qualified that language by creating exceptions or otherwise limiting the scope of this provision such that terms related to property settlements would not be included, but it did not do so. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White , 231 Ariz. 337, 341, ¶ 14, 295 P.3d 435, 439 (App. 2013) ("We ‘will not read into a statute something which is not within the manifest intent of the legislature as indicated by the statute itself.’ " (citation omitted)).

¶11 We recognize that both our supreme court and this court have held that property settlement payments cannot be enforced by contempt proceedings. See, e.g. , Proffit v. Proffit , 105 Ariz. 222, 224–25, 462 P.2d 391, 393–94 (1969) ; Masta v. Lurie ex rel. Superior Court , 22 Ariz. App. 170, 171, 525 P.2d 301 (1974) ; Danielson, 201 Ariz. at 411, ¶ 37, 36 P.3d at 759. In Proffit , the superior court found the defendant wife in contempt because she failed to pay her husband money she owed him under the divorce decree. 105 Ariz. at 223–24, 462 P.2d at...