Eash v. Cnty. of York
| Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:19-cv-141 |
| Citation | 450 F.Supp.3d 568 |
| Parties | Douglas L. EASH, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Jeremy Alan Donham, Donham Law, Dellslow, WV, for Plaintiff.
Cory A. Iannacone, Pillar Aught LLC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Kristy Bixler ("Bixler"), Kimberly Rinker ("Rinker"), Ashli Stroud ("Stroud," collectively the "Individual Defendants"), and County of York, Pennsylvania (the "County"), seeking to dismiss Plaintiff Douglas Eash's ("Eash") amended complaint. (Doc. 6.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in part.
The following facts are garnered from Eash's amended complaint and are taken as true for the purpose of resolving Defendants' motion to dismiss. Eash was employed by York County at the County of York Department of Emergency Services (the "County") from 2005 to 2018. (Doc. 6, ¶ 11.) From February 2007 to July 2018, Eash held the position of Operations Supervisor. (Id. ¶ 14.)
On June 22, 2018, Eash initiated a private chat with C.H., a female 911 employee with the County who he did not supervise, over Facebook Messenger during off-the-clock hours. (Id. ¶ 16.) The two followed up on a conversation they had during work hours, which led to further conversations, "banter regarding sexual preferences," and Eash sending photographs of himself partially disrobed and lying on his stomach after a "fire-cupping session," which he used as a stress-reduction technique. (Id. ¶¶ 25-27.) C.H. participated in the conversations, including their sexual content, and did not voice any objection to Eash. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 27 28.)
On June 28, 2018, C.H. filed a complaint with the County's human resources department regarding the conversations. (Id. ¶ 31.) Thereafter, Eash was instructed to attend a June 29, 2018 meeting with human resources. (Id. ¶ 33.) The meeting was conducted by Rinker, the Deputy Director of Human Resources, and Stroud, the East End Human Resources Representative for the County of York. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 32.)
During the meeting, Plaintiff initially objected to discussing the conversations with C.H. because they pertained to his "private life." (Id. ¶ 42.) Rinker and Stroud then instructed Eash to show them the contents of the communications under threat of termination. (Id. ) Eash eventually complied with the instruction and showed Rinker and Stroud the messages between him and C.H. out of fear of being terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 46-50.)
Subsequently, Eash was terminated effective July 2, 2018, and was notified by letter dated July 3, 2018. (Id. ¶ 51, Doc. 6-1.) The letter was signed by Rinker and allegedly drafted at the direction of Bixler, the Director of Human Resources for the County. (Doc. 6, ¶ 51, Doc. 6-1.) It asserted that the human resources investigation found that Eash engaged in inappropriate communication between a supervisor and subordinate and that Eash was not truthful during the investigation. (Doc. 6, ¶ 59; Doc. 6-1.) The letter also listed various sections of the County disciplinary policy that it claimed Eash violated: "Disregard for policies, procedures and rules in performance of job duties;" "Theft or any form of dishonesty;" "Instigating dissatisfaction among fellow employees;" and "Sexual harassment." (Doc. 6-1.)
In January 2019, Eash initiated this action by filing a complaint, which he subsequently amended in April 2019. The amended complaint alleges claims for (1) civil rights deprivation of liberty interest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County; (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment against all the Defendants; (3) intrusion upon seclusion invasion of privacy against the Individual Defendants; (4) defamation against the Individual Defendants; and (5) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against all the Defendants.1
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them." Taksir v. Vanguard Grp. , 903 F.3d 95, 96–97 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The facts alleged must be "construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."
In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig. , 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (). But "[t]he court is not required to draw unreasonable inferences" from the facts. 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004).
The Third Circuit has detailed a three-step process to determine whether a complaint meets the pleading standard. Bistrian v. Levi , 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012). First, the court outlines the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief. Id. at 365. Second, the court must "peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. Third, the court "look[s] for well-pled factual allegations, assume[s] their veracity, and then ‘determine[s] whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ " Id. (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). The last step is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id.
The County moves to dismiss Eash's claim for deprivation of liberty interest.2 "[T]o make out a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in reputation, a plaintiff must show a stigma to his reputation plus deprivation of some additional right or interest." Hill v. Borough of Kutztown , 455 F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis original). In the context of public employment, this "stigma-plus" test "has been applied to mean that when an employer ‘creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the employee in connection with his termination,’ it deprives the employee of a protected liberty interest." Id. (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) ). "To satisfy the ‘stigma’ prong of the test, it must be alleged that the purportedly stigmatizing statement(s) (1) were made publicly, and (2) were false." Hill , 455 F.3d at 236 (citations omitted). The "plus" prong is met so long as the statements were made in the course of the public employee's termination. See id. at 238.
Here, the amended complaint adequately states a claim for deprivation of liberty interest. Eash alleges that the County created a defamatory impression of him in connection with his termination by falsely writing in his termination letter that he violated the County's policy governing sexual harassment and by disseminating that letter inside and outside his department. The County's argument that this claim fails because Eash "has conceded to his underlying conduct concerning his sexually oriented text message exchange with C.H." and instead merely challenges "the County's opinion" that the messages rise to the level of sexual harassment is unavailing.3 The statement in Eash's termination letter that he "violated" the County's employee discipline policy governing sexual harassment is not expressed as an opinion, and its truth or falsity can be determined through the straightforward task of applying Eash's underlying conduct to the policy itself. (See infra § IV(d).)
The County also argues that Eash's claim for deprivation of liberty interest should be dismissed because it fails to allege a custom or policy necessary to impose municipal liability under § 1983. To establish municipal liability pursuant to § 1983, a plaintiff "must show that they were deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, and that the deprivation of those rights was the result of an official government policy or custom." Mulholland v. Gov't Cty. of Berks, Pa. , 706 F.3d 227, 238 (3d Cir. 2013). "A policy is a decision of a municipality's ‘duly constituted legislative body’ or of ‘officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.’ " B.S. v. Somerset Cty. , 704 F.3d 250, 274 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 403–04, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) ).
In this case, Eash alleges that Bixler and Stroud made a recommendation to the County Commissioners to terminate Eash on the basis of false information; that the County Commissioners ratified that decision and its underlying bases as outlined in Eash's termination letter; that the County Commissioners publicly disseminated the contents of the letter; and that the County Commissioners had final policymaking authority with respect to Eash's termination. This is sufficient to plead municipal liability under § 1983, since the "policy or custom" requirement is met where the official or body in question is responsible for making policy in the particular area of municipal business, and where such authority is final and unreviewable. Hill , 455 F.3d at 245 ; B.S. v. Somerset Cnty. , 704 F.3d 250, 275 n. 36 (3d Cir. 2013). Moreover, the County's argument that a plaintiff's allegations of custom or policy are subject to a heightened pleading requirement is based on outdated caselaw that has since been abrogated. See Alston v. Parker , 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004) ; Evancho v. Fisher , 423 F.3d 347, 351-52 (3d Cir. 2005). The amended complaint thus sufficiently alleges...
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