East Coast Properties v. City of Oneida Planning Bd.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1990
• Citation: 167 A.D.2d 641,562 N.Y.S.2d 864
• Parties: In the Matter of EAST COAST PROPERTIES, Appellant, v. CITY OF ONEIDA PLANNING BOARD et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 864

562 N.Y.S.2d 864

167 A.D.2d 641

In the Matter of EAST COAST PROPERTIES, Appellant, v. CITY OF ONEIDA PLANNING BOARD et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

Nov. 8, 1990.

Hancock & Estabrook (Winthrop H. Thurlow, of counsel), Syracuse, for appellant.

Linus W. Walton, Oneida, for City of Oneida Planning Bd., respondent.

Coupe, Siegel, Hester, Stephens & Kahler (Thomas L. Bell, of counsel), Utica, for TecStar Corp. of New York, respondent.

Before WEISS, J.P., and LEVINE, MERCURE and HARVEY, JJ.

WEISS, Justice Presiding.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Tait, Jr., J.), entered March 2, 1990 in Madison County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review two determinations of respondent City of Oneida Planning Board granting the request of respondent TecStar Corporation of New York for site plan approval and a conditional use permit.

Respondent TecStar Corporation of New York sought a site plan approval and a conditional use permit to construct a 48-unit condominium project in the City of Oneida, Madison County. The permit process resulted in a negative declaration as an unlisted type action under State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art. 8) (hereinafter SEQRA). Petitioner, owner of a neighboring apartment complex, challenged the SEQRA determination, the site plan approval and the conditional use permit. Since more than four months had expired since issuance of a negative declaration and site plan approval on April 13, 1989, prior to the commencement of this proceeding on December 8, 1989, Supreme Court found the challenges to the SEQRA and the site plan approvals untimely. The court also found that the determination to issue a conditional use permit on November 9, 1989 had a rational basis.

Petitioner has appealed, contending that its challenge was timely in that the Statute of Limitations does not commence on a SEQRA determination until the underlying action has become final and binding and has an impact upon aggrieved petitioners (see, Matter of Wing v. Coyne, 129 A.D.2d 213, 217, 517 N.Y.S.2d 576). Petitioner has challenged the negative declaration, contending that there had not been a "hard look" at the water pressure issues relating to fire safety. Petitioner also contends the conditional use permit is arbitrary, alleging insufficient consideration of the water pressure issue and the zoning density requirements. Petitioner further argues that the decision granting the conditional use permit was procedurally defective as lacking sufficient specific findings and conclusions.

Initially, we hold that petitioner's challenge to the negative declaration was timely as the declaration did not have an impact on petitioner until the related decision-making process had been completed (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v. City of Albany, 117 A.D.2d 267, 269, 502 N.Y.S.2d 540, mod., 70 N.Y.2d 193, 518 N.Y.S.2d 943, 512 N.E.2d 526), which in this instance was the granting of the conditional use permit on November 9, 1989. Moreover, respondent City of Oneida Planning Commission (hereinafter the City) completed an additional SEQRA review on November 9, 1989 and again made a negative declaration (cf., Matter of Monteiro v. Town of Colonie, 158 A.D.2d 246, 558 N.Y.S.2d...