Easter v. Lexington Memorial Hospital, Inc., 116

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BRANCH; CARLTON
• Citation: Easter v. Lexington Memorial Hospital, Inc., 303 N.C. 303, 278 S.E.2d 253 (N.C. 1981)
• Decision Date: 02 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 116,116
• Parties: , 17 A.L.R.4th 128 Ruth W. EASTER, Administratrix of the Estate of Bobby Lee Easter, Deceased v. LEXINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.; Dr. James A. Cline; Dr. Lloyd D. Lohr; Dr.C. F. Meade; Lexington Clinic For Women, P. A.; and North Carolina BaptistHospitals, Inc.

Page 253

278 S.E.2d 253

303 N.C. 303, 17 A.L.R.4th 128

Ruth W. EASTER, Administratrix of the Estate of Bobby Lee Easter, Deceased v. LEXINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.; Dr. James A. Cline; Dr Lloyd D. Lohr; Dr.C. F. Meade; Lexington Clinic For Women, P. A.; and North Carolina BaptistHospitals, Inc.

No. 116.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 2, 1981.

Michael J. Lewis and Teresa G. Bowden, Winston-Salem, for plaintiff.

Petree, Stockton, Robinson, Vaughn, Glaze & Maready by J. Robert Elster and Jackson N. Steele, Winston-Salem, for defendant Cline.

BRANCH, Chief Justice.

The sole question presented for review is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Dr. Cline. The Court of Appeals held that all of the evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment tended to show that Dr. Cline never saw or treated plaintiff's intestate at all. The court stated: "We find no evidence in rebuttal." Easter v. Hospital, 49 N.C.App. at 402, 271 S.E.2d at 547. The court further noted that "(n)o act or omission to act by Dr. Cline was the proximate cause of Mr. Easter's developing tetanus." Id. at 402, 271 S.E.2d at 547. Finally, the court found "no evidence that a doctor-patient relationship ever existed between Dr. Cline and Mr. Easter." Id. at 401, 271 S.E.2d at 547.

It is well settled that "Rule 56, Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes the rendition of summary judgment upon a showing by the movant that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Vassey v. Burch, 301 N.C. 68, 72, 269 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1980). We have observed that the purpose of summary judgment is "to eliminate formal trials where only questions of law are involved by permitting penetration of an unfounded claim or defense in advance of trial and allowing summary disposition for either party when a fatal weakness in the claim or defense is exposed." Id. Finally, it is a general rule that,

issues of negligence are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication either for or against the claimant "but should be resolved by trial in the ordinary manner." 6 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.17(42) at 946 (2d ed. 1980). Hence it is only in exceptional negligence cases that summary judgment is appropriate because the ... applicable standard of care must be applied, and ordinarily the jury should apply it under appropriate instructions from the court.

Id. at 73, 269 S.E.2d at 140.

In the instant case, as the Court of Appeals noted, defendant Cline's evidence tended to show that he never treated or saw plaintiff's intestate and thus the physician-patient relationship never arose. It is well settled that the relationship of physician to patient must be established as a prerequisite to an actionable claim for medical malpractice. Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931). There is also evidence in the record, as testified to by Charles Thomas Frock, President of Lexington Memorial Hospital, upon deposition, that the hospital records indicated that Dr. Cline saw the patient initially in the emergency room. Mr. Frock also stated that the discharge summary recited that "Dr. Cline saw the patient in the emergency room." Frock further noted that "(i)t was the policy of the hospital ... to keep complete and accurate records of the patient care."

We recognize that Dr. Cline's evidence included the affidavit of Dr. Meade, who made the hospital records testified to by Mr. Frock, averring that the hospital records were in error due to his own mistaken assumptions regarding the night in question. Nevertheless, Mr. Frock's testimony directly contradicts the evidence presented by Dr. Cline that he never saw plaintiff's intestate. Such a contradiction raises an issue of material fact to be decided by a jury with the credibility of the witnesses likewise to be determined by a jury. We further note that there is evidence that...