In re Merrimack Cnty.
Decision Date | 23 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 2006–525.,2006–525. |
Citation | 930 A.2d 1202,156 N.H. 35 |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Parties | Appeal of MERRIMACK COUNTY (NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD). |
Atlas & Atlas, P.C., of Nashua (Susan A. Atlas, on the brief and orally), for the petitioner.
Backus, Meyer, Solomon & Branch, LLP, of Manchester (Jon Meyer and Ellen Purcell, on the brief), and International Chemical Workers Union Council/United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1046C, of Akron, OH (Randall Vehar, assistant general counsel, on the brief and orally), for the respondent.
The petitioner, Merrimack County (county), appeals and the respondent, International Chemical Workers Union Council/United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1046C (union), cross-appeals a decision of the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) ordering the county to implement an arbitrator's award mandating reinstatement of an employee represented by the union. We affirm in part, vacate in part and remand.
The record supports the following: The county is a public employer within the meaning of RSA 273–A:1, X (Supp.2006). The union is the exclusive bargaining representative for certain workers at the county's nursing home. The county and the union were signatories to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Particularly relevant to this appeal are articles 1, 2, 24 and 25 of the CBA:
The CBA expired on March 31, 2002; the parties did not enter into a new CBA until after the events herein described.
Beginning in May 1999, the county employed Melissa Foote as a resident assistant, and later as a licensed nursing assistant (LNA), at the nursing home. Foote also served as a shop steward for the union, participating in contract negotiations and representing bargaining unit members.
On October 28, 2002, Foote was working at the nursing home where her duties included performing safety checks on certain nursing home residents every half hour and responding to their calls. At approximately 2:30 p.m., two LNAs found one of the residents sitting in his wheelchair. He had defecated. One LNA thought that the resident should be wearing an adult diaper, but the other was unsure. Foote, as the LNA primarily responsible for this resident, was called to answer this question. Foote responded to the resident's accusation that she had not attended him by pointing a finger in his face and yelling, or loudly interrupting him, to emphasize what she had done that day. Ultimately, this incident was reported to the assistant director of nursing at the nursing home, who filled out a complaint form, asked a social worker to interview the resident, and called Foote and a union representative to her office to discuss what had happened. It was also reported to the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
Based upon recommendations from the administrator and assistant administrator of the nursing home, the county's board of commissioners voted to terminate Foote's employment effective November 23, 2002. The administrator testified that he based his recommendation, at least in part, upon Foote's refusal to admit to wrongdoing. The union then filed a grievance on Foote's behalf.
The parties proceeded to arbitration. The arbitration issue to which they stipulated was: In its brief to the arbitrator, the county agreed that "under RSA 28:10–a, County employees who have been employed for more than one year are entitled to a ‘good cause’ standard of discharge." According to that brief, the county further agreed that "good cause would be examined under traditional just cause standards."
After five days of hearing, the arbitrator found that while Foote had not neglected the resident, she had verbally abused him. The arbitrator further found, however, that her conduct "was no more serious than employees who have continued to work at the Nursing Home," and that had Foote admitted to having verbally abused the resident, she would not have been terminated. Therefore, the arbitrator found that terminating Foote was an "overly harsh and unreasonable penalty" for which the county lacked just cause. The arbitrator ordered the county to reinstate Foote, without back pay or other lost benefits, conditioned upon Foote's taking anger management and abuse/neglect training programs. The county refused to reinstate Foote, prompting the union to file an unfair labor practice charge with the PELRB. The county filed a counterclaim alleging that the union had engaged in an unfair labor practice by demanding Foote's reinstatement. Specifically, the county asserted that the arbitrator's award was void and unenforceable because it exceeded his authority under the CBA and because it violated public policy. The PELRB ruled in the union's favor. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
When reviewing a decision of the PELRB, we defer to its findings of fact, and, absent an erroneous ruling of law, we will not set aside its decision unless the appealing party demonstrates by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the order is unjust or unreasonable. Appeal of Nashua Police Comm'n, 149 N.H. 688, 689, 827 A.2d 1013 (2003) ; see also RSA 541:13 (2007). Though the PELRB's findings of fact are presumptively lawful and reasonable, we require that the record support its determinations. Appeal of City of Laconia, 150 N.H. 91, 93, 834 A.2d 329 (2003).
The county first argues that the PELRB erred by enforcing the arbitrator's award because the award exceeded the arbitrator's authority and, therefore, was not final and binding. "A judicial challenge to arbitral authority requires the reviewing court to consider both the CBA and the arbitral submission." Larocque v. R.W.F., Inc., 8 F.3d 95, 96 (1st Cir.1993) ; see Appeal of Police Comm'n of City of Rochester, 149 N.H. 528, 534, 823 A.2d 757 (2003) ( ); Local 238 Intern. Broth. Teamsters v. Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.1995) . "[T]he overriding concern is whether the contracting parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute, not whether the agreement is within the CBA." Appeal of Police Comm'n of City of Rochester, 149 N.H. at 534, 823 A.2d 757 (quotation and citation omitted).
While ordinarily we interpret contractual provisions de novo, see Appeal of Town of Durham, 149 N.H. 486, 487, 821 A.2d 1097 (2003), "the general rule [is] that the interpretation of a CBA is within the province of the arbitrator, subject to certain exceptions recognized by our case law" that are not relevant here. Appeal of State of N.H., 147 N.H. 106, 109, 784 A.2d 695 (2001) ; see Appeal of City of Manchester, 153 N.H. 289, 294, 893 A.2d 695 (2006) ( ); Appeal of Town of Durham, 149 N.H. at 487–88, 821 A.2d 1097 (same). "[W]hen the parties include an arbitration clause in their CBA, they choose to have disputes concerning constructions of the CBA resolved by the arbitrator." Appeal of State of N.H., 147 N.H. at 109, 784 A.2d 695 (quotation and brackets omitted). " Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept." United Paperworkers Intern. Union, AFL–CIO, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37–38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) ; see Keebler Co. v. Truck Drivers, Local 170, 247 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir.2001). For this reason, the PELRB does not regularly have jurisdiction to interpret the CBA when it provides for final and binding arbitration. Appeal of State of N.H., 147 N.H. at 108, 784 A.2d 695.
Our review of the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA is similarly limited. See Georgia–Pacific Corp. v. Local 27, 864 F.2d 940, 944 (1st Cir.1988). Just as the court may not reject the arbitrator's factual findings simply because it disagrees with them, neither may the court reject the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA simply because the court disagrees...
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