Eastman v. State
| Decision Date | 25 January 1887 |
| Docket Number | 13,495 |
| Citation | 10 N.E. 97,109 Ind. 278 |
| Parties | Eastman v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Steuben Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
G. B Adams, for appellant.
L. T Michener, Attorney General, and W. B. Hord, for the State.
The appellant challenges the validity of the act regulating the practice of medicine and surgery, and on this challenge arises the principal question in the case.
The police power of a State is very broad and comprehensive. It has been variously defined by the courts and text-writers. It is, said one of the courts, "that inherent and plenary power in the State, which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." Lakeview v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191 (22 Am. R. 71). "All laws," says another court, "for the protection of the lives, limbs, health and quiet of persons, and the security of all property within the State, fall within this general power of the government." State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 189.
In Thorpe v. Rutland, etc., R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, it was held, that, under the general police power of the State, "persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State, of the perfect right in the Legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."
In speaking of this power, it was said by this court, in Hockett v. State, 105 Ind. 250 (55 Am. R. 201, 5 N.E. 178), that
The views expressed in these cases are well supported by authority. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12 (48 Am. R. 692); Cooley Const. Lim. 572; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 28 L.Ed. 923, 5 S.Ct. 357; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 28 L.Ed. 1145, 5 S.Ct. 730; Live Stock Ass'n v. Crescent City, 1 Abbott U.S. Rep. 388; Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L.Ed. 394.
The practice of medicine and surgery is a vocation that very nearly concerns the comfort, health and life of every person in the land. Physicians and surgeons have committed to their care the most important interests, and it is an almost imperious necessity that only persons possessing skill and knowledge should be permitted to practice medicine and surgery. For centuries the law has required physicians to possess and exercise skill and learning, for it has mulcted in damages those who pretend to be physicians and surgeons, but have neither learning nor skill. It is, therefore, no new principle of law that is asserted by our statute; but, if it were, it would not condemn the statute, for the statute is an exercise of the police power inherent in the State. It is, no one can doubt, of high importance to the community that health, limb and life should not be left to the treatment of ignorant pretenders and charlatans. It is within the power of the Legislature to enact such laws as will protect the people from ignorant pretenders, and secure them the services of reputable, skilled, and learned men, although it is not within the power of the Legislature to discriminate in favor of any particular school of medicine. When intelligent and educated men differ in their theories, the Legislature has no power to condemn the one or approve the other, but it may require learning and skill in the school of medicine which the physician professes to practice. White v. Carroll, 42 N.Y. 161 (1 Am. R. 503).
The rule requiring physicians to possess learning and skill is a very ancient one. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke R. 227; College of Physicians v. Levett, 1 Ld. Raym. 472. This rule of the common law has been incorporated in many of the State statutes, and these statutes have always been upheld.
The statute of Minnesota is very similar to ours, and it was held to be valid in State v. State Med. Ex. Board, 32 Minn. 324 (50 Am. R. 575, 20 N.W. 238), the court saying: "In the profession of medicine, as in that of the law, so great is the necessity for special qualification in the practitioner, and so injurious the consequences likely to result from the want of it, that the power of the Legislature to prescribe such reasonable conditions as are calculated to exclude from the profession those who are unfitted to discharge its duties, can not be doubted."
Speaking of a statute like ours, another court said: "We are of opinion that all of the provisions of the act under consideration, as above set out, and independent of any constitutional warrant for its enactment, would be maintainable under the police power of the State; that, under this general power, the Legislature is the proper judge as to what regulations are demanded in dealing with the property and restraining the actions of individuals." Logan v. State, 5 Tex.Ct.App. 306.
The subject was examined in all its important phases in Ex Parte Spinney, 10 Nev. 323, and the statute declared valid. A like result was reached by the court in Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. 353. A full discussion of the question will be found in Fox v. Washington Territory, 5 West Coast Rep. 339, where a similar result was reached. Judge Cooley strongly and unequivocally affirms the validity of statutes like ours. Cooley Torts, 289, 290. The question received a very careful consideration in State v. Dent, 25 W.Va. 1, and it was held that the statute was valid in every part.
For more than eighty years a similar statute has been in force in New York, and the court of that State have uniformly regarded it as valid. Sheldon v. Clark, 1 Johns. 513; Allcott v. Barber, 1 Wend. 526; Timmerman v. Morrison, 14 Johns. 369; Thompson v. Staats, 15 Wend. 395; Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Denio 60; Finch v. Gridley, 25 Wend. 469. In very many other cases such statutes have been enforced. Antle v. State, 6 Tex. Ct. App. 202; Musser v. Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577; Wert v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347; Bibber v. Simpson, 59 Me. 181; Thompson v. Hazen, 25 Me. 104; State v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 123 (53 Am. R. 565).
The appellant is right in asserting that the departments of the government are separate and distinct, and that a clerk of a county can not exercise judicial powers. Smith v. Myers, ante, p. 1, and cases cited. But he is wrong in affirming that the act under examination confers upon the clerk judicial powers.
The power to accept or reject an application for license, under the statute, is not a judicial one, although it may involve some exercise of discretion. Elmore v. Overton, 104 Ind. 548 (54 Am. R. 343, 4 N.E. 197); Cooley Torts, 411.
If an exercise of discretion constituted a clerk a judicial officer, then he would be such in every case in which he issues a writ, files a paper or approves a bond, for all these acts involve some exercise of discretionary power. The statute does not require the clerk to sit in judgment upon the sufficiency of the application for a license, for the affidavits prescribed and the diploma required constitute the evidence upon which the clerk must act. The diploma and affidavits compel him to grant the license, and it is, therefore, not possible to regard his duty as a judicial one. Flournoy v. City of Jeffersonville, 17 Ind. 169; Betts v. Dimon, 3 Conn. 107; State, ex rel., v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 175.
Whether the statute is a wise one or not is purely a legislative question, and so is the question...
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...court upheld the validity of the law, in the case of State ex rel. v. Hathaway, 115 Mo. 36. A similar conclusion was reached in Eastman v. State, 109 Ind. 278. And as dentists, in Wilkins v. State, 113 Ind. 514. A like conclusion was reached in Arkansas, in Richardson v. State, 47 Ark. 562.......