Easton v. Bradford, 79-1588
| Decision Date | 12 November 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-1588,79-1588 |
| Citation | 390 So.2d 1202 |
| Parties | Ballard William EASTON and Goodville Mutual Casualty Company, Appellants, v. William Jones BRADFORD, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael S. Rywant of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, P. A., Tampa, for appellants.
Steven T. Northcutt of Levine, Freedman, Hirsch & Levinson, P. A., Tampa, for appellee.
Appellants Ballard William Easton and his insurer, Goodville Mutual Casualty Company, appeal an order granting appellee Bradford's motion for a new trial in a vehicular negligence action. Appellants also contend that the trial court improperly admitted a certain medical bill into evidence in the absence of testimony from a medical expert as to the reasonableness of the bill.
The relevant facts are as follows: Prior to opening statements at the jury trial, appellants admitted liability for the accident and the cause was tried solely on the issue of whether appellee Bradford surpassed the no-fault threshold and the matter of damages, if any. During the trial, a medical bill from Dr. Urquiza was admitted into evidence over appellants' objection. Bradford testified that his treating physician, Dr. Sierra, had referred him for physiotherapy to Dr. Urquiza in an effort to alleviate the pain from injuries received in the accident. He stated that he had not paid the bill.
At a jury instruction conference held prior to final argument, both parties submitted their proposed instructions. After the conference, but before the jury was impanelled for closing arguments, the court gave both parties an opportunity to state any objections they might have to the proposed instructions. The only objection noted was that of appellants regarding the court's refusal to give a requested instruction on personal injury protection benefits.
After the jury was charged, the court gave an additional opportunity for the parties to advise if there were any further instructions. At that time both parties indicated that there was no other instructions that they wished the jury to be given. During deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the court relative to filling out the verdict form. The question as stated by the foreman was: "If we award no permanent injuries, can we award damages?" The court instructed the jury to answer both questions on the verdict form. After the jury again retired to deliberate, appellee's counsel requested for the first time that the court instruct the jury as to a serious, nonpermanent injury. The court refused this request contemporaneously with the jury's indication that it had arrived at a verdict. The jury found that appellee Bradford had not sustained a permanent injury and awarded him $7,500 in damages.
Following a hearing on appellee's motion for a new trial, the court entered an order finding, in pertinent part, that the omission of the issue of serious, nonpermanent injury from the verdict form was brought to the court's attention while the verdict was still under the control of the jury, and that appellee's objections was timely made. The court found that the omission of that issue from the verdict form did not afford appellee a fair trial on all the issues and that appellee was entitled to a new trial on the sole issue of whether he had sustained a serious, nonpermanent injury.
In view of the extensive testimony elicited regarding appellee's physical condition from the date of the accident to the time of trial, we hold that evidence of nonpermanent injuries was properly presented to the jury for determination upon instruction by the court. Appellee's counsel pointed out the deficiency in the jury charge and verdict form before the jury returned its verdict. Thus, the trial court correctly...
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