Eccher v. State

• Decision Date: 25 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. SD 36821,SD 36821
• Citation: 629 S.W.3d 113
• Parties: Caleb Z. ECCHER, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

629 S.W.3d 113

Caleb Z. ECCHER, Appellant,

v.STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. SD 36821

Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, Division One.

Filed: August 25, 2021

Appellant's attorney: JoEllen Grohs.

Respondent's attorneys: Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, and Evan J. Buchheim, Assistant Attorney General.

JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J.

Caleb Eccher shot at three people with a shotgun, seriously injuring two. He pleaded guilty to seven felonies and sought minimum sentences to be served concurrently. Instead, he essentially received 75 years. He claims that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crimes and that his trial counsel misled him into believing he would receive at most a 25-year sentence if he pleaded guilty. We affirm.

Background

Eccher was driving to work when he noticed a vehicle driven by Donald Hembree, a former co-worker against whom Eccher bore a grudge. Eccher pursued Hembree's vehicle until it stopped. Eccher got out of his vehicle, took his already-loaded shotgun, and shot at Hembree's vehicle six times. Hembree drove away, eventually stopping at his workplace. Eccher pursued Hembree, reloaded, and fired two more shots at Hembree as he fled into the workplace. The shots missed Hembree but struck a bystander, Krista Gerster. Eccher then went around to the other side of the building, where he saw Michael Galer kneeling on the ground. Eccher shot Galer in the neck.

Gerster was hospitalized for several days and would have shotgun pellets still embedded in her chest cavity years later. Galer thought he was going to die. Surgeons worked for 15 hours to keep him alive, removed bullet fragments from his chest and spine, and stabilized his neck with titanium rods. He spent 17 days in the ICU and eight months in a rehabilitation hospital. Eccher's attack left Galer a quadripalegic who will require constant care for the rest of his life.

Eccher was charged with seven felonies: two counts of first-degree assault with serious physical injuries (class A felonies), one count of attempted first-degree assault (class B felony), unlawful use of a weapon, and three counts of armed criminal action ("ACA"). The state offered to recommend an aggregate 90-year sentence if Eccher pleaded guilty, which Eccher rejected. Nonetheless, Eccher and his attorney supposed that a guilty plea would result in more lenient sentencing and concurrent sentences rather than consecutive. On the day his trial was scheduled to begin, Eccher entered an open guilty plea on all seven counts.

At the sentencing hearing, the court heard from the victims, their families, Eccher, his family, and others. Before pronouncing sentence, the court expressly stated it had considered the "very comprehensive," 17-page sentencing assessment report, Eccher's personal and family history, and Eccher's mental issues. Eccher was sentenced to 30 years for each class A felony assault and 15 years for the class B felony assault, with each sentence to run consecutively. Eccher received 10 years for each ACA and 15 years for unlawful use of a weapon, all running concurrently with his other sentences. By application of § 558.019.3,¹ Eccher, who was 20 at the time he committed his crimes, will not be eligible for parole consideration until he is 70 years old.²

Eccher timely sought Rule 24.035³ relief.⁴ The motion court considered the record from the guilty plea hearing, during which Eccher had affirmed that he understood: (1) the court would assess punishment within the range provided by law, (2) the range of punishment for each offense, and (3) "if anyone has told you what they think the Court is going to do it's just their opinion, it's certainly not binding by the Court."⁵ Eccher's trial counsel, who had practiced criminal defense law for 30 years, testified he had never promised a particular sentence, he had explained to Eccher what an open guilty plea was, and he had explained the range of punishment for each charged offense. Eccher testified that he had not been promised a particular sentence but he was "under the impression" he would get 25 or fewer years based on conversations with counsel. Eccher's motion was denied and this appeal followed.

Point I – Guilty Plea

Eccher first contends his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently because he relied on plea counsel's opinion that Eccher was likely to receive no more than 25 years if he pleaded guilty.

We review the denial of a Rule 24.035 motion to determine whether the motion court's findings and conclusions were clearly erroneous. Glover v. State , 477 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Mo. App. 2015). The findings and conclusions are presumptively correct and will be overturned only if we are left with a definite and firm impression a mistake has been made after reviewing the entire record. Id.

The motion court found, "While Mr. Eccher may have hoped for a lesser sentence, he was well aware that any discussion of sentencing, prior to actually being sentenced, were mere opinions and that the Court would be the one giving the sentence." This finding is supported by the record as summarized above and as more fully set out in the appendix to this opinion. " ‘Neither a disappointed expectation of a lesser sentence, nor a mere prediction as to sentencing by counsel that proves incorrect, is sufficient to render a guilty plea involuntary.’ " Robertson v. State , 502 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Mo. App. 2016) (quoting Porter v. State , 480 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Mo. App. 2016) ).

Eccher's appellate counsel acknowledges the record but argues it's difficult to know whether Eccher, who has mild autism

, truly understood he could receive a sentence greater than 25 years. This argument also is refuted by the record. At the guilty plea hearing, trial counsel indicated Eccher had no difficulty understanding the charges, no difficulty communicating with counsel, and could assist the defense if trial were necessary. Eccher's mental limitations were discussed and testimony was presented on that issue at the sentencing hearing. The same doctor who diagnosed Eccher with autism

found Eccher was competent to stand trial because he understood the nature of the proceedings, did not have a psychotic disorder, knew what was real and what was not, and had the ability to cooperate in his defense. Point I is denied.

Point II – Proportionality of Sentences

Eccher next argues the length of his sentence is cruel, unusual, and grossly disproportionate to the crimes for which he was convicted.

" ‘Embodied in the Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the offense.’ " Glover , 477 S.W.3d at 74 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825, (2010) ). "Proportionality does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence but rather forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime." Id. (internal punctuation omitted). In determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate, we consider the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty. Id. A finding of gross disproportionality only occurs in extreme and exceedingly rare cases. Id.

We accord substantial deference to the legislature's determination of proper punishment. Id. at 75. Additionally, trial courts have broad discretion in their sentencing function, including but not limited to the discretion to order consecutive or concurrent sentences. Id. " ‘[W]hen the sentence imposed is within the range prescribed by statute, it cannot be judged excessive, and the consecutive effect of the sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. ’ " Id. (quoting State v. Mubarak , 163 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Mo. App. 2005) ) (emphasis added in Glover ).

Eccher emphasizes his youthfulness at the time of the crimes, his lack of prior convictions and low risk of recidivism, and reduced culpability due to his neuropsychological impairment and autism

. At the sentencing hearing, a doctor opined that Eccher's offenses were emotionally-driven, and he could better manage his emotions in the future with proper medication and treatment.

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits juveniles from being mandatorily sentenced to life without the possibility of parole without first considering whether such punishment is just and appropriate given the offender's age, the offender's development, and the circumstances of the offense. Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ; State ex rel. Carr v. Wallace , 527 S.W.3d 55 (Mo. banc 2017). Eccher acknowledges he was not a juvenile under Missouri law at the time of his offenses. However, he argues that the principles applied to juveniles in Miller and Carr should "require that no twenty-year-old receive an aggregate sentence that by all intents and purposes amounts to a sentence of life without parole." This argument fails for three reasons.

First, in contrast to the juvenile offenders in Miller and Carr , Eccher was subjected to term-of-years sentences, not a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Trial counsel could and did argue mitigating factors in support of sentences in the lower range of those provided by statute. Eccher does not argue and the record does not show that the sentencing court believed it was without discretion in sentencing⁶ or that it failed to take mitigating evidence into consideration at sentencing. To the contrary, the sentencing court expressly stated it did take that evidence into account before determining the appropriate sentences.

Second, even if Eccher's sentence did constitute a de facto life sentence, which we do not find, it would not offend the Eighth Amendment. The state is not required to guarantee release of an offender during his natural life, even if he is a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. State v. Denzmore , 436 S.W.3d 635, 645 (Mo. App. 2014) (citing Graham v....