Eckart's Estate, Matter of

• Decision Date: 04 May 1976
• Citation: 384 N.Y.S.2d 429,39 N.Y.2d 493,348 N.E.2d 905
• Parties: , 348 N.E.2d 905 In the Matter of the ESTATE of Julia ECKART, Deceased. Carl KRAMER, Appellant, Attorney-General of the State of New York, Intervenor-Appellant, v. Charlotte A. ECKART et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 429

384 N.Y.S.2d 429

39 N.Y.2d 493, 348 N.E.2d 905

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Julia ECKART, Deceased.

Carl KRAMER, Appellant, Attorney-General of the State of New

York, Intervenor-Appellant, v. Charlotte A. ECKART et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 4, 1976.

George H. Hartman and Emory Gardiner, New York City, for appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Anthony S. Urso, Albany, and Samuel A Hirshowitz, New York City, of counsel), for intervenor-appellant.

Douglas J. Danzig, William P. Laino, New York City, and Paul D. Montclare, Scarsdale, for respondents.

WACHTLER, Judge.

Julia Eckart died on August 13, 1970, survived by her two children, Charlotte Eckart and Frank Darmody, the petitioners in this proceeding. She left a simple will, dated August 4, 1966, in which beginning with the THIRD article, she disposed of her entire estate as follows:

'THIRD: Should they survive me, I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter, CHARLOTTE ANNA ECKART, and to FRANK DARMODY, the son of my divorced husband, Patrick Darmody, the sum of Fifty Dollars each.

'FOURTH: For reasons that to me are good and sufficient, I make no further testamentary provision for my said daughter and Frank Darmody, and I intentionally make no provision for any other of my relatives.

'FIFTH: All of the rest and residue of my property, real and personal, wheresoever situated, owned by me at my death, I give, devise and bequeath to WATCH TOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA.'

After the will was admitted to probate, the petitioners served a notice of election 'to contest the testamentary disposition for charitable purposes * * * pursuant to the provisions of section 5--3.3 of the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law'. The relevant portion of that statute provides:

'(a) A person may make a testamentary disposition of his entire estate to any person for a benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious or missionary purpose, provided that if any such disposition is contested by the testator's surviving issue or parents, it shall be valid only to the extent of one-half of such testator's estate, wherever situated, after the payment of debts, subject to the following:

'(1) An issue or parent may not contest a disposition as invalid unless he will receive a pecuniary benefit from a successful contest as a beneficiary under the will or as a distributee.'

It is conceded that according to the terms of the Will the testatrix has left more than one half of her estate for charitable purposes. The question is whether the petitioners have standing to contest the charitable bequest under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of the statute. There is no doubt that they are the children, ^* and thus the 'issue' (EPTL 1--2.10) of Julia Eckart, but the executor urges that they nevertheless lack standing because they will not 'receive a pecuniary benefit from a successful contest'. His point is that the testatrix, in the FOURTH article of the will, expressly provided that she did not want her children to share in her estate--beyond the nominal $50 legacies--and this he claims is a kind of negative bequest or disinheritance clause which precludes them from taking any further share in the estate under the will or by the laws of intestacy. He relies on Matter of Cairo, 35 A.D.2d 76, 312 N.Y.S.2d 925, affd. 29 N.Y.2d 527, 324 N.Y.S.2d 81, 272 N.E.2d 574.

In Cairo, a testatrix survived by a sister and a grandson, left certain property to her sister but, in the residuary clause, left the bulk of her estate to three charities. Nothing was left to the grandson and in fact she specifically provided in the SIXTH article: 'I make no bequest to my grandson, Joseph L. Cairo * * * for good and sufficient reason.' The Appellate Division held that the 'first rule of testamentary construction is that a will be interpreted to reflect the testator's intent' and here the 'will made clear she wanted no part of her estate to go to' her grandson (Matter of Cairo, 35 A.D.2d 76, 77, 78, 312 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927, Supra). The SIXTH article was thus treated as a negative bequest (see Tarbox, Part Three-Property Law, Decedents' Estates, 25 Syracuse L.Rev. 253, 263) or disinheritance clause which barred the grandson from sharing in any property passing by intestacy (see, e.g., Matter of Dammann, 12 N.Y.2d 500, 240 N.Y.S.2d 968, 191 N.E.2d 452; EPTL 1--2.18, subd. (a); 9 Rohan, N.Y. Civ.Prac., par. 1--2.18(1), p. 1--65). And since he could not benefit from a successful contest, of the charitable bequest, the Appellate Division held that the grandson had no standing to challenge the bequest under EPTL 5--3.3. Our court affirmed, without opinion (29 N.Y.2d 527, 324 N.Y.S.2d 81, 272 N.E.2d 574).

In the case now before us the Surrogate found that Cairo was not controlling. In Cairo the testatrix had left nothing to her grandson and mainfested a clear 'intent to disinherit entirely'. Here on the other hand he found that in the FOURTH article 'the testatrix had assigned different levels of importance to her relatives, and that the contestants enjoyed a somewhat higher standing than the others. When this is coupled with the fifty dollar legacies which the others did not receive, and upon a reading of the entire will, it cannot be said that this testatrix intended to disinherit the contestants should any part of her estate fall into intestacy'. Matter of Eckart, 72 Misc.2d 934, 937, 339 N.Y.S.2d 860, 864.

The Appellate Division affirmed by a bare majority (48 A.D.2d 61, 368 N.Y.S.2d 28). In a concurring opinion Justice Christ rejected the distinction drawn by the Surrogate but voted to affirm on the ground that Cairo was wrongly decided and should not be followed. He stated: 'The error in Cairo is the search for the testatrix's intention when the statute is designed to make that intention immaterial. In fact, it presumes that the testatrix intended to give more than one half of her estate to charity and to cut off the issue and/or parent. The very object of EPTL 5--3.3 is to limit what a testator can do in his will be preventing the disinheritance of the family, at the expense of a charity. Unfortunately, Cairo fails to perceive this limitation and in so doing destroys the fulfillment of the legislative purpose.'

In our view, Matter of Cairo, is in point and, under its holding, these petitioners would lack standing to contest the charitable bequest. The FOURTH article of the will, the negative bequest provision, is essentially identical to the one in Cairo. The fact that the testatrix here left the contestants $50 is of no significance. If anything, the grant of a nominal bequest to a close relation is the more accepted or customary way of indicating an intent to disinherit. Nor do we find any merit to the petitioners' argument that the disinheritance clause should have no effect on their intestate rights since it only refers to 'testamentary' provisions. No meaningful distinction can be drawn between a clause which expressly leaves 'no bequest' to the contestant, as in Cairo, and one which makes 'no further testamentary provision' for his benefit as here. The two clauses are essentially the same and should have the same effect. DP Cairo, in short, cannot be distinguished and the primary question is whether it should be followed. As Justice Christ noted, the result reached in the case has been the subject of considerable criticism by the courts and the commentators on the ground that it permits a testator to nullify the statute which was designed to protect his issue and parents from being disinherited by excessive gifts to charity. Under the Cairo holding all he has to do is include a statement in his will Expressly disinheriting them. This it has been said emasculates the statute (see Tarbox, Op. cit.) and is inconsistent with its terms and legislative history (48 A.D.2d 61, 368 N.Y.S.2d 28, Christ, J., concurring).

'Precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust' (Blackstone Commentaries on the Law, p. 70). Blackstone's blunt statement of the rule shows that from the earliest times the doctrine of Stare decisis did not require a strict adherence to precedent in every instance. In an early case our own court recognized that the doctrine had certain limitations, but it was noted that the court would not depart from its prior holdings, 'unless impelled by 'the most cogent reasons" (Baker v. Lorillard, 4 N.Y. 257, 261). It is now well settled in this State and elsewhere, that the courts will not, as a general rule, follow a former decision 'where it can be shown that the law has been misunderstood or misapplied, or where the former determination is evidently contrary to reason' (Rumsey v. New York & New England R.R. Co., 133 N.Y. 79, 85, 30 N.E. 654, 655; see, also, 20 Am. Jur., Courts, § 187). As Chief Judge Breitel noted in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 488, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 426, 348 N.E.2d 894, 901, 'stare decisis does not spring full-grown from a 'precedent' but from precedents which reflect principle and doctrine rationally evolved.'

But the exception is not a hard and fast rule either. There are cases where the need for stability and predictability in the law outweigh the need to purge an erroneous decision. Some precedents are more durable than others.

The source of the existing rule is of course a significant consideration. When the courts themselves have originated the rule, as for instance a common-law rule of tort, the courts will more readily re-examine it and, if necessary, set it aside (see, e.g., Kalechman v. Drew Auto Rental,33 N.Y.2d 397, 355 N.Y.S.2d 414, 308 N.E.2d 886). In cases involving error in the construction of the Constitution or a statute, for sound reasons of policy and practicality, courts are generally more reluctant to change the statutory rule than the constitutional one (People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 348 N.E.2d 894, Supra). But if a recent holding...