Eddy v. Inland Bay Drilling & Workover, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. G-91-417.,G-91-417.
• Citation: 784 F. Supp. 370
• Parties: Emmett EDDY and Wife, Grace Eddy, Plaintiffs, v. INLAND BAY DRILLING & WORKOVER, INC., Broussard Brothers, Inc., Halliburton Company, Apache Corporation, Inland Bay Equipment Leasing Corporation, and N.R. Broussard Landing, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

784 F. Supp. 370

Emmett EDDY and Wife, Grace Eddy, Plaintiffs, v. INLAND BAY DRILLING & WORKOVER, INC., Broussard Brothers, Inc., Halliburton Company, Apache Corporation, Inland Bay Equipment Leasing Corporation, and N.R. Broussard Landing, Inc., Defendants.

No. G-91-417.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

February 12, 1992.

Ernest H. Cannon, Ernest Cannon & Associates, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Ronald L. White, Brown, Sims, Wise & White, Louise E. McCarter, Vinson & Elkins, Gary J. Siller, Griggs & Harrison, Houston, Tex., James R. Sutterfield, New Orleans, La., Roland Garcia, Houston, Tex., for defendants.

ORDER

KENT, District Judge.

Before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand and Motion for Sanctions and Defendants' Motion to Transfer. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' Motion to Remand is GRANTED, Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions is DENIED, and Defendants' Motion to Transfer is not reached.

I.

Plaintiffs initiated this action on April 24, 1991 in the 212th District Court, County of Galveston, State of Texas, asserting a Jones Act¹ claim and several state-law negligence claims. Plaintiffs filed suit in state court pursuant to the maritime "savings to suitors" clause. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in this Court on November 22, 1991. Defendants' original Notice of Removal alleges four grounds for this Court's exercise of removal jurisdiction: 1) Plaintiffs' claims arise under federal law, and Plaintiff Grace Eddy's claim is a claim under general maritime law and not a claim under the Jones Act; 2) the failure of Texas courts to recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens deprives Defendants of substantial federal rights and thereby vests jurisdiction in this Court; 3) Texas's venue and jurisdiction procedures deprive the foreign Defendants of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights; and 4) this action arises under federal law and therefore this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants filed an Amended Notice of Removal and Motion to Transfer on December 2, 1991. The amended notice was never accepted by the Court. However, this was an oversight and the Court accepts the Amended Notice of Removal at this time. The amended notice asserts three grounds for this Court's exercise of removal jurisdiction, which are quoted here verbatim:

1. The refusal of the State of Texas to recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens directly conflicts with an important substantive right afforded to defendants by federal maritime law, giving the Federal District Court original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

2. The venue provisions of the State of Texas provide rights that are illusory and in conflict with the venue provisions of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, thereby raising a federal question and giving the Federal District Court original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

3. Original jurisdiction remains with the Federal District Court for Jones Act or general maritime law claims brought under the "saving to suitors" clause where a state court lacks proper venue.

Plaintiffs filed a timely Motion to Remand on December 23, 1991.

II.

A state court action is not removable to federal court if the action could not have originally been brought in federal court. Thus, removal is proper only where the district court could have exercised original diversity or federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Pursuant to section 1441, a federal district court has removal jurisdiction over any action that it could have exercised original jurisdiction over, had such action originally been filed in federal court, "except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress...." To be sure, a federal court has original subject matter jurisdiction over a Jones Act claim. However, under the "savings to suitors" clause, a Jones Act claim may also be brought in state court, and Congress has expressly provided that federal district courts do not have removal jurisdiction over such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a); 46 U.S.C.App. § 688. See also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 37-38, 46 S.Ct. 410, 412, 70 L.Ed. 813 (1926).

Indeed, it is axiomatic that a Jones Act case filed in state court is not removable.² Only one possible exception exists: if a Jones Act claim is joined with another, separately removable claim, the whole case may be removable. In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 62 (5th Cir.1991).³ No such separately removable claim exists in the instant case, however. Instead, Defendants argue that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 1445(a), this Court has removal jurisdiction because Plaintiffs' Jones Act claim encompasses at least one other federal question. Defendants, however, cite no authority, and the Court has found none, for the novel proposition that an independent basis of original subject matter jurisdiction, as opposed to the joinder of an independently removable claim, will make a Jones Act case removable.⁴ Indeed, it can scarcely be argued that the existence of complete diversity between the parties in a Jones Act case will support removal.⁵ Moreover, the terms of section 1445(a) are not qualified. They appear to indicate that Plaintiffs have an absolute right⁶ to have their Jones Act claim adjudicated in state court. Even assuming, however, that the presence of an independent federal question will support removal of a Jones Act case, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that an independent federal question exists.

A.

First, Defendants argue that because the Texas legislature has abolished the doctrine of forum non conveniens,⁷ Defendants will be deprived of important substantive rights if forced to defend this suit in Texas state court, and that this deprivation creates original federal question jurisdiction sufficient to support removal pursuant to section 1441. This argument is without merit; Texas's failure to recognize forum non conveniens is not a basis for removal, and, even if it might be under certain circumstances, it does not, in this case, deprive Defendants of any substantive rights.

1.

Defendants cite no authority, and the Court has found none, for the proposition that, notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1445, a state's failure to recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens creates a federal question and thereby makes a Jones Act case originally brought in state court automatically removable. Indeed, it is well settled that, under the "well-pleaded complaint rule," federal question jurisdiction is proper only where the federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). Where original federal question jurisdiction exists, a case may be removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal may not, however, be predicated solely on the existence of a defense grounded in federal law, even a defense that Plaintiff's claim is preempted by federal law. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, supra, 482 U.S. at 392-93, 107 S.Ct. at 2429-30; Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2847, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Instead, if the defendant has a valid federal defense to the plaintiff's state law claim, he must raise it in state court. If the state court refuses to recognize the defense, the defendant may seek relief from the United States Supreme Court. Compare Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908) (defense grounded in federal law not sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction) with Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 31 S.Ct. 265, 55 L.Ed. 297 (1911) (Railroad allowed to appeal state court judgment ordering specific performance where performance of contract would violate federal law).

The Fifth Circuit has held that, by virtue of the reverse-Erie doctrine, a state court is required to apply the federal law of forum non conveniens, rather than its own law, in maritime actions. Camejo v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration, 838 F.2d 1374, 1382 (5th Cir.1988); Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307, 322 (5th Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 486 U.S. 140, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988). It does not follow, however, that Texas's failure to recognize the existence of the doctrine of forum non conveniens makes this action removable. Instead, assuming Defendants are entitled to a forum non conveniens dismissal, their remedy is to move for a dismissal in the state court, and, if the state court refuses to apply federal law, to seek relief from the Supreme Court.

2.

This point is, however, moot, because Defendants are not entitled to a forum non conveniens dismissal. Defendants, rely heavily on Ikospentakis v. Thalassic S.S. Agency,⁸ in which the Fifth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case without prejudice so that Plaintiff could refile in Louisiana state court. In contrast to the instant case, the plaintiff initially brought his Jones Act suit against multiple defendants in federal court. Even assuming, however, that based on the particular facts of that case the Ikospentakis defendants would have had the right to remove to federal court had the case originally been filed in state court, a careful reading of Ikospentakis indicates that it does not require the result advocated by Defendants in this case.

Unlike the instant case, Ikospentakis involved an alien plaintiff, alien defendants, an alien vessel with alien owners, and an adequate alternative forum in a foreign nation. 915 F.2d at 179. Thus Ikospentakis was "a classic case for the application of forum non conveniens." Id. Likewise, most of the cases relied on by Defendants each consider a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens based on the alien status of at...