Mizell v. Prism Computer Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 3:97-CV-497WS.,Civ.A. 3:97-CV-497WS.
• Citation: 27 F.Supp.2d 708
• Parties: Pat M. MIZELL, Plaintiff, v. PRISM COMPUTER CORPORATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

27 F.Supp.2d 708

Pat M. MIZELL, Plaintiff, v. PRISM COMPUTER CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 3:97-CV-497WS.

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Jackson Division.

August 4, 1998.

Joel W. Howell, III, Joel W. Howell, III, Attorney, Jackson, MS, for Pat M. Mizell, plaintiff.

John W. Robinson, III, Phelps Dunbar, Jackson, MS, for Prism Computer Corporation, defendant.

ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE UNDER § 1404

WINGATE, District Judge.

Before the court is the motion of defendant Prism Computer Corporation (hereinafter "Prism") asking this court to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for lack of in personam jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)¹ of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or for transfer to a more convenient forum under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).² Pat M. Mizell (hereinafter the "plaintiff") opposes the motion to dismiss and, further, contends that this case should not be transferred because all operative events pertaining to this lawsuit occurred in Mississippi. Prism disputes this assertion, arguing that the plaintiff is not even a resident of Mississippi entitled to benefit of Mississippi's long-arm statute.³ Notwithstanding the dispute regarding the plaintiff's citizenship and whether in personam jurisdiction over Prism may be obtained in a Mississippi Court, this court is persuaded to grant transfer to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division, pursuant to § 1404(a).

I. BACKGROUND

Prism, a California corporation, hired the plaintiff in May of 1992 to be a regional sales manager for Prism with his office in the Dallas, Texas, area. According to the affidavit of Michael A. Ellis, the president and sole owner of Prism, the plaintiff contacted him in 1992 when the plaintiff was working for Titan Software, a competitor of Prism, and expressed his interest in working for Prism. Ellis says he informed the plaintiff of an opening with Prism in the Dallas, Texas, area, and that the plaintiff came to California soon thereafter to continue their discussion of this possibility. The plaintiff accepted Ellis' offer of employment with Prism. One of the plaintiff's primary duties was to service the account of Oracle Corporation of Irving, Texas, one of Prism's major customers. The plaintiff's sales territory included Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma. According to Ellis, Prism had no customers in Mississippi and had never maintained an office in Mississippi. Moreover, says Ellis, the plaintiff held himself out to be a resident of the State of Texas and, according to his tax documents, paychecks and fax transmissions, the plaintiff was a Texas resident at the time he was hired.

The plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Prism in February of 1997. According to the plaintiff, Prism failed to pay the plaintiff all the sales commissions which were due and owing at that time. Thus, the plaintiff had his attorney make demand for the unpaid commissions. This lawsuit was filed on July 15, 1997, shortly after Prism's refusal to comply with the plaintiff's demand for commissions. The plaintiff's complaint claims that the plaintiff is owed $250,000.00 in commissions; that Prism is bound to pay the amount claimed under the doctrine of promissory estoppel; that Prism negligently misrepresented that it would pay the commissions claimed; that Prism tortiously breached its contract with the plaintiff; that Mississippi law⁴ requires payment of the commissions in question; and that the refusal to transfer the plaintiff's retirement benefits constitutes an intentional tort. The plaintiff seeks $300,000.00 in punitive damages.

According to the plaintiff's affidavit, he was residing in Mississippi at the time he was hired by Prism and did not move to Texas from Mississippi until September of 1992, about four months after he was hired by Prism. Additionally, the plaintiff says he solicited sales in Mississippi for Prism; received pay at his Mississippi address; and was terminated from his employment with Prism by telephone in Mississippi. In response, Ellis' affidavit contends that the plaintiff was a Texas resident at the time he was hired by Prism. Prism refers to the plaintiff's tax returns and his W-2 forms where the plaintiff claimed Texas as his state of residency. Moreover, Ellis points to the plaintiff's paychecks from Prism which show Irving, Texas, to be the plaintiff's place of residence and asserts that no part of the contract entered into between Prism and the plaintiff was to be performed in the State of Mississippi.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Parties' Jurisdictional Arguments

The parties have presented several arguments concerning the question of whether this court has in personam jurisdiction over Prism. They distinguish between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction,⁵ with Prism arguing that it has no systematic and continuous contacts with Mississippi. Prism reminds the court that it must be satisfied that Prism has the requisite minimum contacts to subject it to the jurisdiction of the court. Applewhite v. Metro Aviation, Inc., 875 F.2d 491, 495 n. 3 (5th Cir.1989), citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). Further, says Prism, this court, sitting in diversity, may assert personal jurisdiction over Prism only if: (1) the state's long-arm statute applies; and (2) due process is satisfied under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Cycles, Ltd. v. W.J. Digby, Inc., 889 F.2d 612, 616 (5th Cir.1989); and WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir.1989).

Prism contends that Mississippi's long-arm statute does not apply in the instant case because the plaintiff was a resident of Texas, not Mississippi, when he contracted with Prism. The plaintiff responds that one's residency and entitlement to exercise Mississippi's long-arm statute is determined at the time the lawsuit is filed, not at the time the contract was made, citing Golden v. Cox Furniture Manufacturing Company, Inc., 683 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir.1982).⁶ Of course, Golden is a tort case involving an automobile accident, not a breach of contract claim, where the plaintiff moved to Arkansas after the accident and filed suit in Mississippi against a Louisiana resident. As noted by Prism, the Golden case was decided pursuant to Mississippi's long-arm statute in its pre-1980 version. See Golden, 683 F.2d at 117 n. 4. After the 1980 amendment to Miss.Code Ann. § 13-3-57, Mississippi's long-arm statute permitted in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident person not doing business in Mississippi where the nonresident makes a contract with a resident of Mississippi to be performed in whole or in part by any party in Mississippi, or who shall commit a tort in whole or in part in Mississippi against a resident or nonresident of Mississippi. Inasmuch as this case involves breach of a contract,⁷ Prism argues that the plaintiff must be a resident of Mississippi to have the benefit of Mississippi's long-arm statute. Since the plaintiff is not a resident of Mississippi, says Prism, this court has no basis for jurisdiction over this dispute.

Otherwise, says Prism, even if this court finds the plaintiff to be a resident of Mississippi, due process under the United States Constitution still requires that a defendant have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The nature and quality of these contacts, says Prism, must justify the conclusion that defendant should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Mississippi. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061, 1068 (5th Cir.1992). Calling attention to the United States Supreme Court's analytic device of drawing a distinction between specific and general jurisdiction see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), Prism argues that for this court to have specific jurisdiction, Prism must have purposely directed its activities at the plaintiff as a resident of Mississippi and the subsequent litigation must result from the alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to Prism's activities directed at Mississippi. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174; Aviles v. Kunkle, 978 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir.1992). The appropriate inquiry, says Prism, is whether Prism purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Mississippi, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of Mississippi's laws. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75, 105 S.Ct. 2174). Prism insists that it has not purposefully so availed itself.

Prism also argues that it has conducted no activities in Mississippi which are continuing and systematic as is required for the general jurisdiction of this court over Prism to apply. See Helicopteros, 104 S.Ct. at 1872 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (where the cause of action is not related to or does not arise from the defendant's activities in the forum, the forum may still have general jurisdiction if the defendant's contacts with the forum are of a continuous and systematic nature).

Plaintiff says that he undertook to make sales in Mississippi on behalf of Prism as proof of Prism's minimum contacts with Mississippi.⁸ Set against this contention are the cases which hold that jurisdiction is improper if it is grounded in the unilateral activity of the plaintiff. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213, 216 (5th Cir.1990), citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 563, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1...