Eddy v. State

• Decision Date: 07 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 42682,42682
• Citation: 338 S.E.2d 262,255 Ga. 321
• Parties: EDDY v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 262

338 S.E.2d 262

255 Ga. 321

EDDY v. The STATE.

No. 42682.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 7, 1986.

Michael E. Sumner, Glover & Davis, P.A., Newnan, for Marvin Wayne Eddy.

Arthur Mallory III, Dist. Atty., LaGrange, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, J. Michael Davis, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HILL, Chief Justice.

The defendant in this case, Marvin Wayne Eddy, was convicted of the murder of the five-year-old son of his girl friend with whom he lived. He received a life sentence and appeals. ¹

The evidence showed that, after consuming about a half of a fifth of tequila and over their mother's objection, the defendant took the victim and his seven year old brother, Michael, out of their trailer about 10:30 p.m. on the night of January 27, 1985, for the purpose, he said, of getting some drinking water from a creek more than a mile away, because the pipes in the trailer had frozen and broken. According to Michael, the victim began complaining on the walk and slipping and falling on the ice, and the defendant beat him and picked him up and threw him in the bushes. When Michael tried to intervene, the defendant also hit him.

The defendant testified that both boys were told to sit on a log at the top of the bank while he filled the water jug, but they fell down the rocky bank into the creek, hitting their heads.

The defendant carried the unconscious victim back to the trailer, where he beat the boy's mother and refused to allow her to seek medical help. The next afternoon the younger child was still comatose, and the mother asked a neighbor to take her and the boys to the hospital. Michael received stitches in his head, but the victim was transferred the next day to the intensive care unit of a children's hospital, where he died on February 6, 1985. The cause of death was a subdural hematoma (a massive blood clot on the brain). While his jaw was fractured, his skull was not.

1. Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. The defendant enumerates as error the denial of his motion for an independent psychiatric evaluation. He argues that such expert help was necessary because the defendant had no prior criminal record, had always had a close relationship with the two boys, and the possibility of temporary insanity needed to be explored.

The standard for the appointment of a psychiatric expert is set out in the recent United States Supreme Court case, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). We have had several occasions to review Ake since its decision in February of this year. Williams v. Newsome, 254 Ga. 714, 334 S.E.2d 171 (1985); Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 566, 331 S.E.2d 532 (1985); Lindsey v. State, 254 Ga. 444, 330 S.E.2d 563 (1985); Walker v. State, 254 Ga. 149, 327 S.E.2d 475 (1985). ²

In Ake, supra, the Court held at the outset (105 S.Ct. at 1092): "We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one." Later the Court reiterated its holding (105 S.Ct. at 1097): "We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense."

In the case before us, the defendant failed to make the necessary preliminary showing to the trial judge that the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense was likely to be a significant factor at trial. The defendant's only support for the motion was that the crime, by an adult upon a child residing in the same household, was inexplicable. ³ The defendant offered no evidence that he suffered from or had...