Edgmon v. State

• Decision Date: 14 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. A-16,A-16
• Citation: 702 P.2d 643
• Parties: Dale E. EDGMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.
• Court: Alaska Court of Appeals

Page 643

702 P.2d 643

Dale E. EDGMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee.

No. A-16.

Court of Appeals of Alaska.

June 14, 1985.

Grant Callow, Asst. Public Defender, and Dana Fabe, Public Defender, Anchorage, for appellant.

John A. Scukanec, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, and Norman C. Gorsuch, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellee.

Before BRYNER, C.J., and COATS and SINGLETON, JJ.

OPINION

SINGLETON, Judge.

Dale E. Edgmon was convicted of two counts of manslaughter for the death of two pedestrians caused by an automobile driven by Edgmon while he was intoxicated. AS 11.41.120(a)(1). Prior to sentencing, he moved for an order vacating the convictions. Alaska R.Crim.P. 35(c). Edgmon argued that manslaughter as he committed it is indistinguishable from criminally negligent homicide, so that it is a violation of equal protection to convict him of the former which carries a substantially higher penalty. He also argued that the statutory definition of manslaughter is constitutionally deficient by virtue of its vagueness. ¹ After sentencing, Edgmon's Rule 35 motion was denied. Edgmon renews his arguments on appeal. We affirm.

Edgmon relies on the so-called Pirkey/Olsen rule, which provides that equal protection is violated when a statute prescribes different punishments for the same act committed under the same circumstances by persons in like situations. See State v. Pirkey, 281 P.2d 698 (Or.1955) (en banc); Olsen v. Delmore, 295 P.2d 324 (Wash.1956) (en banc ). Edgmon recognizes that the United States Supreme Court essentially rejected this argument in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979), but vigorously argues that we should adopt it under our state constitution.

We are satisfied that criminally negligent homicide is not the same as manslaughter under the relevant statutes and that Edgmon's argument would fail even if we were to adopt the Pirkey/Olsen rule. Edgmon effectively concedes that there is a difference between manslaughter based on recklessness and criminally negligent homicide. Recklessness requires conscious disregard of a known risk. In contrast, the essence of criminal negligence is failure to perceive the risk. Compare AS 11.41.120 (manslaughter) and AS 11.81.900(a)(3) (defining "recklessly") with AS 11.41.130 (criminally negligent homicide) and AS 11.81.900(a)(4) (defining "criminal negligence"). Consequently, manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide involve a significant difference in mental state. See State v. Walton, 650 P.2d 1264, 1273 (Ariz.App.1982).

The real thrust of Edgmon's argument is that the section of AS 11.81.900(a)(3) eliminating consideration of voluntary intoxication for purposes of establishing recklessness destroys the statutory distinction between manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. The state admits on appeal that the prosecution's theory was that Edgmon was in fact not aware of the risk created by his actions but that his unawareness was due solely to his voluntary intoxication. This concession does not in our view totally eliminate the distinction between recklessness and criminal negligence. The state is still obligated to prove that Edgmon, given his faculties, his education, his experience, and his intelligence, would have perceived the risk but for his intoxication. In contrast, peculiarities of a given individual--his or her intelligence, experience, and physical capabilities--are irrelevant in determining criminal negligence since the standard is one of the reasonably prudent person. Thus, the fact that a given defendant did not perceive a risk because he or she was mentally retarded, because he or she had bad eyesight or bad hearing, or because his or her experience had not fitted him or her to appreciate the risk would be irrelevant in proving negligence but highly relevant with regard to recklessness. This would be so whether the given individual was intoxicated or not. Consequently, elimination of intoxication as a basis for a finding that a specific individual did not appreciate a specific risk does not totally destroy the distinction between criminal negligence and recklessness. ²

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

1 Edgmon contends that two relevant statutory definitions fail the vagueness test set forth in State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 531 (Alaska 1980) (a statute violates due process of law where reasonable men and women must guess at its meaning). Edgmon argues that the statutory definitions of "intoxicated," AS 11.81.900(b)(27), and "recklessly," AS 11.81.900(a)(3), fail this test. We disagree. The terms "intoxicated" and "recklessly" as defined in the code are sufficiently clear in the various contexts in which they occur to satisfy due process. See Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325, 330-31, 334-35 (Alaska App.1982) (...