Edsall v. Moore

• Decision Date: 15 July 2016
• Docket Number: S–15–0274
• Parties: Ray P. Edsall, Trustee of the Ray P. Edsall Revocable Living Trust, Dated October 28, 2011, Appellant (Defendant), v. Joy Bell Moore and Tiffany La Toya Moore, Appellees (Plaintiffs).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

375 P.3d 799

2016 WY 71

Ray P. Edsall, Trustee of the Ray P. Edsall Revocable Living Trust, Dated October 28, 2011, Appellant (Defendant)

v.Joy Bell Moore and Tiffany La Toya Moore, Appellees (Plaintiffs).

S–15–0274

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

July 15, 2016

Representing Appellant: Harriet M. Hageman and Korry D. Lewis, Hageman Law P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Lewis.

Representing Appellees: Madison M. Brown and Matthew R. Sorenson, Daly & Sorenson, LLC, Gillette, Wyoming. Argument by Ms. Brown.

Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.

BURKE, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Appellant, Ray Edsall, challenges the district court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees incurred in his defense of an action to establish a private road brought by Appellees Joy Bell Moore and Tiffany La Toya Moore. He also challenges the denial of his motion seeking compensation as a result of the district court's decision to grant the Moores temporary access to an existing road across Mr. Edsall's property. We find the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motions. Because we have no greater jurisdiction than the district court, we dismiss.

ISSUE

[¶2] Does this Court have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Edsall's appeal?

FACTS

[¶3] In 2006, Joy Bell Moore and her daughter, Tiffany La Toya Moore, received a 520-acre parcel of land in Crook County, Wyoming from Alice Jay, mother to Joy and grandmother to Tiffany.¹ The property, referred to as the “Jay Ranch,” is adjacent to property owned by Mr. Edsall. Following Ms. Jay's death in 2011, the Moores sought access to the property via the “Jay Road,” an existing private road which runs across Mr. Edsall's property. According to the Moores, they made attempts to contact Mr. Edsall in October and November 2012 in order to gain access to the hay crop on the property. Mr. Edsall did not respond. The Moores made several attempts to contact Mr. Edsall again in July 2013 and, in a letter dated July 25, 2013, they offered to pay for access across Mr. Edsall's property. In August, counsel for Mr. Edsall responded that he would be willing to negotiate access to the property. However, as a result of the delayed response, the Moores were unable to harvest the hay crop.

[¶4] In October 2013, the Moores filed a Complaint for Private Road and Damages. In Count I of their complaint, the Moores sought to establish a private road pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24–9–101 (LexisNexis 2013).² In Count II, they sought to recover damages for loss of the hay crop. Mr. Edsall answered and filed a motion to dismiss the Moores' damage claim. He contended the Moores' claim for damages was not a recognized cause of action because the Moores had no legally enforceable right to cross his property.

[¶5] While this suit was pending, the Moores were also involved in litigation to determine the rightful ownership of the Jay Ranch. In January 2014, after learning of that litigation, Mr. Edsall filed a motion to stay the proceedings in this case. He also filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $4,717.50, alleging that the Moores' damage claim had been brought in bad faith. The district court denied both motions.

[¶6] The district court subsequently held a hearing, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24–9–101(h), to determine whether the Moores had satisfied the statutory threshold requirements to move forward with their private road claim. The court found that the Moores had satisfied the requirements and granted the Moores temporary access to the “Jay Road” across Mr. Edsall's property until September 30, 2014. Subsequently, the court extended access to December 31, 2014. The court required the Moores to post a $10,000 bond for costs allowed under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24–9–103.³ The district court also dismissed the Moores' damage claim with prejudice. It concluded, however, that the Moores had not acted in bad faith in asserting their claim and denied Mr. Edsall's motion for attorney's fees.

[¶7] Mr. Edsall filed a notice of appeal from the district court's order. He sought review of the district court's determination that the Moores had satisfied the threshold statutory requirements to establish a private road, as well as the court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees. This Court dismissed the appeal after finding the district court's order “is not a final, appealable order because it does not determine the action or ‘resolve all outstanding issues.’ ”

[¶8] In October 2014, a decision was rendered against the Moores in the litigation to determine ownership of the Jay Ranch. Afterwards, they took no further action in the present case. On February 11, 2015, the district court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The notice informed the parties that, because no action had taken place in the case for a period of 90 days, the court would dismiss for lack of prosecution unless the parties provided good cause for continuing the case within 30 days. Neither party objected. On March 19, 2015, the district court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of prosecution.

[¶9] On April 8, Mr. Edsall filed a “Defendant's Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Motion for Compensation for the Plaintiffs' Temporary Road Access During 2014.” Mr. Edsall requested a total of $27,597.50 in attorney's fees, which included the $4,717.50 requested in his initial motion for attorney's fees. The district court denied both motions. In its order, the court concluded that “the Plaintiff's claims were not made in bad faith and there is no other applicable exception to the general rule that each party is responsible for its own attorney fees.” The court also stated that “Given that Plaintiffs' access was by an established road, locally referred to as the Jay road, the court finds no provision of the governing statutes to permit the award of compensation for the temporary road access.” This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶10] Before considering the issues presented in this case, we must first address the threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the parties have not raised the issue, whether jurisdiction exists “may be asserted at any time by any interested party or sua sponte by the court at the trial or appellate level.” City of Casper v. Holloway , 2015 WY 93, ¶ 16, 354 P.3d 65, 70 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting In re AGS , 2014 WY 143, ¶ 15, 337 P.3d 470, 476 (Wyo. 2014) ). The absence of subject matter jurisdiction in a district court cannot be waived, and this Court can have no greater jurisdiction of the subject matter than the district court. Platte Dev. Co. v. State, Envtl. Quality Council , 966 P.2d 972, 974 (Wyo. 1998). Whether a court has jurisdiction to decide a particular matter is a question of law, which we review de novo . Scott v. Board of Trustees , 2015 WY 128, ¶ 7, 357 P.3d 1137, 1138 (Wyo. 2015).

[¶11] Mr. Edsall claims the district court erred in denying his motion for award of attorney's fees.⁴ In that motion, Mr. Edsall asserted his request for attorney's fees was authorized under W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2), which permits the filing of a post-judgment motion for attorney's fees “[w]hen allowed by law.” However, Mr. Edsall did not seek to recover attorney's fees pursuant to any statute or contract, as is generally required for departure from the American Rule, which holds that each party is responsible for their own attorney's fees. Thorkildsen v. Belden , 2012 WY 8, ¶ 10, 269 P.3d 421, 424 (Wyo. 2012). Rather, he asserted that he was entitled to attorney's fees due to the Moores' “bad faith” and abuse of “the judicial process.” Likewise, in this appeal, Mr. Edsall contends “[The Moores'] damages claim was a patently frivolous claim from the beginning and was filed against Edsall in bad faith.” According to Mr. Edsall, his attorney's fees are recoverable under the inherent power of the court to impose sanctions in order to control the administration of justice.

[¶12] We find Mr. Edsall's post-judgment motion for attorney's fees was not authorized under Rule 54. As noted above, Mr. Edsall requested attorney's fees as a sanction for the Moores' alleged bad faith. However, Rule 54(d)(2)(E) specifically provides that “The provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (D) do not apply to claims for fees and expenses as sanctions for violations of these rules.” Accordingly, Rule 54 did not provide the district court with jurisdiction to determine Mr. Edsall's post-judgment motion for attorney's fees.

[¶13] Mr. Edsall's request for attorney's fees is properly characterized as a motion for sanctions under W.R.C.P. 11. Indeed, the allegations contained in Mr. Edsall's motion before the district court fall squarely within the scope of that Rule. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; representations to court; sanctions.

(a) Signature .—Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's address, telephone number, and attorney number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.

(b) Representations to court .—By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) It is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;

(2) The claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein

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