Edwards v. Aaron Rents, Inc.
| Citation | 482 F.Supp.2d 803 |
| Decision Date | 17 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. EP-04-CA-00219-KC.,EP-04-CA-00219-KC. |
| Parties | Sonja EDWARDS, Plaintiff, v. AARON RENTS, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
John A. Wenke, Attorney at Law, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.
Chad A. Shultz, Julie S. Elgar, Patricia G. Griffith, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Jeffrey S. Alley, Scott & Hulse, El Paso, TX, Michael P. Maslanka, Ford & Harrison, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
On this day, the Court considered "Plaintiffs Application, for Attorney Fees" filed on July 5, 2006, "Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law; In the Alternative, Defendant's Motion for New Trial; and, In the Alternative, for Remittitur," "Plaintiff's Application for Attorney Fees" filed on August 10, 2006, and "Plaintiffs Motion for Equitable Relief and Motion for Entry of Judgment." For the reasons, set forth herein, Plaintiffs Application for Attorney Fees filed on July 5, 2006 is DENIED as moot, Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part, Plaintiffs Application for Attorney Fees filed on August 10, 2006 is GRANTED in part, and Plaintiffs Motion for Equitable Relief and Motion for Entry of Judgment is GRANTED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2004, Defendant Aaron Rents, Inc. ("Defendant") removed the instant action for employment discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) to federal court. On March 7, 2006, this Court ruled on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, granting the motion as to Plaintiffs retaliation claim but denying the motion as to Plaintiffs gender discrimination claim. A more detailed factual background to this case can be found in that order. Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial by jury, and on June 1, 2006, the jury rendered a verdict in Plaintiffs favor.
Specifically, the jury unanimously found the following:
(1) By a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant intentionally terminated Plaintiff because of her gender;
(2) That $113,000 in back pay and $300,000 in compensatory damages would fairly and reasonably compensate Plaintiff for damages that resulted from such conduct;
(3) By clear and convincing evidence, that Defendant engaged in gender discrimination with malice or with reckless indifference to the right of Plaintiff to be free from gender discrimination; and
(4) That $1,000,000 should be assessed against Defendant as punitive damages for. engaging in gender discrimination.
In working to secure this verdict, Plaintiffs counsel submitted an affidavit claiming to have spent the following amount of time on the following work:
General Description of Work Hours
(1) Correspondence to and from
defense counsel, client and court
telephone calls 39.0
(2) Pleadings (drafting of petition
depo notices, motions for leave
pleadings associated with pretrial
order (schedules A and C), subpoenas
summary judgment response
and appendix (and research); limine
motions, witness and exhibit lists)
and reviewed defendant's pleadings 93.3
(3) Discovery (drafting of interrogatories
requests for production (3
sets), preparing disclosures, answering
defendant's interrogatories, request
for production, supplemental
responses; reviewing defendant's
responses to plaintiffs interrogatories,
requests for production (3 sets) 47.8
(4) Depositions (preparation, review
of discovery responses, meetings
with witnesses, and attendance —
depos of Edwards, Sanderson,
Strickland) 35.4
(5) Mediation (preparation and
attendance) 10.6
(6) Hearings — motion to quash,
status hrg — (prep and attendance) 8.3
(7) Trial preparation (reviewed
depositions, discovery responses,
meetings with witnesses, drafting of
direct and cross examination questions,
researched legal issues raised
in defendant's motion in limine) 75.0
(8) Trial 34.5
(9) Post trial motions (entry of judgment,
attorney fee applications,
affidavit) 15.0
Total 358.9
II. DISCUSSION
In a case arising under diversity jurisdiction yet governed by state law, courts apply state law in determining whether and in what amount to award attorneys' fees. Mathis v. Exxon Corp., 302 F.3d 448, 461 (5th Cir.2002). State law in Texas allows a court to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party for claims brought under the TCHRA. TEX. LAB CODE ANN. § 21.259(a) (Vernon 1996).
The standard for reviewing a motion for a judgment as a matter of law is the same as that for reviewing a motion for summary judgment Gluzman v. United States, 2006 WL 2713785, *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68150, at *8 (N.D.Tex. Sep. 22, 2006) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, then there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). The court should consider all evidence in the light, and with all reasonable inferences, most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Wardlaw v. Inland Container Corp., 76 F.3d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969)). "If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion is proper." Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides a district court with discretion to grant a new trial. FED.R.CIV.P. 59 (2006). While Rule 59 does not specify the grounds for a new trial, case law illustrates that a new trial may be granted if the district court finds that the size of the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages awarded are either excessive or inadequate, or that the trial was unfair or marred by prejudicial error. Norris v. Bertucci Contr. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53567, at *1-2 (E.D.La. July 31, 2006) (citing Dunn v. Consol. Rail Corp., 890 F.Supp. 1262, 1287 (M.D.La.1995)). In making this determination, courts examine whether the verdict is against the great weight of evidence or would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 allows a district court to alter or amend a damage award if the jury's judgment was excessive. FED.R.Civ.P. 59. Nonetheless, a court will not reverse a jury verdict as excessive except upon the "`strongest of showings" that the award was completely disproportionate to the injury sustained by the plaintiff. DiStefano v. Otis Elevator Co., 1998 WL 51804, *10, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1071, at *30 (E.D.La. Jan. 30, 1998) ). A court will grant a remittitur only when the distortion between the injury and the award is so vast as to "`shock the judicial conscience, so gross or inordinately large as to be contrary to right reason, so exaggerated as to indicate bias, passion, prejudice, corruption, or other improper motive, or as clearly exceeding that amount that any reasonable man could feel the claimant is entitled to.'" Id.
In considering a motion for remittitur, the Fifth Circuit employs the "maximum recovery rule," which holds that a court must reduce a jury's verdict to the maximum amount that a jury could have properly awarded. DiStefano, 1998 WL 51804, *10, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1071, at *30-31; see Rutland v. Sundowner. Offshore Serv., Inc., 1992 WL 236136, **2-3, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13494, at *5-6 (E.D.La. Sep. 2, 1992). The court's reassessment of damages is inherently subjective because it involves experience, emotion, And calculation. DiStefano, 1998 WL 51804, *10, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1071 at *30-31. The court is not required to compare a jury's award to awards in other cases as each case is determined on its own facts. Id., 1998 WL 51804, *10, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1071 at *31.
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to a lodestar fee of anywhere between $71,780.00 and $125,616.00, in addition to an upward adjustment based on several factors, for a total of $175,000.00 in attorneys' fees. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a reasonable hourly rate for the work performed in El Paso County by an attorney of her counsel's expertise is between $200.00 and $350.00 per hour, for 358.9 hours of work, which results in a lodestar between $71,780.00 and $125,616.00. Plaintiff further argues that she deserves an upward adjustment based upon: (1) the time and labor required in this case, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the level of skill required, (4) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney, (5) the fact that the fee was contingent, (6) the amount involved and the result obtained, and (7) awards in, similar cases. Finally, Plaintiff asks this Court to award contingent appellate fees.
Defendant responds by arguing first that the application for attorneys' fees should be denied in its entirety because Plaintiff's counsel did not submit a record sufficient to justify the award of attorneys' fees. In the alternative, Defendant argues that any fees awarded Plaintiff should be reduced either by 50%, because Plaintiffs counsel failed to separate the work done in preparation for the successful gender discrimination claim froth the unsuccessful retaliation claim, or 70% because of the...
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