Edwards v. ABC Transp. Co., 92-1886

• Decision Date: 26 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-1886,92-1886
• Citation: 616 So.2d 142
• Parties: 18 Fla. L. Weekly D815 Mack EDWARDS and Arcie Edwards, etc., Appellants, v. ABC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 142

616 So.2d 142

18 Fla. L. Weekly D815

Mack EDWARDS and Arcie Edwards, etc., Appellants, v. ABC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 92-1886.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fifth District.

March 26, 1993.

Joseph H. Williams of Troutman, Williams, Irvin & Green, P.A., Winter Park, for appellants.

Laura P. Kowalczyk and David C. Beers of Beers, Jack, Tudhope & Wyatt, P.A., Maitland, for appellee.

DAUKSCH, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a personal injury case.

Appellants allege they were injured as a result of the negligent operation of a tractor and semi-trailer. Appellee owned the semi-trailer while another defendant owned the tractor and a third defendant was the operator of the tractor-trailer unit.

Appellee moved for summary judgment on the ground that absent evidence of negligence on its part it could not be held responsible for injuries to the appellant. Appellants moved for summary judgment against appellee alleging that appellee was vicariously liable for their injuries as a result of its ownership of the trailer. Appellants alleged that a semi-trailer is statutorily defined as a motor vehicle and is therefore a dangerous instrumentality as a matter of law. Following a hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment in appellee's favor.

The issue is whether a trailer is a motor vehicle and therefore a dangerous instrumentality for purposes of imposing vicarious liability in this negligence action. Because a trailer is defined as a motor vehicle in Chapter 320 of the Florida Statutes which pertains to motor vehicle licensing requirements, appellant contends that the trial court's failure to categorize a trailer as a motor vehicle for purposes of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was erroneous. See Sec. 320.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). The legislative intent underlying the implementation of Chapter 320 specifies that

all services affecting motor carriers be consolidated in order to encourage interstate commerce and achieve maximum efficiency in registration, permitting, and safety programs administered by this state. In order to achieve this goal, Florida must join the cooperative effort that is being conducted on the national level by Congress, the United States Department of Transportation, and other groups to achieve uniformity among the jurisdictions and reduce the number of separate reports required by each jurisdiction of the motor carrier industry. Florida shall consolidate all requirements imposed on motor carriers operating in this state and shall actively negotiate reciprocal agreements and compacts with other jurisdictions to accomplish the intent of this chapter.

Sec. 320.0104(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). Because it is apparent that Chapter 320 pertains to vehicle registration and permitting requirements, the trial court's refusal to include trailers within the definition of motor vehicles for purposes of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is correct.

This court's recent decision in Cheung v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 595 So.2d 82 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) is controlling. Though not directly on point, language contained in Cheung directly addresses the issue presented in this case. In Cheung, Joseph Cheung, the passenger of a Pontiac, was seriously injured when the car in which he was riding encountered a rapidly moving wheel which had become disengaged seconds earlier from the left rear axle of a Toyota Corolla while being towed on the rear of a rented Ryder Truck. Though the vehicles were travelling in opposite directions on a four-lane divided highway, the wheel crashed through the windshield of the Pontiac in which Cheung was riding. John Slein, the driver of the Ryder truck, was towing the Toyota owned by his father, James Slein, on the rear of the truck attached to a tow bar. Michael Burney had rented both the truck and the tow bar from Ryder.

In Count V of his complaint (the only count applicable to the present case), Cheung sued Ryder, James Slein and Michael Burney under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Ryder and Slein moved for summary judgment after which the trial court granted their motions and entered judgment in their favor. Cheung appealed and this court affirmed the summary judgment entered in favor of Slein but reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of Ryder. This court found a genuine issue of material fact as to Ryder's liability to Cheung under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine because Ryder had made it possible for John Slein to inflict injury on others by perhaps negligently operating the truck and towing the Toyota, also under his control, behind the truck.

Relying upon Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), this court explained that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is founded upon the common law doctrine of master and servant. Under this doctrine, the master is liable for a servant's negligence where he entrusts the servant with a dangerous instrumentality which is under the servant's custody or control at the time of the injury.

Finally, this court found that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine precluded a finding of liability against James Slein, the owner of the Toyota stating:

... Under the facts of this case, the Toyota was not a dangerous...