Edwards v. Bloom

• Citation: 246 S.C. 346,143 S.E.2d 614
• Decision Date: 10 August 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18389,18389
• Parties: Rachel J. EDWARDS, Respondent, v. Charles E. BLOOM and Joe Champey, of whom Joe Champey is Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

Page 614

143 S.E.2d 614

246 S.C. 346

Rachel J. EDWARDS, Respondent, v. Charles E. BLOOM and Joe Champey, of whom Joe Champey is Appellant.

No. 18389.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 10, 1965.

Rogers & McDonald, Columbia, for appellant.

Hutto & Hutto, Columbia, for respondent.

Moss, Justice.

Rachel J. Edwards, the respondent herein, instituted this action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries received by her when the car she was driving struck a parked automobile owned by Joe Champey, the appellant herein, and parked on Beltline Boulevard, in the City of Columbia, by his agent or servant, Charles E. Bloom.

The respondent, in her complaint, alleges that on October 7, 1963, at about 7:00 o'clock A.M., she was driving her automobile in an easterly direction, over and along Beltline Boulevard, and in the right-hand lane thereof. She alleges that an automobile owned by Joe Champey had been parked by Charles E. Bloom, his agent, in the right-hand lane of said Beltline Boulevard and had been so parked in violation of the traffic ordinances of the City of Columbia. It is further alleged that Beltline Boulevard is inclined upward in an easterly direction and that at the time aforesaid the sun was at the crest of the incline and had a partially blinding effect on the respondent as she proceeded up the incline in the right-hand lane of said highway. She further alleges that due to her partial blindness, because of the sun, her automobile struck the left rear of the appellant's automobile which was parked as aforsaid. It is asserted that the respondent's personal injury was solely and proximately caused by the negligent and willful acts of the appellant in parking his automobile in violation of the traffic ordinances of the City of Columbia. The appellant, by his answer, sets forth (a) a general denial, (b) that the injury to the respondent was due to and caused by her sole negligence and willfulness, and (c) the injury suffered by the respondent was due to and caused by her contributory negligence and willfulness.

This case came on for trial before the Honorable Legare Bates, Judge of the Richland County Court, and a jury, at the 1964 September term thereof. At the close of the case for the respondent, a motion for a nonsuit as to Charles E. Bloom was granted but a motion as to the appellant was refused. At the close of all the testimony, the Trial Judge eliminated the issue of willfulness and refused the motion of the appellant for a directed verdict made on the ground that the negligence of the respondent, in the operation of her automobile, contributed as a direct and proximate cause to her injury. The Trial Judge submitted to the jury the question of whether the appellant was guilty of negligence in the parking of his automobile. He also submitted to the jury the question of whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence in the operation of her automobile. The jury returned a verdict for actual damages in favor of the respondent.

After the rendition of the verdict the appellant moved for judgment non obstante veredicto and, in the alternative, for a new trial upon the same grounds as above stated. The motion was refused and this appeal followed.

The appellant asserts that the only reasonable inference from all of the evidence is that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law so as to bar her recovery against the appellant. It is the position of the appellant that the Trial Judge was in error in not so holding. In determining whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence, we will assume, as we must, that the issue of negligence on the part of the appellant was properly for the jury and that the evidence warranted their finding him guilty of such. The determination of the question of contributory negligence is controlled by the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the court will not decide it as one of law if the testimony is conflicting or if the inferences to be drawn therefrom are doubtful. It is well settled that the injured person's negligence, in order to bar a recovery, must have contributed as a proximate cause to the injury. If the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all the evidence is that the negligence of the complainant is a direct and proximate cause of her injury or that such negligence contributed as a direct and proximate cause, then it would be the duty of the Trial Judge to direct a verdict against the complainant. West v. Sowell, 237 S.C. 641, 118 S.E.2d 692. The issue of willfulness on the part of the appellant having been eliminated in this case, proof of simple contributory negligence was all that was required to defeat respondent's recovery.

The record shows that Two Notch Road is United States Highway No. 1 and runs generally in a north-south direction. Beltline Boulevard runs generally in an eastwest direction and crosses Two Notch Road. The collision with which we are here concerned occurred about 7:00 o'clock A.M. at a point on Beltline Boulevard about 150 feet, more or less, east of the intersection thereof with Two Notch Road. Beltline Boulevard on either side of the intersection with Two Notch Road slopes uphill in an easterly direction. At the time of the collision, the respondent was driving her automobile in an easterly direction on Beltline Boulevard on her way to work, this being a route she normally traveled, and with which she was familiar. Rather than attempting to summarize the testimony of the respondent, we quote her testimony from the record, as follows:

'Q. Where were you on the morning of October 7th of last year at about seven o'clock in the morning? Just tell these gentlemen what happened. Where were you driving?

'A. I was coming up Beltline. I was approaching the stop light.

'Q. Whereabouts? What stop light?

'A. At the intersection of Beltline and Two Notch Road, and the sun was real bright that morning, as always. I did go by there every morning on my way to work, and usually I would try to get in the middle lane, but unfortunately that morning, I couldn't get in the middle lane.

'Q. Where was the sun then?

'A. The sun was right in front of me. Going up the hill it was blinding me so that I couldn't see but just about a car length in front of me, I suppose, and I stopped at the stoplight which I had seen, and the distance in front of me before I got in the intersection, I knew it was red, and when I got to the intersection I couldn't see the stoplight. I couldn't even look at the stoplight.

'Q. So you stopped there?

'A. Yes.

'Q. Waiting on the light?

'A. Yes. So there was a truck beside me. On Two Notch Road the cars had stopped and the truck started off and naturally I presumed that the light had turned green so I started my car and I guess I was going about 20 or 25 miles an hour, maybe not that fast. I think I was in second gear when I stopped, or when I hit the car. And I didn't see the car because I couldn't. I couldn't look straight up the hill because the sun was blinding me and I could just look a little distance in front of me.

'Q. I believe you stated that you were in the habit of going along that street there?

'A. Yes, sir, every day.

'Q. About the same time?

'A. Yes, sir.

'Q. State whether or not, just tell us whether conditions were similar to this before?

'A. Yes, they were.'

The record shows that Beltline Boulevard has two lanes for eastbound traffic and the respondent was proceeding in the lane nearest the curb. The automobile of the appellant was parked in this lane next to the curb.

The general rule is that a motorist whose vision is obscured by unfavorable atmospheric...