Edwards v. Bloom, No. 18389

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: Moss; This case came on for trial before the Honorable Legare Bates; TAYLOR; BUSSEY
• Citation: 246 S.C. 346,143 S.E.2d 614
• Parties: Rachel J. EDWARDS, Respondent, v. Charles E. BLOOM and Joe Champey, of whom Joe Champey is Appellant.
• Decision Date: 10 August 1965
• Docket Number: No. 18389

Page 614

143 S.E.2d 614 246 S.C. 346 Rachel J. EDWARDS, Respondent,
v.
Charles E. BLOOM and Joe Champey, of whom Joe Champey is Appellant. No. 18389. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Aug. 10, 1965.

[246 S.C. 347]

Page 615

Rogers & McDonald, Columbia, for appellant.

Hutto & Hutto, Columbia, for respondent.

[246 S.C. 348] Moss, Justice.

Rachel J. Edwards, the respondent herein, instituted this action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries received by her when the car she was driving struck a parked automobile owned by Joe Champey, the appellant herein, and parked on Beltline Boulevard, in the City of Columbia, by his agent or servant, Charles E. Bloom.

The respondent, in her complaint, alleges that on October 7, 1963, at about 7:00 o'clock A.M., she was driving her automobile in an easterly direction, over and along Beltline Boulevard, and in the right-hand lane thereof. She alleges that an automobile owned by Joe Champey had been parked by Charles E. Bloom, his agent, in the right-hand lane of said Beltline Boulevard and had been so parked in violation of the traffic ordinances of the City of Columbia. It is further alleged that Beltline Boulevard is inclined upward in an easterly direction and that at the time aforesaid the sun was at the crest of the incline and had a partially blinding effect on the respondent as she proceeded up the incline in the right-hand lane of said highway. She further alleges that due to her partial blindness, because of the sun, her automobile struck the left rear of the appellant's automobile which was parked as aforsaid. It is asserted that the respondent's personal injury was solely and proximately caused by the negligent and willful acts of the appellant in parking his automobile in violation of the traffic ordinances of the City of Columbia. The appellant, by his answer, sets forth (a) a general denial, (b) that the injury to the respondent was due to and caused by her sole negligence and willfulness, and (c) the injury suffered by the respondent was due to and caused by her contributory negligence and willfulness.

[246 S.C. 349] This case came on for trial before the Honorable Legare Bates, Judge of the Richland County Court, and a jury, at the 1964 September term thereof. At the close of the case for the respondent, a motion for a nonsuit as to Charles E. Bloom was granted but a motion as to the appellant was refused. At the close of all the testimony, the Trial Judge eliminated the issue of willfulness and refused the motion of the appellant for a directed verdict made on the ground that the negligence of the respondent, in the operation of her automobile, contributed

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as a direct and proximate cause to her injury. The Trial Judge submitted to the jury the question of whether the appellant was guilty of negligence in the parking of his automobile. He also submitted to the jury the question of whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence in the operation of her automobile. The jury returned a verdict for actual damages in favor of the respondent.

After the rendition of the verdict the appellant moved for judgment non obstante veredicto and, in the alternative, for a new trial upon the same grounds as above stated. The motion was refused and this appeal followed.

The appellant asserts that the only reasonable inference from all of the evidence is that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law so as to bar her recovery against the appellant. It is the position of the appellant that the Trial Judge was in error in not so holding. In determining whether the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence, we will assume, as we must, that the issue of negligence on the part of the appellant was properly for the jury and that the evidence warranted their finding him guilty of such. The determination of the question of contributory negligence is controlled by the facts and circumstances of the particular case and the court will not decide it as one of law if the testimony is conflicting or if the inferences to be drawn therefrom are doubtful. It is well settled that the injured person's negligence, in order to bar a recovery, must have contributed as [246 S.C. 350] a proximate cause to the injury. If the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all the evidence is that the negligence of the complainant is a direct and proximate cause of her injury or that such negligence contributed as a direct and proximate cause, then it would be the duty of the Trial Judge to direct a verdict against the complainant. West v. Sowell, 237 S.C. 641, 118 S.E.2d 692. The issue of willfulness on the part of the appellant having been eliminated in this case, proof of simple contributory negligence was all that was required to defeat respondent's recovery.

The record shows that Two Notch Road is United States Highway No. 1 and runs generally in a north-south direction. Beltline Boulevard runs generally in an eastwest direction and crosses Two Notch Road. The collision with which we are here concerned occurred about 7:00 o'clock A.M. at a point on Beltline Boulevard about 150 feet, more or less, east of the intersection thereof with Two...