Edwards v. Edwards

• Decision Date: 09 March 2020
• Docket Number: S-19-0144
• Citation: 459 P.3d 448
• Parties: Adrienne Janel EDWARDS, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. Andy EDWARDS, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

459 P.3d 448

Adrienne Janel EDWARDS, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.Andy EDWARDS, Appellee (Defendant).

S-19-0144

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 9, 2020

Representing Appellant: Donna D. Domonkos, Domonkos Law Office, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: No appearance.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Adrienne Janel Edwards (Mother) appeals from the district court’s divorce decree. She argues the court abused its discretion when determining Father was not voluntarily underemployed, dividing the marital property as it did, and establishing Father’s visitation schedule. Andy Edwards (Father) did not file an appellate brief. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in determining child support and dividing marital property, but did err by issuing a visitation order too vague to support understanding, compliance, and enforcement. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the court to provide necessary detail regarding visitation.

ISSUES

[¶2] We rephrase Mother’s issues:

I. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it concluded Father was not voluntarily underemployed.

II. Whether the district court abused its discretion by dividing marital property as it did.

III. Whether the district court abused its discretion in the manner in which it ordered visitation.

FACTS

[¶3] Mother and Father married in 2001 in Utah, moved to Cheyenne three years later, and purchased a home. In 2006, they started a landscaping business (Titan Lawn Care)—Mother performed clerical work and occasionally assisted Father with physical work. Mother filed for divorce in May 2017, and the court held a one-day bench trial in July 2018. Her appeal addresses two events which occurred while awaiting trial: Father refinanced the marital home and obtained a lower paying job. We focus our factual discussion accordingly.

[¶4] Father unilaterally refinanced the marital home to pay an outstanding marital tax debt after Mother filed for divorce. Mother first learned of the refinancing when Father filed a "Motion for Allocation of Marital Funds[.]" She requested the court order Father to deposit funds remaining from the refinancing with the court pending trial. She later filed a "Motion for Order to Show Cause" why Father should not be held in contempt for violating the court’s previous order prohibiting either party from refinancing the marital home. The court granted Mother’s motion, and set a hearing.

[¶5] At hearing, Father’s counsel explained that Father refinanced shortly before the court entered its order prohibiting refinancing.

Father realized "[a] little more than" $100,000 from the refinancing after paying off the existing mortgage, and "roughly" $77,000 remained after paying the tax bill. Father then deposited the money into his bank account, and spent $55,719 on various marital debts and home expenses. Mother agreed that Father expended some money on marital debts, but argued he also paid individual debts, such as child support.

[¶6] The court acknowledged Mother’s argument, but because Father had already refinanced and expended funds, the most the court could do was hold the remaining funds until trial and consider Father’s refinancing and spending activity when equitably distributing marital property. The court ordered $14,200 of the remaining funds into the court’s custody. Because the family was in a tenuous financial situation, the court divided the rest equally between Mother and Father for immediate use.

[¶7] At trial, each party presented argument about how Father spent the refinancing funds. Mother testified that the court should reimburse her for her half of the funds Father spent on non-marital debts; she urged the court to award her specific marital assets to off-set money she argues she should have received from the refinancing. Father testified they should split the marital assets equally.

[¶8] Father also closed Titan Lawn Care and obtained a data entry position. Father testified at trial that he closed the business primarily because it became unprofitable after Mother filed for divorce. He identified several reasons for the downturn, including employees moonlighting with business equipment and a decline in business opportunities. Father also described the difficult hours required to independently operate Titan Lawn Care and how it would prevent him from fully exercising visitation with the children. His new job allowed him to consistently work from "8:00 to 5:00[,]" with nights and weekends off. Mother argued Father was voluntarily underemployed because he had the ability to earn more and maliciously chose to make less money. She requested the court calculate Father’s child support based on the income he earned while operating Titan Lawn Care.

[¶9] The court orally announced its ruling in December, and later entered a divorce decree. The court awarded Mother principal physical and residential custody of the children, and granted Father visitation on alternating holidays and periodic weekends. The court concluded Father was not voluntarily underemployed. Accordingly, it based child support on Mother’s and Father’s most recent income. In distributing marital property, the court ordered Mother and Father to sell the home. The court determined Father’s refinancing the home did not significantly impact the property division. Mother timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶10] We review the court’s divorce decree for abuse of discretion.

Custody, visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Scherer v. Scherer , 931 P.2d 251, 253–54 (Wyo. 1997) ; Triggs v. Triggs , 920 P.2d 653, 657 (Wyo. 1996) ; Basolo v. Basolo , 907 P.2d 348, 352 (Wyo. 1995).... "We do not overturn the decision of the trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of a violation of some legal principle." Fink [v. Fink] , 685 P.2d [34, 36 (Wyo. 1984) ].

A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Pinther v. Pinther , 888 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Dowdy v. Dowdy , 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo. 1993) ). Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the district court’s decision, and we afford the prevailing party every favorable inference while omitting any consideration of evidence presented by the unsuccessful party. Triggs , 920 P.2d at 657 ; Cranston v. Cranston , 879 P.2d 345, 351 (Wyo. 1994). Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, or against the great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained. Jones v. Jones , 858 P.2d 289, 291 (Wyo. 1993). Similarly, an abuse of discretion is present " ‘when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored.’ " Triggs , 920 P.2d at 657 (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay , 847 P.2d 993, 996 (Wyo. 1993) ).

Johnson v. Johnson , 2020 WY 18, ¶ 10, 458 P.3d 27 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Jacobson v. Kidd , 2018 WY 108, ¶ 14, 426 P.3d 813, 820 (Wyo. 2018) ).

DISCUSSION

I. Voluntary Underemployment

[¶11] Mother argues the court erred by finding Father was not voluntarily underemployed, highlighting the fact that Father earned less money at his new job than he made while operating Titan Lawn Care. The court considered her argument and Father’s characterization of his decision to close the business. Though the situation gave the court some pause, it found Father was not voluntarily underemployed. There is no error in this finding. Johnson , ¶ 10.

[¶12] A district court has sound discretion to calculate income for child support purposes. Opitz v. Opitz , 2007 WY 207, ¶ 7, 173 P.3d 405, 407–08 (Wyo. 2007). Statutory provisions guide that discretion. Id. ¶ 8, 173 P.3d at 408. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 outlines the presumptive child support guidelines; there is a rebuttable presumption that a calculation under these guidelines is "the correct amount of child support[.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(a) (LexisNexis 2019). A court may deviate from these guidelines if their application "would be unjust or inappropriate[.]" Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b).

[¶13] A court must consider several factors before deviating from the presumptive support amount, such as whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b)(xi). There is no definitive test to determine whether a party is voluntarily underemployed; however, the following factors for determining an underemployed parent’s earning capacity are instructive:

(A) Prior employment experience and history;

(B) Educational level and whether additional education would make the parent more self-sufficient or significantly increase the parent’s income;

(C) The presence of children of the marriage in the parent’s home and its impact on the earnings of that parent;

(D) Availability of employment for which the parent is qualified;

(E) Prevailing wage rates in the local area;

(F) Special skills or training; and

(G) Whether the parent is realistically able to earn imputed income.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b)(xi)(A)–(G); Wood v. Wood , 964 P.2d 1259, 1266–67 (Wyo. 1998).

[¶14] The district court heard testimony concerning most of these factors. Father never used his bachelor’s degree in education. He worked various jobs in his life, but worked in lawn care for the previous 12 years—initially with a friend, but soon after with Mother at Titan Lawn Care. He closed the business for various reasons, testifying that his new job allowed him to fully exercise visitation with his children. Mother argues Father could realistically earn more income by continuing to operate Titan Lawn Care. Yet the evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable to Father—indicates the business was failing, and Father could not independently revive a failing business and parent his four children as a single father. The court did not exceed the bounds of reason when, on this evidence, it found Father was not...