Edwards v. Griffin

• Decision Date: 10 March 1958
• Docket Number: No. 5-1483,5-1483
• Citation: 310 S.W.2d 798,228 Ark. 844
• Parties: J. G. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. Clyde GRIFFIN et al., Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 798

310 S.W.2d 798

228 Ark. 844

J. G. EDWARDS, Appellant, v. Clyde GRIFFIN et al., Appellee.

No. 5-1483.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

March 10, 1958.

S. M. Bone and Chas. F. Cole, Batesville, for appellant.

W. M. Thompson, Batesville, Erwin & Bengel, Newport, for appellee.

HARRIS, Chief Justice.

Dr. E. A. Gibbons, a non-resident, owned certain lands in Independence County. He died intestate in 1918, and was survived by his widow, Mrs. Mina Gibbons, and three children, Mrs. Marie Wanderscheid, Ralph Z. Gibbons and Cecil C. Gibbons. Mrs. Mina Gibbons had only a life estate in the property.

Appellee, Clyde Griffin, leased these lands from Mrs. Gibbons, for the term of five years, the lease to expire December 31, 1955, and later obtained another lease from Mrs. Gibbons which was to commence upon the expiration of the first lease, and was to run another five years, expiring December 31, 1960. Mrs. Gibbons died October 12, 1955. On March 17, 1956, Edwards purchased the lands from the remaindermen, and being unable to obtain possession of the property from Griffin and his sub-tenant, Barney Young, instituted suit in the Chancery Court asking that appellees be restrained and enjoined from interfering with his right to enter said lands. The case was transferred to Circuit Court, and after preliminary motions had been disposed of, proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellees for the possession of the property under the terms of the lease; judgment was accordingly entered, and from such judgment comes this appeal.

Appellant contends that, after the death of Mrs. Gibbons, the appellees became tenants by sufferance, or merely at will; contends that it was necessary that the lease, (executed in September, 1955, by Mrs. Gibbons) in order to remain in effect, be ratified in writing by the remaindermen, and that there was no written ratification of the lease by them; and finally, that appellees' defense falls within the statute of frauds.

Appellant moved for an instructed verdict at the conclusion of his evidence, adn at the conclusion of all the testimony, on the premise that the lease, being executed by a life tenant, became void and expired upon Mrs. Gibbons' death, and that appellees were thereafter tenants by sufferance, or at will; that the heirs had not given any lease, and that the testimony showed no ratification by any of them as to the lease executed by Mrs. Gibbons. Both motions were overruled by the court.

As stated in the Iowa case of Sanders v. Sutlive Bros. & Co., 163 Iowa 172, 143 N.W. 492, 494: ¹

'It is a general rule that upon the death of a tenant for life all interest of his lessee ceases. * * * the lessee has no greater rights than his lessor, and the estate held by him is subject to be defeated by the death of a tenant for life. * * * Upon the termination of the lease * * * in the absence of facts showing to the contrary, the further occupancy of the lessees with the consent of the owners would be assumed to be as tenants at will. * * * The presumption thus created is not a conclusive one, ² but it is subject to the met and overcome by proof that the parties had by their agreement or acts determined upon or recognized a different tenancy. * * *

'The lease under which appellants now claim the right of possession by its terms was to commence May 15, 1910. Before the arrival of that time the lessor was dead. Her estate in the property having been limited to her lifetime, no rights could be claimed by the lessees under such second lease, unless after the death of the lessor it was adopted by her heirs, ³ * * *. To ascertain the rights of the parties, we must therefore turn to the evidence, in its application to the question of adoption or acceptance of the contract of lease, and also as to the knowledge which the grantee in the deed had of the claim of Sutlive Bros.'

In the Sanders case, the court held the proof established that the lease had been ratified by the remaindermen. Accordingly, whether appellees were merely tenants at will depends upon the proof in this case. We agree with appellant that upon the death of Mrs. Gibbons, it became necessary that the remaindermen ratify the lease before appellees could successfully claim any rights thereunder. We also agree that oral ratification would not be sufficient. As stated in Vol. 36 Words and Phrases, Ratification, p. 131:

"Ratification' is equivalent to original authority, and, where a statute requires the original authority to be in writing, on principle the ratification must also be.'

It was not necessary, however, that the ratification be endorsed on the lease itself, but any writing, denoting recognition and approval, would amount to ratification. Allegany Gas Co., to Use of East Penn Development Co., v. Kemp, 316 Pa. 97, 174 A. 289.

After a study of the evidence, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the question of whether the lease had been ratified in writing. Appellant admitted that he received a letter from Cecil Gibbons, a son of Mrs. Mina Gibbons, on January 16, 1956, relative to a prior conference the two had had in regard to a sale of the land. The letter contains the following language:

'After our telephone conversation last Thursday, I again discussed selling our land in Independence County, Arkansas, to you with my brother and sister and our attorney, Mr. Frank Schwirtz of Bellevue, Iowa.

'As a result of this conference we agreed that we would sell the land to you for a cash payment of $30 an acre, subject to the existing lease now held by Mr. Clyde Griffin of Newark.

'The selling price would therefore be $10,720 subject to the lease held by Mr. Griffin, which would be assigned to you. In order that you will be fully informed as to the text of the lease, I am enclosing a copy thereof.

'I am sending copies of this letter to both Mr. Clyde Griffin and Mr. Barney Young so that each will be fully informed of our intentions. It is hoped that if you are still interested in buying the land at the above figure, a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out between you and the lessee, in order that the transaction can be completed. * * *'

Edwards says this was only an offer of sale, which he rejected, pointing out that the selling price offered in the letter was $10,720, whereas the sale was actually consummated for an agreed sum of $10,150. Gibbons also wrote a letter on the same date to Griffin, enclosing a copy of the letter to Edwards, and stating '* * * So if Mr. Edwards wants to buy and can work out the lease with you, we will let the land go.

'In the event that Edwards does not want to buy, we will probably place the land in some dealer's hands for sale, under the same conditions stated in Edwards' letter. * * *'

The deposition of Gibbons, taken by interrogatories, (the witness being in Rock Island, Illinois) was read to the jury. Gibbons stated that he received a reply from Edwards to his letter of January 16th, in which Edwards offered $10,160 for the land (which offer was later accepted), and that relative to the...