Edwards v. Kelley

• Decision Date: 26 August 2021
• Docket Number: No. 110116,110116
• Citation: 178 N.E.3d 55
• Parties: Linnie EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher M. KELLEY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

178 N.E.3d 55

Linnie EDWARDS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Christopher M. KELLEY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 110116

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 26, 2021

Richard E. Hackerd, Cleveland, for appellant.

Reminger Co., L.P.A., Andrew J. Dorman, and Aaren R. Host, Cleveland, for appellee.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

{¶ 1} Linnie Edwards appeals from a trial court decision granting judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of Christopher Kelley upon Edwards's legal malpractice claims. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

{¶ 2} In 2018, Edwards was sentenced to serve a one-year community control sanction for a felony of the fifth degree theft offense. State v. Edwards , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109104, 2020-Ohio-927, 2020 WL 1191093, ¶ 17. While under supervision, Edwards committed a petty theft offense in Franklin County that culminated with a charge for a misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Id. This case presents the ultimate question of whether Kelley, who represented Edwards in her community control violation hearing, should have objected to a 12-month sentence based on what Edwards claims to have exceeded the limitations of R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), eff. March 22, 2019. At the time, the legislature capped sentences on community control sanction violations to 90 days for a violation that either consists of a misdemeanor offense or is considered a technical violation. In her violation case, the 12-month term of imprisonment was reversed by the Edwards panel, resulting in Edwards serving 76 days beyond the 90-day cap before posting bond to stay application of the sentence during the appeal. Edwards at ¶ 21-22.

{¶ 3} Following the favorable decision, Edwards filed a legal malpractice action against Kelley claiming that an attorney-client relationship was created when the trial court appointed Kelley to represent her, Kelley breached that duty when he failed to know the relevant sentencing law and failed object to the trial court's sentence, and as a result of Kelley's breach, the sentence exceeded the maximum by 76 days. Krahn v. Kinney , 43 Ohio St.3d 103, 105, 538 N.E.2d 1058 (1989).

{¶ 4} In the proceedings below, Kelley focused on the technical violation aspect of the violation sentencing statute and claims that Edwards's conduct did not constitute a technical violation of her community control supervision, and therefore, he had no obligation to object to the sentence. According to Kelley, the misdemeanor offense was not the only violation considered at the hearing — a matter that could be determined from the transcript of that proceeding that is not part of the record.¹

{¶ 5} As part of this appeal, Edwards claims that the Edwards panel concluded that her conduct constituted a nontechnical violation of the conditions of her community control. Id. at ¶ 17. The Edwards panel never reached that conclusion, however, expressly stating that "we need not consider whether appellant's failure to appear for the April 3, 2019 probation violation hearing constitutes a ‘technical’ violation of community control" because the offense Edwards committed while on community control was a misdemeanor. Id. at ¶ 18, citing R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), eff. March 22, 2019. R.C. 2929.15(B)(1)(c)(i), in effect at the time of Edwards's violation, provided that

[i]f the prison term is imposed for any technical violation of the conditions of a community control sanction imposed for a felony of the fifth degree or for any violation of law committed while under a community control sanction imposed for such a felony that consists of a new criminal offense and that is not a felony, the prison term shall not exceed ninety days.²

Thus, the statute then provided two possible avenues for the offender to limit the sentencing exposure for community control violations. Edwards at ¶ 18. If the violation was either based on a technical violation of the terms of the community control or based on the commission of a misdemeanor offense, the sentence imposed on the violation could not exceed 90 days. According to the Edwards panel, the only violation considered during the community control violation hearing was the commission of the misdemeanor offense, and as a matter of law, the sentence for such a violation was statutorily capped at 90 days. Id. at ¶ 6.

{¶ 6} According to Kelley, Edwards misrepresented the basis of the community control violation in Edwards , and the violation was actually based on Edwards's systemically failing to abide by the terms of the community control sanction, and such conduct was not a technical violation triggering the 90-day sentencing limitation. In answering the malpractice complaint, Kelley attached several documents to his answer and counterclaim, including the docket and several journal entries from Edwards's criminal case. The trial court considered the materials, over Edwards's objection, and concluded that

The plaintiff's claim before the court is very narrow and can be decided as a matter of law on the pleadings and the record of the underlying criminal case. Defendant Kelley represented plaintiff Edwards for a probation violation after the plaintiff Edwards failed to report to probation for four months, failed to appear for a probation violation hearing, resulting in the trial court issuing a capias, and where plaintiff was convicted of a subsequent crime. The court finds that the totality of the circumstances that led to plaintiff [Edwards's] sentence was non-technical.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Kelley was entitled to a judgment in his favor after construing the evidence presented in the answer. The transcript from the community control violation hearing is not part of this record and, therefore, was not considered by the trial court.

{¶ 7} Civ.R. 12(C) states that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Because Civ.R. 12(C) motions test the legal basis for the claims asserted in a complaint, the appellate standard of review is de novo. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious , 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). Determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is restricted solely to the allegations in the complaint and answer, as well as any material attached as exhibits to those pleadings. Id. ; State ex rel. Montgomery v. Purchase Plus Buyer's Group, Inc. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1073, 2002-Ohio-2014, 2002 WL 723707.

{¶ 8} " Civ.R. 12(C) motions are specifically for resolving questions of law[,]" such as application of the statute of limitations affirmative defenses that appear on the face of the complaint or personal jurisdiction issues. Whaley v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 92 Ohio St.3d 574, 581, 752 N.E.2d 267 (2001), citing Nelson v. Pleasant , 73 Ohio App.3d 479, 482, 597 N.E.2d 1137 (4th Dist.1991), and Gawloski v. Miller Brewing Co. , 96 Ohio App.3d 160, 163, 644 N.E.2d 731 (9th Dist.1994). Under Civ.R. 12(C), matters outside the pleading cannot be considered because such motions are restricted to considering only the allegations contained within the four corners of the pleadings. Peterson v. Teodosio , 34 Ohio St.2d 161, 166, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973) ; Mendoza v. Seger , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1071, 2019-Ohio-4284, 2019 WL 5295405, ¶ 18, citing Kuhn v. Schmidt Bros., Inc. , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1235, 2008-Ohio-1567, 2008 WL 853546, ¶ 10, and Piersant v. Bryngelson , 61 Ohio App.3d 359, 362, 572 N.E.2d 800 (8th Dist.1989).

{¶ 9} The trial court, in this case, considered the evidence of Edwards's criminal proceedings because Kelley attached the court records to his answer, including the docket in the underlying criminal case; the August 6, 2019 journal entry sentencing appellant to 12 months; the March 11, 2019 journal entry setting appellant's first probation violation hearing; and the March 11, 2019 extension of appellant's probation. Attaching court documents to an answer, however, does not circumvent the limitation to solely reviewing the pleadings. The term "pleadings" as contemplated under Civ.R. 12(C) is expressly defined to consist of the complaint and answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, and a third-party complaint and an answer. State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted , 154 Ohio St.3d 60, 2018-Ohio-3361, 110 N.E.3d 1275, ¶ 17, citing Civ.R. 7(A). Under Civ.R. 10(C), a "written instrument" attached to a complaint or answer also qualifies as part of the pleadings; however, not every document attached to a pleading constitutes a written instrument. Id. " ‘Written instrument’ has primarily been interpreted to include documents that evidence the parties’ rights and obligations, such as negotiable instruments, ‘insurance policies, leases, deeds, promissory notes, and contracts.’ " Id. , citing Inskeep v. Burton , 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2007 CA 11, 2008-Ohio-1982, 2008 WL 1838343, ¶ 17, and 1 Klein & Darling, Baldwin's Ohio Practice 744-745 (2004). The documentary evidence from Edwards's criminal case is not a "written instrument" that may be properly considered as part of the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C).

{¶ 10} Further, a court cannot take judicial notice of evidence that cannot be considered under Civ.R. 12(C). Taking judicial notice of documentary evidence upon which the defendants’ defenses are predicated does not obviate the limitation to what can be considered under Civ.R. 12(C). If a trial court could simply take judicial notice of evidence the defendants cannot rely upon within a Civ.R. 12 motion, such a practice would indelibly nullify the limitations of considering only that which is contained in the pleadings.

{¶ 11} At one time, the type of documents that could be attached to pleadings and considered under Civ.R. 12(C) was more fluid. Panels routinely accepted court filings or...