Edwards v. People

• Citation: 129 P.3d 977
• Decision Date: 13 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04SC565.,04SC565.
• Parties: William EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 977

129 P.3d 977

William EDWARDS, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

No. 04SC565.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

February 13, 2006.

Rehearing Denied March 20, 2006.^*

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Alan Kratz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Petitioner.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Laurie A. Booras, First Assistant Attorney General Appellate Division, Criminal Justice Section, Denver, for Respondent.

BENDER, Justice.

I. Introduction

We review and affirm the court of appeals' decision in People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo.App.2004), which held that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), does not apply retroactively to cases involving postconviction proceedings that concern convictions finalized prior to Crawford.

Edwards initiated postconviction proceedings to vacate his felony conviction, which was finalized before the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford. The Court rendered the Crawford decision while Edwards's postconviction proceedings were pending. This case established that testimonial¹ out-of-court statements are a violation of the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had a previous opportunity to adequately cross-examine the witness. Because Edwards had had no opportunity to cross-examine a key witness whose statements were admitted at trial under various hearsay exceptions, he seeks to vacate his conviction on grounds that include the violation of his confrontation rights under Crawford.²

Generally, new rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. However, the United States Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), outlines two exceptions to this general rule. We hold that Crawford is a new rule of criminal procedure and adopt the Teague test. We analyze Crawford under the second Teague exception, which allows for retroactive application of a rule if it constitutes a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure. Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. To be considered watershed, a rule must meet two criteria: (1) "[i]nfringement of the rule must seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction;" and (2) "the rule must alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has identified only one rule as watershed: the holding in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which recognizes a criminal defendant's right to counsel in cases that involve a possible prison sentence. Because the Crawford holding does not alter fundamental due process rights to the extent that the Gideon guarantee of right to counsel does, we hold that, under current United States Supreme Court precedent, Crawford does not qualify as a watershed rule.

We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision that Crawford does not apply retroactively to cases involving postconviction proceedings that concern convictions finalized prior to Crawford.

II. Facts and Proceedings Below

Police forced William Edwards, petitioner and defendant below, to halt his vehicle when he failed to pull over for a traffic stop. As the police addressed Edwards, a passenger, who appeared to have been beaten, emerged from Edwards's car yelling, "He beat me. He beat me." Later, during the victim's treatment for her injuries, she told attending medical personnel that she had been assaulted.

The prosecution could not locate the victim to testify at trial; but the trial court admitted her statements to the police under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, CRE 803(2). The trial court also admitted the victim's statements to medical personnel, relying on the medical diagnosis and business records exceptions to the hearsay rule — CRE 803(4) and (6), respectively. A jury convicted Edwards of first-degree assault with a deadly weapon, and a judge subsequently convicted him of habitual criminal counts.

Edwards's conviction was affirmed in a direct appeal on issues unrelated to our inquiry, and this court denied certiorari on the case. People v. Edwards, 971 P.2d 1080 (Colo.App.1998), cert. denied, May 10, 1999. Edwards then filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion to vacate judgment of conviction, in which he argued, among other issues, that he was denied his constitutional right to confront the victim as a witness against him. The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, in an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals remanded the case with directions for the trial court to address the confrontation issue. The trial court ruled that Edwards's constitutional rights of confrontation were protected through the hearsay rule exceptions. While Edwards's appeal of that ruling was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Crawford, which held that testimonial out-of-court statements are a violation of the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and the defendant had a previous opportunity to adequately cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.

The court of appeals, relying on Teague, held that Crawford did not apply retroactively to Edwards's case. Edwards, 101 P.3d at 1124. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals reasoned that the holding in Crawford announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, and thus was not applicable retroactively unless it fit one of two exceptions outlined in Teague. Id. at 1121-22. The court of appeals analyzed the rule under Teague's second exception — the watershed exception. The court of appeals held that the Crawford rule is not a watershed rule and, therefore, does not apply to Edwards. Id. at 1124.

Edwards now petitions this court on certiorari to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. He argues that Crawford should apply retroactively to his conviction for several reasons: (1) Crawford did not announce a new rule of criminal procedure; (2) the court of appeals erred in applying the Teague retroactivity test because it has not yet been adopted by this court; and (3) if Teague is the applicable test, Crawford nonetheless constitutes a watershed rule of criminal procedure and thus is retroactively applicable.

III. Analysis

The sole issue we address in this case is whether Crawford applies retroactively to convictions finalized before that decision. Generally, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). However, the United States Supreme Court has set forth exceptions to this general rule. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. In order to ascertain whether Crawford applies retroactively, we begin our analysis with an overview of Crawford and its constitutional underpinnings. We then establish which test controls the decision whether the rule announced in Crawford applies retroactively. Finally, we analyze the Crawford rule under the applicable test. To do so, we must make a series of determinations: (1) whether Crawford announces a procedural rule; (2) whether that rule is new; and (3) if the Crawford holding does amount to a new rule of criminal procedure, whether it constitutes a "watershed" rule. We turn now to the Sixth Amendment.

A. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. Const. amend. VI; Gonsoir v. People, 793 P.2d 1165, 1165 n. 2 (Colo.1990) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)).³ In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the Confrontation Clause is principally directed toward controlling the admission of "ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused." 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In order to discuss Crawford's impact on Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, we must first consider its predecessor.

Prior to Crawford, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), was the controlling case outlining the elements needed to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. In Roberts, the United States Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause required that, in order for a witness's prior statement to be admitted at trial, the witness must be deemed unavailable to testify and the statement must bear "adequate indicia of reliability." Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court determined that hearsay evidence could be considered adequately reliable if it "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." Id.

In Crawford, the Supreme Court revised the criteria under which testimonial out-of-court statements may be admitted at trial when the witness who made the statements does not testify. Crawford involved a wife who refused to testify against her husband under marital privilege. 541 U.S. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. As a result, the prosecution sought to have her earlier statement to police admitted at trial under a hearsay exception. Id. The Court held that the Confrontation Clause requires out-of-court testimonial statements by witnesses to be barred from use at trial unless the witness "was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Referencing the Roberts requirement for adequate reliability, the Court explained that the only constitutionally adequate indication of reliability for testimonial statements is confrontation, as the Constitution requ...